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Introducing the study
In June 2011, the Dutch Council of State affirmed the decision that the young 
asylum seeker Mauro Manuel should leave the Netherlands and return to his 
biological mother in his country of origin, Angola. By that time Mauro had been 
living in the Netherlands for eight years, since the age of ten. He had built up a 
happy life with a Dutch foster family who supported his request to stay in the 
Netherlands and wanted to adopt him. After many years of asylum procedures, 
the final decision of the Council of State was a motivation for Mauro, his foster 
parents, his lawyer and the children’s rights organization ‘Defence for Children’ 
to seek media attention for his case. In the autumn of 2011, Mauro’s impending 
repatriation made headlines in the Dutch media for weeks. On social media 
there was a peak of attention for Mauro’s case as well: an online petition raised 
over 60,000 signatures and the Twitter hashtag #Mauromoetblijven (English: 
‘#Mauroshouldstay’) became trending.
While some media reports were critical toward his asylum request, support 
for Mauro dominated in traditional media as well as social media (Dekker & 
Scholten 2015). The media coverage in favor of Mauro’s asylum request was 
indicative of the political climate at that time. Repatriation of young asylum 
seekers who had been residing in the Netherlands for many years was already 
a politically contested subject. Before Mauro’s case became public, two 
members of parliament had been drafting a private member’s bill to change 
the Dutch asylum act in order to grant these children asylum based on their 
length of stay.
After a political struggle in the government coalition, the responsible 
Minister Gerd Leers decided to grant Mauro a temporary study visa. This was 
not the outcome Mauro and his family had hoped for, but the decision of the 
Council of State was at least off the table. Stakeholders agree that without the 
media attention for his case, Mauro would not have been able to stay in the 
Netherlands (Argos TV Medialogica 2012). Media coverage of the case was a 
factor that Minister Leers and policymakers at his department had to reckon 
with. As the Minister commented on the case of Mauro in the opinion pages 
of a local newspaper:
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‘opportunities to consider various solutions and public support for these solutions 
are influenced by how media portray the issue and influence public opinion. It is very 
easy to ‘frame’ an image that disregards the sensitivities that are dealt with in our 
policy domain. […] My discretionary power has been limited by the public attention 
that the media devoted to this case.’1
Public and political support for a general amnesty provision for asylum 
children (Dutch: ‘Kinderpardon’) grew after the media coverage of Mauro’s 
case. A year later, the new government coalition agreed on such a ‘pardon for 
children’ regulation. Asylum children are now considered to be ‘rooted’ after 
five years of stay in the Netherlands and are granted a permanent residence 
permit on that basis. This regulation came into force in early 2013 and Mauro 
was among the first young asylum seekers to be granted a permit under this 
new policy.
The case of Mauro is a clear example of how media coverage of policy-related 
issues can feed back into policymaking and eventually result in policy change. 
The policy field of immigration and migrant integration is publicly and politi-
cally controversial in many Western democracies. Immigration concerns the 
admission of immigrants to a nation-state, while migrant integration con-
cerns the subsequent incorporation of immigrants into the receiving society. 
There are many different views on related issues and appropriate courses of 
action, and these are often debated in the media. Historically, the Netherlands 
has witnessed multiple cases of media debate on immigration issues that 
influenced policies (Bonjour & Schrover 2015). Furthermore, cases similar 
to Mauro have occurred in many Western European countries, for example 
the Norwegian case of ‘Maria Amelie’ (Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud 2014). Not only 
1 Minister Leers on media attention for Mauro’s case in ‘Eindhovens Dagblad’, 12 October 2011. 
Original quotation: ’de ruimte en het draagvlak voor oplossingen worden mede bepaald door 
de wijze waarop de media de beeldvorming voeden. Het is zo gemakkelijk een beeld te ‘framen’ 
dat voorbij gaat aan de fragiele balans die op dit terrein aan de orde is. […] De mogelijkheid tot 
inzet van de discretionaire bevoegdheid is – door de openheid die de media daarover zelf hebben 
afgedwongen – stevig geconditioneerd.’
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media coverage of immigration and integration issues is characterized by 
a multiplicity of issue interpretations or ‘frames’. Also the policy agenda of 
this domain regularly undergoes major and minor changes. That makes this 
particular policy domain a suitable case to study the role of media in policy-
making.
In this introductory chapter I first provide theoretical background to the 
study introduced here. In this section, the theoretical and societal relevance 
of this research is outlined and the three central research themes that are 
addressed in this dissertation are introduced (Section 1.2). Next, the research 
aim and questions are introduced (Section 1.3), and in the following section 
(1.4) I offer a general introduction to the ontology and epistemology em-
ployed in this research. The final section of this chapter presents an outline of 
this dissertation that clarifies how the empirical chapters address the various 
research questions (Section 1.5).
Theoretical background and relevance
Media report on issues related to public policies on a daily basis. How exten-
sively and in what ways they report on policy issues provides an important 
form of feedback to processes of public policymaking (Wolfe et al. 2013). Me-
dia reports can provide new information on the development of policy issues 
and the effects of policy measures. Regarding immigration and migrant inte-
gration, the media for example report on issues related to irregular migration 
or the results of local integration measures. As such, media coverage is a form 
of information by which policies are informed, in addition to for example of-
ficial statistics, expert advice and stakeholder lobbying. In the policy process, 
policymakers weigh this information and act upon it by devoting attention 
to certain issues and issue frames over others (Cobb & Elder 1981; Kingdon 
1984; Baumgartner & Jones 1993).
In addition to being an important source of information on policy issues 
themselves, media coverage informs policymakers on how issues are per-
ceived by members of the public (Herbst 1998). By reporting on these issues, 
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media communicate a certain issue interpretation or ‘frame’. Frames describe 
policy issues in terms of a specific problem definition, causal rationale, 
proposed solution and target group (Entman 1993: 52; Rein & Schön 1993: 
146). They are social constructions of the issue at hand which resonate with 
broader cultural frames of reference in society. (Davis 2007; 2009). The media 
have become a major channel of communication linking the public to the 
institutions and individuals by which they are governed (Kennamer 1992: 2). 
By communicating public opinion to the government representatives, media 
act as bearers of the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1962; Cobb & Elder 1972). 
Media coverage is both formed by and formative of public opinion in society 
(Soroka 2002b). Media thus have a direct effect on the policy agenda as well 
as an indirect effect through processes of public agenda-setting (Dearing & 
Rogers 1996: 74). Studies indicate that media coverage does not represent the 
‘public agenda’ in many respects. Media coverage is produced by professional 
organizations that operate according to a certain logic of selecting and fram-
ing issues (Altheide & Snow 1979; Harcup & O’Neill 2001), which leads them 
to represent certain issues and issue frames over others.
Policymakers have various motivations to be responsive to media cover-
age as a source of information on issue salience and framing. Firstly, there 
is the normative incentive of democratic legitimacy. Media inform govern-
ment representatives about the priorities and preferences of the citizens on 
whose behalf they are acting. Secondly, policymakers are responsive to media 
attention from a more rational concern of preventing public reprisals in the 
form of protests and electoral loss (Brooks & Manza 2006). When citizens 
feel ill-represented, they may revolt and strive for better representation. The 
publicity of the issue and related government (in)action forces a response. 
According to Davis (2009), policymaking activities have become characterized 
by ‘media-reflexivity’. Policymakers not only respond to media coverage once 
it emerges, but continuously anticipate how their decisions will be portrayed 
in the media. Policymakers adapt to how the media operate. This characteris-
tic of policymakers’ behavior has, on an institutional level, been linked to the 
‘mediatization’ of governance (Hajer 2009; Schillemans 2012; Thorbjørnsrud 
et al. 2014).
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To what extent and how media coverage of policy issues influences the 
policy agenda is a question that pertains to agenda-setting and framing 
theory. Agenda-setting or agenda building theory asserts that media can put 
issues on the policy agenda (Cobb & Elder 1972; Kingdon 1984; Baumgart-
ner & Jones 1993; Dearing & Rogers 1996; Jones & Baumgartner 2005). 
This theory analyzes the quantity of media attention as a measure of issue 
salience. The effect of specific issue frames is explained by framing theory. 
While agenda-setting and framing are sometimes described as two distinct ef-
fects and theories (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007), other scholars see them as 
integrated processes (McCombs & Ghanem 2001; Baumgartner & Jones 1993). 
This study departs from the latter interpretation. Media attention for policy 
issues is never neutral, but always inhabits a certain issue frame. The same is 
true for the representation of issues on the policy agenda.
The original agenda-setting hypothesis contends that when media report 
on a certain policy issue extensively, the policy agenda will consequently attri-
bute more salience to that issue. Empirical studies generally agree that there 
is an effect of the media agenda on the policy agenda (Baumgartner & Jones 
1993; Soroka 2002b; Yanovitzki 2002; Tan & Weaver 2009; Korthagen 2011; 
Melenhorst 2015). However, studies come to different conclusions regarding 
the strength of this effect as they study different versions of the policy agenda, 
different measures of media coverage and different types of media. Theories 
on policy agenda-setting and framing by the media attempt to explain these 
diverging responses. Related research has insufficiently brought together 
insights from different disciplines, including political communication and 
policy studies (Wolfe et al. 2013). Fairly independent research traditions have 
developed within each discipline. As a result, it is yet unclear how findings on 
media effects are generalizable to other types of agendas (the public agenda, 
the political agenda and the policy agenda) and how effects on different agen-
das may be steered by different mechanisms. In this dissertation, I will study 
policy agenda-setting and framing by combining theories from these various 
research traditions to contribute to a more interdisciplinary understanding of 
policy agenda-setting processes. 
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Recent studies suggest that it is not only the quantity of media attention 
that matters, but that other aspects of media coverage and the policy agenda 
play a role as well. Furthermore, it is argued that media are not ‘almighty 
agenda setters’, but that actors receiving media information respond differ-
ently to various sources and types of media coverage (Walgrave & Van Aelst 
2006). This means that we should go beyond a model of agenda-setting in 
which media are conceptualized as agents pursuing agenda change and the 
policy agenda is portrayed as a passive recipient undergoing this influence. 
We can come to a better understanding of policy agenda-setting when we take 
into account multiple qualities of media coverage and when we conceptualize 
the reception of media information on the policy agenda an active process of 
sense-making and consideration by policymakers and institutions. 
In this study, I therefore choose to apply a feedback model of policy agenda-
setting (cf. Nowak 2013; Wolfe et al. 2013). While such a feedback model 
has been theoretically outlined in the literature, by my knowledge it has not 
been operationalized and applied in empirical studies so far. This feedback 
model goes beyond a quantitative measurement of agenda-setting effects 
and includes factors related to the media coverage that is sending the policy 
feedback, as well as factors related to the policy domain that is receiving this 
feedback. Furthermore, it assumes reciprocal exchanges between media and 
the policy agenda. I also pay attention to agenda-setting effects of social media 
which have expanded the media landscape by directly communicating ‘user-
generated content’. By conceptualizing policy agenda-setting as complex feed-
back processes and taking into account both aspects of sending and receiving 
feedback, I aim to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the role of 
media in policy agenda-setting processes. This dissertation addresses three 
research themes related to this feedback model which I will outline below.
Grasping the substantive policy agenda
The policy agenda is not a straightforward and tangible agenda that can be 
looked up in archives and studied as such. Instead, the term is used meta-
phorically. It is often defined very generally, for example by Kingdon (1984: 3) 
as: ‘a list of problems to which government officials, and those associated with 
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government, are paying serious attention’. Birkland also defined the policy 
agenda in very general terms, but his definition elaborates different elements 
of issues that appear on the policy agenda: ‘a collection of problems, under-
standings of causes, symbols, solutions, and other elements of public problems 
that come to the attention of members of the public and their governmental 
officials.’ (Birkland 2011: 106). This definition suggests that the policy agenda 
not only entails a prioritization of issues, but that it includes issue frames as 
well. Policy agendas exist on all levels of government and in different forms. 
The policy agenda can be as concrete as a list of bills in the legislative process, 
but it can also be an abstract set of ideas regarding the issues to be addressed 
by government institutions. Furthermore, the political agenda – for example 
the parliamentary agenda or agendas of political parties – can be considered 
a central part of the policymaking process, but it can also be seen as distinct 
from the policy agenda.
The broad definition of the policy agenda leaves room for different op-
erationalizations in research. The influence of media coverage on the policy 
agenda depends on the type of policy agenda that is under scrutiny. Cobb 
and Elder (1972: 85-86) and Pritchard and Berkowitz (1993: 86) make a 
similar, important distinction between a ‘systemic’ or ‘symbolic’ agenda and 
a ‘substantive’, ‘institutional’, ‘executive’ or ‘resource’ agenda. The systemic or 
symbolic agenda consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by mem-
bers of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving 
matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority 
(Cobb & Elder 1972: 85). A subset of the symbolic agenda is the substantive 
agenda. Issues on the substantive agenda are explicitly under the active and 
serious consideration of authoritative decision-makers. They are addressed 
with substantive action on the part of policymakers, including the alloca-
tion and re-allocation of government resources. In this study, I distinguish 
between the political agenda as a symbolic agenda and the policy agenda as 
substantive agenda.
Not all issues will reach the substantive agenda (Birkland 2011: 108). It is 
generally easier to establish an effect of media on the symbolic policy agenda 
than on the substantive policy agenda. This is the case because changes on the 
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symbolic agenda do not necessarily entail substantive personal or financial 
investment. The symbolic, political agenda indeed constitutes an important 
aspect of democratic representation and sometimes is a precursor of substan-
tive policy change. However, rhetorical actions are not always substantialized 
on the executive agenda as for example policy amendments or budgetary 
changes (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). It is, therefore, important to under-
stand how media coverage permeates into further stages of the policymaking 
process in which the policy agenda becomes substantive: an executive or 
resource agenda that directly affects policy implementation.
Changes to the substantive policy agenda require significant engagement 
and resources and are therefore relatively scarce in comparison to changes to 
the political agenda. Furthermore, effects of media on the substantive policy 
agenda are more difficult to observe as they are less direct and require a lon-
ger time period. The ‘attention cycle’ of the media is relatively short compared 
to the more incremental workings of the policy process (Downs 1972; Dear-
ing & Rogers 1996; Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). Media-effects are not always 
discernable, especially in cases where no policy change occurs. Yet even when 
changes to the policy agenda correspond with changes in media coverage, it 
is difficult to isolate a media effect from other sources influencing the policy 
agenda, or to establish the direction of causality.
Most studies analyzing the impact of media coverage on the policy agenda 
therefore address the impact on the symbolic political agenda, which is 
operationalized as the parliamentary or congressional agenda including 
questions and debates, or the agendas of members of parliament (MPs) or 
political parties (Van Aelst et al. 2014: 215). Further effects on the substantive 
policy agenda are important to study as it entails change in actual policy. This 
research therefore focuses on the substantive policy agenda and aims to get a 
grip on this agenda by concentrating on the issue agenda of one specific policy 
domain: immigration and integration. Section 1.4 will further elaborate the 
choice of this policy agenda as a case in this research. I analyze how the sub-
stantive policy agenda has evolved on a local and national level, how changes 
to this agenda take shape, and how various external factors play a role in this.
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Qualitative aspects of policy agenda-setting by the media
The original agenda-setting hypothesis assumes a correspondence between the 
media and policy agenda in terms of issue salience. This means that the atten-
tion devoted to issues in the media influences the prioritization of issues on the 
policy agenda. However, studies come to different conclusions with regard to 
the strength of this policy agenda-setting effect (Nowak 2013). To explain such 
varying conclusions, scholars propose to take a more comprehensive approach 
to this media influence. We should not only focus on quantitative measures of 
media attention, but also on qualitative aspects of media coverage including 
issue frames (Eilders 2000: 182; Yanovitzki 2002: 445; Walgrave & Van Aelst 
2006; Wolfe et al. 2013). Political agenda-setting studies indicate that agendas 
are selectively responsive to different types of information and that framing 
of media coverage is an important determinant of whether media coverage is 
taken into account (Green-Pedersen & Stubager 2010; Vliegenthart & Walgrave 
2011; Van der Pas 2014).
Frames in media coverage are structured by ‘media logic’. This entails cer-
tain common patterns in how media select and communicate their message 
(Altheide & Snow 1979: 10). Media logic results from different – sometimes 
opposing – values and standards. On the one hand, these include journalistic 
norms of covering issues that are relevant to the general public and balanced 
and adversarial coverage of issues. On the other hand, these include the com-
mercial values of attracting a large (paying) audience and selling advertise-
ment space. Media coverage thus not only communicates a measure of issue 
salience, but also of issue framing which makes for an important additional 
topic of study.
A central aspect of framing and explicit ways in which frames are com-
municated in media coverage are ‘framing practices and devices’. These are 
rhetorical and visual practices that concisely communicate a larger frame by 
appealing to pre-existing interpretive schemata among audiences (Gamson & 
Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2006: 83). Common examples taken into account 
in this study include the use of metaphors, catchphrases, examples, visual 
images and statistics (Edelman 1964; Stone 1988). A well-known example of a 
framing device that was used in the case of Mauro was a close-up photograph 
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of Mauro’s tears, taken during a public manifestation by press photographer 
Koen van Weel. This photo was published and abundantly shared in the media, 
and became an important expression of the frame supporting Mauro’s case.
Framing is not a practice that is exclusive to media, but is also present in day 
to day communication and in policies. Media coverage is influenced by fram-
ing practices of various policy actors (Bennett 1990; Entman 2003a). Frames 
in media coverage should therefore not be situated outside and independent 
of the policy process (Cook 2006; Korthagen 2015a). Rather, media frames are 
supported by policy actors in society and in the government itself (D’Angelo & 
Kuypers 2010). In Schattschneider’s terms (1960), media function as venues 
for the ‘mobilization of bias’ in favor of policy alternatives. This is often initi-
ated after a ‘focusing event’. Focusing events are sudden, relatively rare events 
that spark intense media attention and public attention (Birkland 2011:116; 
Birkland 1998). Actors use events as opportunities to start pushing for alter-
native issues and issue frames in the media. ‘Going public’ with issues and 
issue frames can be a strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs to influence 
the policymaking process beyond engaging in routine institutional procedures 
(Voltmer & Koch-Baumgartner 2010: 8). Some policy entrepreneurs will frame 
focusing events as evidence for the success of current policies and the need to 
sustain them (negative feedback). Others will frame focusing events to contest 
current policies and push for policy change (positive feedback) (Wolfe et al. 
2013: 181; Baumgartner & Jones 2002). In the latter process, focusing events 
create ‘windows of opportunity’ for changes on the policy agenda (Kingdon 
1984).
This second research theme leads me to focus on qualitative aspects of me-
dia coverage in policy agenda-setting processes. I study how issue attention in 
association with issue framing in media coverage corresponds with changes 
on the policy agenda. An additional topic of study is how media coverage is in-
fluenced by various policy entrepreneurs who aim to promote certain issues 
and issue frames, and aim to minimalize attention for others. I pay attention 
to framing practices that are used to fit media logic and to communicate a 
larger frame. I distinguish a number of policy entrepreneurs within the policy 
domain of immigration who regularly contribute to media coverage and ana-
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lyze how various framing practices fit their aims of delivering positive and 
negative feedback toward the policy frame.
Responsiveness to social media
Studies on policy agenda-setting have almost exclusively focused on traditional 
media, also referred to as ‘mass media’ or ‘broadcast media’. Traditional media 
coverage is produced by news organizations consisting of an editorial board 
and a team of journalists. They broadcast their coverage to relatively large 
publics of media consumers. Traditional media thus function on a ‘one-to-many’ 
basis and maintain a clear distinction between media producers and consumers 
(Lievrouw & Livingstone 2002). Examples of traditional media are television 
news broadcasts, national and local newspapers and opinion magazines. Also 
news websites and editorial blogs publishing news articles online can, by this 
definition, be considered part of traditional media. Scholars generally agree 
that the policy agenda is responsive to this type of media (Cook 1998; Hajer 
2009; Thorbjørnsrud et al. 2014; Schillemans & Pierre 2016). Many government 
organizations have a public relations department that provides policymakers 
with a selection of relevant news reports on a daily basis. In some cases, but not 
in all, policy processes act upon this source of information.
Hand in hand with developments in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs), a second type of media has emerged more recently: 
social media. Sharing ‘user-generated content’ on a ‘many-to-many’ basis are 
the key characteristics of social media. In this type of media, the distinction 
between producers and consumers of information has become blurred. Social 
media applications allow users to be creators and users of information at the 
same time. This is notably different from traditional media and also from early 
years of consumer internet. The technological infrastructure of Web 2.0 and 
the commercial companies that are marketing social media platforms facili-
tate these new modes of news production and exchange (Kaplan & Haenlein 
2010). Examples of social media are social network sites, virtual communities 
and forums, blogs and microblogs, picture-sharing and video-sharing sites. 
Today, they have acquired a stable position in the Dutch media landscape 
(Bakker & Scholten 2014). Traditional and social media have also become 
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increasingly intertwined. Many traditional media now offer opportunities to 
leave an online review or have an additional Facebook page or Twitter ac-
count that allows users to share and respond to publications.
Fitting a broader trend from broadcasting to narrowcasting, social media 
are primarily organized according to shared interests (Haythornthwaite 
2005: 140; Boyd & Ellison 2008: 219). For example, various online venues exist 
including individuals sharing certain hobbies, problems or preferences (cf. De 
Koster 2010). They provide opportunities to communicate with others beyond 
one’s personal network of social ties. As such, social media constitute a hybrid 
form between interpersonal and mass communication. In the first instance, 
the audience that social media reach may be relatively small, but by the ample 
opportunities for sharing, information can quickly reach and potentially mo-
bilize larger publics (Bekkers et al. 2011). This way, information that is shared 
on social media can create an ‘inflammatory’ situation for policymakers, as it 
is rather unpredictable what information will eventually pose a challenge for 
current policies (Ibid.). Policymakers’ responsiveness to this type of media is 
less institutionalized and may differ from their responsiveness to traditional 
media. Policymakers’ responsiveness to social media may be challenged by 
access to social media, but also by policymakers’ understanding and interpre-
tation of it.
Social media are able to play a distinct role in processes of policy agenda-
setting. Traditional news organizations fulfil a gatekeeping role in determining 
the amount of attention and framing that traditional media devote to certain 
issues. Based on a set of news values and their media logic, these organiza-
tions determine what makes today’s news from the huge flow of information 
available to them (Altheide & Snow 1979; Harcup & O’Neill 2001). Informa-
tion coming from societal elites or ‘strong public spheres’ (Fraser 1992) is 
more likely to get published. Therefore, traditional media do not represent 
all groups in society on an equal basis (D’Angelo & Kuypers 2010; Ihlen et al. 
2015). More specifically, they represent mainstream society while alternative 
voices and minority groups – including immigrants and ethnic minorities – 
are ill-represented in these mainstream media (cf. Studlar & Layton-Henry 
1990; Fraser 1992; Dahlberg 2001; Mehra et al. 2004; Albrecht 2006). This is 
Introduction 27
problematic, especially when these minorities are the subject of media cover-
age, which is the case with coverage of immigration and integration issues.
Social media are seen as a promising venue for the creation of ‘subaltern’ 
public spheres (Fraser 1992). The networked infrastructure of many-to-many 
communication lowers the threshold for participating in and contributing to 
media debate. Even though Habermas never identified the web as an ideal 
platform for a public sphere, many other scholars have done so (cf. Dahlgren 
2009: 158). Dahlgren (2005: 151) for example refers to the internet as the 
‘vanguard’ of the public sphere. Several scholars have tempered such ‘cyber 
optimism’ (but also ‘cyber pessimism’) with empirical accounts of the role of 
social media in democratic processes (Mergel & Bretschneider 2013; Ellison & 
Hardey 2014). These studies indicate that social media bring new opportuni-
ties for as well as new challenges to democratic communication.
While social media content may not behave according to the same news 
values and media logic of media organizations, they are also subject to a 
certain media logic. Social media platforms are developed by commercial 
companies as well and the technological design of the medium and the net-
worked infrastructure it creates, limits and structures the information that 
is shared on social media (Van Dijck 2013). Also within specific social media 
venues, a certain culture and identity is created that normatively delimits the 
types of issues that can be discussed and spectrum of opinions that is deemed 
acceptable (Wilson & Peterson 2002). We should therefore be wary of seeing 
social media as free and neutral platforms for discussion.
Two particular issues related to social media and agenda-setting will be 
addressed in this dissertation. Firstly, the issue of how ethnic minorities use 
social media. Are they creating online venues constituting subaltern ‘intra-
ethnic’ public spheres which may function as a platform for micro-mobilization 
(cf. Bekkers et al. 2011)? And do they bring a different array of issues and issue 
frames to the attention of policymakers? Second, it is relevant to study whether 
policymakers are responsive to social media to the same degree as they are 
responsive to traditional media. There must be a structural link between 
online communicative spaces and the centers of decision-making to facilitate 
processes of agenda-setting and feedback (Dahlgren 2001). As Cook (2006) 
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argues, we should study the full range of news outlets instead of concentrating 
only on mainstream elite media. It is yet to be seen whether policymakers are 
responsive to information that is communicated via these platforms.
Relevance and contribution
The policy process has been mediatized since media have become a primary 
channel by which information is exchanged between citizens and  government 
officials (Strömback 2008: 230). Media are not merely channels of communi-
cation – as the term would suggest. Media have an effect on the information 
that they mediate by selecting and framing the information according to 
media logic. According to McLuhan (1964: 90), the medium ‘not only carries, 
but translates and transforms, the sender, the receiver, and the message’. This 
finding leads him to the conclusion that information does not exist outside its 
mediated form: ‘the medium is the message because it is the medium that shapes 
and controls the scale and form of human association and action’ (1964: 9). 
Even though this likely overstates policymaking reality, it remains important 
to study how media communicate information related to policy issues, what 
policy entrepreneurs take part in the process of constructing this message, 
and how this information is taken into account in the policy process.
The theoretical relevance of this research thus lies in addressing gaps in 
policy agenda-setting and framing research concerning the influence of media. 
I aim to offer a more comprehensive and contextualized understanding of when 
media are able to exercise influence on the policy agenda. I do this by combin-
ing theorization on agenda-setting and framing from various disciplines, and 
by applying a feedback model to study policy agenda-setting. Although several 
scholars have theoretically argued their preference for such a model over mod-
els assuming direct causality, by my knowledge such a model has not been 
applied in empirical research before. This dissertation addresses three specific 
research themes. I focus on capturing the substantive policy agenda of a specific 
policy domain, the role of framing in policy agenda-setting and social media as 
a new venue of the public sphere. As such, this dissertation contributes to policy 
agenda-setting theory, to theories on the framing of immigration and integra-
tion issues, and to theory on the democratic function of social media.
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Findings of this study have societal relevance as well. At the core of demo-
cratic theory is the argument that citizens should be able to influence the 
policies that govern their lives (Held 1996; Dahl 2000). This requires that 
private citizens and societal organizations have an understanding of ways in 
which the policy agenda is formed and – if willing – can put this knowledge 
into practice for their own interests. As Fraser says (2014: 155), it is important 
‘that ordinary people are not just objects of the designs of the great, but political 
subjects; that they deserve a decisive say in the matters that concern them in 
common; that they have the capacity to mobilize communicative power both 
as a means to effect change and as an end in itself.’ A better understanding of 
policy agenda-setting processes can help private citizens and societal actors 
to critically examine the attention and the frames that media apply to public 
issues, and to mobilize this communicative power and thereby contribute 
to the policy agenda. Vice versa, it can help policymakers to reach a better 
understanding of media dynamics, and develop more considered practices of 
dealing with media influences in policymaking processes.
Research aims and questions
This research aims to gain a better understanding of policy agenda-setting 
processes, by focusing on three research themes: (1) the policy agenda of an 
intractable policy controversy; (2) media framing and policy agenda-setting; 
and (3) responsiveness to social media as a subaltern public sphere. In this 
way the research addresses the gaps in theoretical knowledge identified in 
the previous section.
The overall research question addressed in this dissertation is formulated 
as follows:
How are policy agendas in the domain of immigration and integration shaped and 
how do traditional and social media coverage of policy-related issues influence this 
type of agenda?
1.3
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The social constructivist epistemology of this dissertation – to be further 
elaborated in the next section – implies that this research question is explana-
tory in an interpretive sense (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2013). The case study 
design of this research also means that the statistical generalizability of the 
research findings is limited (Yin 2013). However, as outlined in the next sec-
tion, the research findings on this case allow for theoretical generalization 
to similar policy domains that deal with intractable policy controversies, in 
similar political and media systems.
To answer the overall research question, the empirical chapters in this 
dissertation each address a specific sub-question (SQ) related to the three 
research themes that were outlined in this chapter. The first two chapters and 
sub-questions contribute to answering the first part of the overall research 
question of how policy agendas are shaped. They address whether and how 
national or local integration agendas interact (Chapter 1) and how complete 
and coherent frames on local integration policy agendas are (Chapter 2). The 
subsequent two chapters contribute to answering the second part of the 
overall research question. They address how traditional media coverage of 
immigration issues corresponds with changes on the policy agenda (Chapter 
4) and how policy entrepreneurs influence media coverage (Chapter 5). 
The final two chapters specifically concern the role of social media in policy 
agenda-setting. Chapter six explores how minority youth are using social 
media and chapter seven addresses the responsiveness of policymakers to 
social media coverage (Table 1.1).
Ontology and epistemology
This research uses a number of different data sources and research designs 
to address the different sub-questions. Each empirical chapter specifies the 
data and methods used to address each research question specifically. This 
section offers a general introduction to the chosen case and methodology. It 
also addresses the ontological and epistemological basis of this dissertation.
1.4
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Table 1.1: Research sub-questions
Research theme Sub-question Chapter
Theme 1: The 
policy agenda of 
an intractable 
policy controversy
SQ1: How is the policy agenda 
of migrant integration framed 
at national and local levels of 
governance?
Chapter 3: A Local Dimension 
of Integration Policies? A 
Comparative Study of Berlin, 
Malmö, and Rotterdam.
SQ2: How complete and coherent 
are policy frames of migrant 
integration on local policy agendas?
Chapter 4: Frame Ambiguity 
in Policy Controversies: A 
Frame Analysis of Migrant 
Integration Policies in 
Antwerp and Rotterdam
Theme 2: Media 
framing and 
policy agenda-
setting
SQ3: How do quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of traditional 
media coverage influence the 
immigration policy agenda?
Chapter 5: Framing the 
Immigration Policy Agenda: 
A qualitative comparative 
analysis of media coverage 
and policy responses of 
sixteen incidents related to 
Dutch immigration policies
SQ4: How do policy entrepreneurs 
contribute to the framing of 
immigration issues in the media?
Chapter 6: The Framing 
of Media Coverage as 
Policy Feedback. Media 
Framing Practices of Policy 
Entrepreneurs related to 
Immigration Policy.
Theme 3: 
Responsiveness to 
social media as a 
subaltern public 
sphere
SQ5: To what extent and in what 
ways are social media used by 
migrant youth as an alternative 
public sphere?
Chapter 7: Interethnic Contact 
Online: Contextualizing the 
Implications of Social Media 
Use by Second-Generation 
Migrant Youth
SQ6: Under what conditions are 
governments responsive to social 
media?
Chapter 8: The Contingency of 
Governments’ Responsiveness 
to the Virtual Public Sphere: A 
Systematic Literature Review 
and Meta-Synthesis
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A brief introduction to the case
The policy domain of immigration and integration in the context of the Nether-
lands was selected as a likely case of media-effects on the policy agenda. This 
has to do with characteristics of the policy domain as well as characteristics 
of the Dutch media and the political system of the Netherlands. This section 
will first introduce the main characteristics of the Dutch policy domain of im-
migration and integration. Thereafter it addresses characteristics of the Dutch 
media and the political system of the Netherlands.
Immigration concerns the admission of immigrants to the Netherlands, 
while integration concerns the subsequent incorporation of immigrants into 
society. This policy domain can be defined as an ‘intractable policy contro-
versy’ (Scholten 2013). Characteristic of intractability is that a multiplicity of 
frames exists and that frame shifts in policy occur rather frequently (Schön 
& Rein 1994). This is indeed the case with the policy field of immigration 
and integration in the Netherlands. First, over the past decades, immigration 
and integration have become contested issues of which different frames 
exist. There is public and political disagreement on what issues should be 
considered immigration and integration issues, how they can be measured, 
and how they should be governed. Also, immigration and integration are no 
longer seen as only concerning immigrants and ethnic minority groups, but 
are perceived as obtrusive issues affecting basic social structures and identi-
ties. As controversy and obtrusiveness are important news values (Harcup 
& O’Neill 2001), the policy domain of immigration and integration regularly 
draws media attention. Media coverage of immigration and integration issues 
in turn influences the public debate (Soroka 2002b).
The second characteristic of intractable policy controversies that makes 
the policy domain of immigration and integration a suitable case to study 
policy agenda-setting, is the regular occurrence of policy change. The Neth-
erlands - similar to other Western European countries - has witnessed many 
changes on the policy agenda in this domain over the past decades (De Haas 
et al. 2016). Such changes range from large-scale adoption of new legislation 
to minor changes in the implementation of specific policy decisions. Dutch 
government officials have discretionary power to change policy decisions 
Introduction 33
related to specific issues. The multicultural policy for which the Netherlands 
has long been known was abandoned during the late 1990s, and there has 
been a struggle over suitable policy alternatives ever since. This pattern is 
present on the national as well as on local policy agendas.
Over the past decades, immigration policies in the Netherlands have be-
come gradually more selective. After the active recruitment of foreign ‘guest 
workers’ during the 1950s and 1960s, policy changes in the 1970s restricted 
the immigration of labor migrants and subsequent family migration. Policy 
changes during the late 1990s and early 2000s also restricted the access of 
asylum seekers to the Netherlands. Simultaneously, the list of requirements 
for naturalization became more extensive. Mascini and Doornbos (2004) 
signal two opposite trends in Dutch immigration policies in recent years: 
on the one hand, immigration policies have become more restrictive toward 
asylum seekers, low-skilled workers and family migrants. On the other hand, 
immigration policies have become more lenient toward high-skilled workers 
and specialists. A clear example is the ‘highly skilled migrant scheme’ (Dutch: 
‘Kennismigrantenregeling’) of 2004. This twofold development indicates a 
multiplicity of frames regarding immigration.
The first migrant integration policies in the Netherlands were developed 
during the late 1970s. The ‘Minority Policy’ of 1983 recognized that labor 
migrants arriving in the Netherlands from the end of the Second World War 
onward were not temporary ‘guest workers’ but that most of them would stay 
permanently. Dutch integration policies were known for their multicultural 
policy frame for the subsequent decades. The revised integration policy of 
2003 (Dutch: ‘Integratiebeleid Nieuwe Stijl’) has been marked as indicative 
of the multicultural backlash and an assimilationist turn in integration poli-
cies (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Scholten 2011). This assimilationist turn 
in Dutch immigrant integration policies occurred hand in hand with the 
development of more restrictive immigration policies, and with an increasing 
interconnection of the two policy fields – for example in obligatory civic inte-
gration programs (Joppke 2007; Scholten 2011). From 2010 onward, migrant 
integration policies were decentralized to municipalities and a universalist 
policy frame became dominant at this policy level.
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During the late 1990s and 2000s, lenient immigration policies and multi-
culturalist integration policies became publicly and politically contested. 
The presence of immigrants, ethnic minorities and particularly Muslims in 
many West-European societies – including the Netherlands – was met with 
increasing suspicion in public discourse and in policy. Immigration and ethnic 
diversity of society were no longer considered to only concern immigrants 
and ethnic minority groups, but increasingly perceived as obtrusive issues 
affecting basic social structures and identities. The presence of a multiplicity 
of issue frames and frequent policy changes makes the policy domain of im-
migration and integration a suitable case to study how changes on the policy 
agenda are associated with different quantities and types of media coverage. 
Immigration and integration issues often gain media attention, and their 
coverage of these issues is characterized by a multiplicity of frames. Soroka 
(2002a) asserts that agenda-setting by the media is most likely for issue do-
mains that lend themselves to dramatic events. Therefore, this policy domain 
is a likely case for media impact on the policy agenda (Koch-Baumgartner & 
Voltmer 2010: 215-224). 
I focus my analysis on specific focusing events within the policy domain of 
immigration and integration as an embedded case study (Yin 2013). Focusing 
events do not have inherent qualities but are social constructions of certain 
occurrences which are deemed policy-relevant. As such, they are strongly in-
tertwined with both media and policy dynamics. Media and policy actors seize 
certain opportunities to frame an event that is recognized as newsworthy 
(Pan & Kosicki 1993). Focusing events thus provide a ‘window of opportunity’ 
for issue advocates seeking policy change to get media-attention (Kingdon 
1984; Wolfe et al. 2013: 181). In the media, focusing events initiate a period 
of ‘alarmed discovery’ and set in motion the ‘issue attention cycle’ (Downs 
1972). Different (groups of) stakeholders in the policy domain of immigration 
and integration maintain a different issue frame and there are ‘struggles over 
the naming and framing of a policy situation […] (as well as) symbolic contests 
over the social meaning of an issue domain, where meaning implies not only 
what is at issue but what is to be done’ (Schön & Rein 1994: 29). Appeals to 
evidence are insufficient to overcome this struggle for interpretation. Frames 
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also appeal to cultural values and beliefs that are shared by groups in society. 
Directly or via the media, focusing events may put new issues or new issue 
frames on the policy agenda. Immigration and integration issues therefore 
often gain media attention, and their coverage of these issues is characterized 
by a multiplicity of frames. Soroka (2002a) asserts that agenda-setting by 
the media is most likely for issue domains that lend themselves to dramatic 
events. Therefore, this policy domain is a likely case for media impact on the 
policy agenda (Koch-Baumgartner & Voltmer 2010: 215-224).
Furthermore, the Netherlands is characterized by a political model and media 
system in which critical media coverage is likely and in which governance pro-
cesses are relatively open to external influences. According to Lijphart (1999), 
the Netherlands can be characterized as a consensus democracy with a coali-
tion government, multiple political parties and a division of power between 
actors. It is generally assumed that in systems where power over the agenda 
is shared among various actors, the media have a more influence on the policy 
agenda (Van Dalen & Van Aelst 2014: 48). Moreover, while media generally 
have a stronger influence on opposition parties than on government parties 
in parliament, a recent study shows that in democracies with a multi-party 
government, media coverage has a relatively higher influence on government 
parties that are most closely linked to the policy agenda (Vliegenthart et al. 
2016).
The media landscape in the Netherlands consists of a dual broadcasting 
system consisting of public and private media with relatively high levels of 
news circulation, press freedom and journalistic professionalism (Hallin 
& Mancini 2004). The Netherlands ranks second place in the most recent 
World Press Freedom Index (RSF 2016). Dutch media generally operate fairly 
autonomously without partisan alignment and with high internal diversity 
of issue framing (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007: 407). Furthermore, the 
Netherlands is one of the frontrunners in adopting internet in general and 
social media applications in particular. The Netherlands has a stable posi-
tion in the top ten of countries with the highest levels of internet access (UN 
International Telecommunications Union 2014). Furthermore, the Dutch are 
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among the most active social media users worldwide (Jacobs & Spierings 
2016: 14). Particularly Twitter, Facebook, forums and weblogs have become 
popular platforms for public discussion on policy issues and current affairs. 
All in all, this democratic and media system makes the Netherlands a likely 
case for policy agenda-setting. This case allows for the theoretical generaliza-
tion of the findings to other, similarly controversial policy domains in similar 
political systems and media systems (Hallin & Mancini 2004).
Ontology and epistemology
In this dissertation, I take a constructivist approach to the policy agenda 
and its development in relation to media coverage. This means that, instead 
of departing from the notion of the inherent nature of policy problems, I ac-
knowledge a socially constructed nature of policy issues (Edelman 1977: 13; 
Stone 1989: 299). The issues that constitute policy problems, and how these 
problems are defined, is not a given. Instead, competing interpretations of 
policy problems are present. As Edelman (1993: 232) put it: ‘The social world 
is […] a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked by 
altering the way in which observations are framed and categorized.’ The cover 
illustration of this dissertation depicts such a kaleidoscopic image of social 
reality. Immigration and integration can be interpreted according to different 
frames which are interpretive packages consisting of multiple parts. Different 
policy actors promote different interpretations in the policy process itself 
but also in the media as an important channel of agenda-setting and venue 
of the public sphere (Hajer & Laws 2006: 252; Hajer 2009). The diversity of 
interpretations of an issue is limited by larger societal schemes of reference: 
they resonate with pre-existing cognitive schemata in society. From multiple 
possible interpretations of the issue at hand, one interpretation will become 
dominant on the policy agenda and guide policy action (Schön & Rein 1994).
Within a constructivist epistemology, I choose the method of frame analysis 
to study interpretations of policy issues in media coverage and in policies. 
Rein and Schön (1993: 146) define frames of policy issues as ways of ‘select-
ing, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality to provide 
guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting’. In contrast to dis-
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courses which can take any form and are more volatile (Hajer & Laws 2006), 
frames take the form of a causal story with a normative component (cf. Stone 
1989: 300). Besides structuring our perception of a policy issue, frames also 
promote a certain course of action. They place responsibility with certain ac-
tors and call for a certain policy response including a specific objective, type of 
solution and the instruments considered most effective (Stone 1988; Gamson 
& Modigliani 1989). In order to resonate with socially shared cognitive frames 
of reference, frames are communicated via so-called ‘framing practices and 
devices’, which are concise ways of communicating a larger frame (Gamson 
& Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2006: 83). While frames as such are structured 
by larger social schemata of interpretation, framing devices and practices are 
more subject to agency and can, to a certain extent, be applied purposefully 
by policy actors.
With regard to immigration, I operationalize a number of frames that may be 
present in media and policy debate: immigration as an issue of human interest, 
immigration as a threat, immigration as a managerial issue and immigration 
as an economic issue. With regard to migrant integration – concerning the 
incorporation of immigrants into society after immigration – I operationalize 
a slightly different set of frames: multiculturalism, assimilationism, differ-
entialism and universalism (cf. Castles & Miller 1993; Koopmans & Statham 
2000; Scholten 2011). Different sets of frames are operationalized regarding 
the issues of immigration and migrant integration, as these issues are discur-
sively constructed in policies and public debate as separate and distinctive 
issues. However, parallels can be drawn between the issue frames as they are 
used in certain combinations by policy actors. For example, an interest group 
defining immigration as a threat will not likely define migrant integration 
in terms of multiculturalism. Rather, they would propose an assimilationist 
policy toward immigrants once they have arrived. In short, there are elective 
affinities between frames of these connected policy domains.
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Outline of this dissertation
This chapter offers a general introduction of the topic of study and has outlined 
the three research themes that are addressed. I also introduced the main con-
cepts used in this research. Chapters 2 through 7 are empirical chapters, each 
addressing one of the research sub-questions. These chapters have already 
been published in academic journals or have been submitted to an academic 
journal and are currently in the review process. The empirical chapters of 
this dissertation are structured in three parts, each of which addresses one of 
the research themes. Table 1.2 visualizes the chapters addressing each of the 
research sub-questions.
Chapter 2 addresses how the intractable policy controversy of migrant 
integration is framed on the policy agenda in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Sweden and how these agendas are formed on the local and national 
level. This chapter has been published as an article co-authored by Henrik 
Emilsson, Bernhard Krieger and Peter Scholten in International Migration 
Review. Chapter 3 studies to what extent complete and coherent frames of 
migrant integration are present on the local policy agendas of Rotterdam and 
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Table 1.2: Outline of this dissertation
Chapter Theme 1:
The policy agenda of 
an intractable policy 
controversy
Theme 2:
Media framing 
and policy 
agenda-setting
Theme 3:
Responsiveness to 
social media as a 
subaltern public sphere
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 SQ1
Chapter 3 SQ2
Chapter 4 SQ3
Chapter 5 SQ4
Chapter 6 SQ5
Chapter 7 SQ6
Chapter 8 Conclusions
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Antwerp. This chapter has been published in Critical Policy Studies. Chapter 4 
reports on a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of mass media coverage 
and policy responses in sixteen cases related to the Dutch immigration policy 
agenda. This chapter has been submitted to an international peer-reviewed 
journal. Chapter 5 analyzes framing practices of various policy entrepreneurs 
who have contributed to media coverage on immigration issues. This chapter 
has been submitted to an international peer-reviewed journal as well. Chap-
ter 4 and 5 have both resulted from a research project commissioned by the 
Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Security and 
Justice (WODC) and are co-authored by Peter Scholten (cf. Dekker & Scholten 
2015).
Chapter 6 studies how social media are used by second-generation migrant 
youth in Rotterdam. It provides insight into the ways in  which these media 
are used for intra-ethnic purposes. This chapter was co-authored by Warda 
Belabas and Peter Scholten and has been published in the Journal of Inter-
cultural Studies. Chapter 7 studies the conditions under which governments 
are responsive to policy debate in social media. This chapter was co-authored 
by Victor Bekkers and has been published in Government Information Quar-
terly. The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, brings findings from the empirical 
chapters together and discusses them in relation to the research questions 
and research themes that were introduced in this chapter. This chapter 
also discusses limitations of this study and the broader contribution of this 
research to the literature. Lastly, the concluding chapter places the findings 
of this study in the light of recent events related to immigration and migrant 
integration.
2
A LOCAL DIMENSION OF 
INTEGRATION POLICIES? 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
OF BERLIN, MALMÖ, AND 
ROTTERDAM
Published as: Dekker, R., Emilsson, H., Krieger, B. & Scholten, P.W.A. 
(2015). A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A Comparative 
Study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. International Migration 
Review, 49(3), 633-658. doi: 10.1111/imre.12133
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Abstract
This study examines three theses on local integration policies by a qualitative 
comparative case study of integration policies in three cities in three differ-
ent countries (Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam). We found little evidence of a 
congruent local dimension of integration policies. Local policies resemble 
their national policy frameworks fairly well in terms of policy approaches 
and domains. Our multi-level perspective shows that this is not the result of 
top-down hierarchical governance, but rather of a multi-level dynamic of two-
way interaction. Local policy legacies and local politics matter and national 
policies are also influenced by local approaches of integration.
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Introduction
Migrant integration policies have often been defined in terms of national 
models of integration (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Castles & 
Miller 2009 [1993]). This idea of national models has been challenged by a 
growing interest in the local dimension of migrant integration policies. Studies 
indicate that local governments do not just implement national policies, but 
that they increasingly formulate policies as well (Alexander 2003, 2007; 
Penninx et al. 2004; Penninx 2009; Caponio & Borkert 2010; Scholten 2013). 
Hence, there is a need to attend to local integration frames and to question 
whether there is a specifically local dimension to integration policies.
Recent studies have provided a number of explanations for congruencies 
and incongruences between local and national policies as well as between 
local policies in different cities. Next to advocates of national models of inte-
gration policies, some scholars argue that there is a specific local dimension 
of integration policies characterized by either a greater tendency to accom-
modate ethnic diversity and solve integration problems in pragmatic ways 
(Poppelaars & Scholten 2008; Caponio & Borkert 2010; Jørgensen 2012) or 
a more exclusionist approach to migrants (Mahnig 2004; Ambrosini 2013). 
These studies argue that there is a distinct local model of integration that 
applies to cities even if in different countries. Horizontal modes of knowledge 
exchange and policy learning between cities would reinforce such congruen-
cies between local integration policies.
Others have claimed that there are neither national nor local models of 
integration, arguing that local policies are uniquely shaped by the specific 
problem, political, and policy settings in the different cities (Alexander 2003; 
Scholten 2013). Focusing much more on how the local context shapes process-
es of policy framing, this would imply that the local dimension of integration 
policies involves incongruences between cities as well as between national 
and local governments.
The aim of this study is to contribute to existing literature on migrant inte-
gration policies operating at different levels of governance and in particular, 
the role of cities as sites of integration. We explore three theses that can be 
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analytically distinguished by different expectations for congruencies between 
local policies and between local policies and their respective national policy 
contexts in three European cities: Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam. Selecting 
three cities with relatively large migrant populations but from three countries 
with different national integration traditions allows us to capture differences 
on the national–local as well as the local–local dimension.
We will address the following research question: To what extent is there a 
specific local dimension of migrant integration policies in Berlin Malmö and Rot-
terdam, and how can this be explained? This question can be differentiated into 
two sub-questions. First, to what extent are there congruencies and incongru-
ences between local policies in the various cities (horizontal dimension)? And 
second, to what extent are there congruencies or incongruences between 
national and local policies (vertical dimension)? For both dimensions, we take 
into account institutional ways of interaction between the different govern-
ment entities as an understanding of (in)congruences.
A multi-level perspective on migrant integration: 
three theses
Scholars such as Alexander (2003, 2007), Penninx et al. (2004), and Jørgensen 
(2012) describe how local governments have increasingly been developing 
their own integration policies. This spurred academic debate on the character-
istics of this local level of policies vis-à-vis national policies. In the literature, 
we can analytically distinguish three theses on how local integration policies 
relate to national policies and to each other. They encompass sometimes more 
than one strand of literature. We refer to them as the local dimension, the 
localist and the national models thesis.
The first thesis claims that as local governments are confronted with 
migrant integration issues more directly than national governments, they will 
respond in rather similar ways to migrant integration. One strand of literature 
contends that local governments are generally more accommodative to ethnic 
differences (Borkert & Bosswick 2007; Vermeulen & Stotijn 2010). As they 
2.2
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are often closely cooperating with immigrant organizations and representa-
tive boards, they are more inclined than national governments to respond 
to immigrants’ needs (Bousetta 2001; Marques & Santos 2004; Moore 2004; 
Schrover & Vermeulen 2005; Poppelaars & Scholten 2008). This phenomenon 
of ‘pragmatic problem-coping’ has been described in other policy areas as 
well as an explanation for national–local differences (Breeman et al. 2015).
On the other hand, there are scholars who have identified congruence in local 
responses fueled by a paradigm of exclusion (Mahnig 2004; Ambrosini 2013). 
Mahnig (2004) described how integration policies in Paris, Berlin, and Zurich 
have been reactive and ad hoc, with exclusionary political interventions trig-
gered by fears that the presence and concentration of migrant communities 
could threaten social peace and public order. This becomes particularly visible 
in conflicts around religious buildings (Maussen 2009; Fourot 2010). Integra-
tion is put on the agenda only when it starts to be perceived as a political issue, 
concerning the whole urban community and not just ethnic minority groups. 
Local migrant organizations are not sufficiently able to mobilize their follow-
ers and to put their claims on the table to influence the political agenda and 
force a decision in their favor (Studlar & Layton-Henry 1990; Caponio 2005).
Even though there is disagreement on the characteristics of local integra-
tion policies, these strands of literature are alike in the way that they distin-
guish a local dimension of integration policies that differs significantly from 
integration policies on the national level. In terms of national–local relations, 
this ‘local dimension’ thesis expects decentralized governance structures that 
allow local governments a large degree of policy discretion, while providing 
a national framework that promotes horizontal policy learning and provides 
only soft policy coordination. Cross-nationally, this thesis predicts congruen-
cies between local-level migrant integration policies, in spite of potential 
national differences. Jørgensen (2012) argues that local congruencies can be 
reinforced by horizontal networks of knowledge exchange; these facilitate 
horizontal policy learning, also between local governments in different coun-
tries. Regardless of their national setting, the expectation is that the proximity 
of local governments to integration issues makes local policies similar in deal-
ing with the presence of migrants.
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A rival thesis claims that there will not only be differences between national 
and local integration policies but also between local policies because of dif-
ferences in the local context. It assumes that local policies reflect the local 
problem situation, political setting, and specifically local policy legacies. For 
example, characteristics of a city’s economy and migrant populations may 
matter to integration policies (Glick Schiller & Çağlar 2009). In terms of the 
policy setting, differences in local policy legacies but also in local politics mat-
ter (Mahnig & Wimmer 2000; Caponio & Borkert 2010). This contrasts with 
the local dimension thesis, which expects local governments to be congruent 
in their response to migrant populations in a specific direction.
Furthermore, in terms of the policy setting, Jørgensen (2012), and Glick 
Schiller and Çağlar (2009) have drawn attention to city branding and the role 
of local policy cultures in accounting for local integration policies. Take for 
example cities like Amsterdam or London, which have traditionally branded 
themselves as multicultural and cosmopolitan cities with significant toler-
ance to ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. This contributes to the unique 
character of a city’s integration policies. Thus, a second thesis expects there 
to be incongruences on the vertical dimension between national and local 
policies, as well as on the horizontal dimension between cities. In terms of 
governance structures, this thesis expects integration policies at different 
levels to be largely decoupled, possibly even involving policy contradictions 
or policy conflicts. Horizontal policy learning may apply in this model as well, 
but will be selective at best and will not be institutionalized.
A third thesis expects that local policies will simply reflect the national 
models of integration of the countries where the local governments are 
situated. Such ‘national models of integration’ can be defined as nationally 
and historically rooted models of integration that are codified centrally and 
implemented in local-level policies. As such, these national models assume 
coherence of integration policies within nation-states (Brubaker 1992; Ire-
land 1994). This thesis expects top-down hierarchical governance structures 
to be in place that provide institutionalized forms of national–level policy 
coordination. The role of local governments is primarily perceived in terms of 
the elaboration and implementation of national policies.
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Thus, this thesis predicts that there will be congruencies on the vertical 
dimension between national and local policies within specific countries. It is 
assumed that national models of integration are driven by strong issue link-
ages between migrant integration and other national issues, such as national 
identity, national security, or the welfare state. Therefore, this thesis predicts 
incongruences on the horizontal level between national migrant integration 
policies in different countries and also between city-level policies in different 
countries (Table 2.1).
Methodology
The empirical analysis involves an in-depth study of local and national 
policies in three cases: Malmö in Sweden, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and 
Berlin in Germany. This involves a most different case study design based 
on three factors: First, the cities differ in size (roughly, Berlin 3,300,000, 
Rotterdam 600,000 and Malmö 300,000 inhabitants), governance structures 
(Sweden and the Netherlands as [decentralized] unitary states and Germany 
as a federal state), and presumed typical national integration philosophies 
(Swedish multiculturalism, Dutch assimilationism and German welfare-state 
integration – Castles & Miller 2009 [1993]). All cities have experienced a large 
influx of immigrants over the past decennia and have developed policies to 
deal with integration issues.
By comparing national and local integration policies and analyzing institu-
tional relations, the validity, and generalizability of the different theses can 
be assessed. We did not take into account the regional level of the federal 
state in Germany and the provinces in the Netherlands and Sweden. In the 
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Table 2.1: Overview of theses
Thesis National-local level Cross country local level
1. Local dimension thesis Incongruence Congruence
2. Localist thesis Incongruence Incongruence
3. National models thesis Congruence Incongruence
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Netherlands, migrant integration is not dealt with on this level of government. 
In the case of Germany, Berlin is a city-state that has a direct relationship with 
the national government. In Sweden, the County Administrative Boards have 
gained responsibility in coordinating national and local integration policies. 
Their role in multilevel relations between Malmö and the national govern-
ment will be addressed.
For each of the cases, national and local policy documents were analyzed, 
to reconstruct policy approaches and domains in the period 2005–2012. In 
addition, a review was made of secondary literature that focuses in particular 
on the policy process that led to these national and local policies. Finally, 
interviews were held with local policymakers (eight in Malmö, seven in Rot-
terdam and nine in Berlin)2. The interviews and consultation of secondary 
literature were conducted to reconstruct policy processes and multilevel 
interaction and to confirm whether our understanding of the local policies 
was correct and complete. Data collection took place under auspices of the 
UniteEurope project.
The three cases are strategically chosen for qualitatively evaluating the 
three theses by congruence analysis (Blatter & Haverland 2012). First of all, 
we analyzed (in)congruences in integration policies in the various national 
and local cases. Similar to Alexander (2007), we used a typology of different 
policy domains at which integration policies can be oriented (socio-cultural, 
socio-economic, legal-political) and normative premises about the inclusion 
of migrants. We distinguish multiculturalism, assimilationism, universalism, 
and differentialism as ideal typical approaches serving as a heuristic device 
to analyze our cases approaches to integration (Castles & Miller 2009 [1993]; 
2 In Berlin, nine interviews have been carried out with the integration commissioners of various 
districts, as well as with senior policy advisors from the integration commissioner’s office of the 
Senate. In Malmö, eight interviews were carried out. Five with administrators working in the field 
of integration in the City of Malmö, two are working in leading positions for the state at the local 
level (employment service and the County Administrative Board) and one is a political secretary 
in the Commissioner’s Unit at the City Office. In Rotterdam, seven interviews were conducted. 
The interviewees include administrators concerned with (civic) integration, current and former 
aldermen and their policy advisors.
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Koopmans & Statham 2000). Domains and approaches often go together as 
the following paragraph will show.
Assimilationism can be defined as unidirectional integration of the im-
migrant in the host society while focusing primarily on the socio-cultural 
domain of migrant integration. Assimilationist policies encourage adaptation 
of migrants to dominant cultural norms, values, and behaviors. Multicultural-
ism also focuses primarily on the socio-cultural domain, but rather stresses 
cultural pluralism and encourages the emancipation of migrant groups while 
recognizing and institutionalizing specific group identities. Multiculturalist 
policies acknowledge the positive potential of immigrants for the city and are 
sensitive to the particular needs and problems of migrant groups. Universal-
ist policies focus more on the socio-economic and legal–political domain of 
integration. Universalism is adverse to the institutionalization of majority or 
minority cultures. Universalist policies are ‘colorblind’ and address the indi-
vidual citizens’ rights and obligations. Policy measures are often described 
as ‘mainstreaming’. Finally, differentialism (also described as segregationism) 
institutionalizes group boundaries in society to such an extent that group 
identities and structures are preserved and groups live alongside each other 
rather than with each other. This applied to some extent to the guest-laborer 
regimes that were established in various European countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s, where apart from economic participation migrant groups were 
largely kept separated from society (Castles & Miller 2009 [1993]; Koopmans 
& Statham 2000).
Secondly, when assessing the analytical leverage of these three theses, we 
also look at institutional inter-government relations. The theses assume very 
different types of governance structures, which can involve formal or more ad 
hoc and informal ways of coordinating vertical (national-local) or horizontal 
(local-local) relations between government entities. The local dimension 
thesis assumes governance structures that leave significant ‘policy discre-
tion’ to the local policy practitioners and street-level bureaucrats. While little 
emphasis will be put on ‘vertical’ national–local government relations, more 
effort will be put into horizontal policy networks. This may entail intra- or 
cross-national city-to-city networks of policy learning and exchanging, ‘best 
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practices’ or even sometimes ad hoc or informal exchanges. The localist thesis 
puts less emphasis on horizontal exchange of policy lessons and does to some 
extent emphasize vertical relations, but stresses independent policy develop-
ment. Finally, the national models thesis also stresses the vertical dimension 
in particular, but then with a focus on top-down and hierarchical forms of 
policy coordination.
In the next paragraph, we will first compare the local integration policies 
of the three city cases in their historical and political context, assessing the 
local dimension thesis. Descriptive analysis of each of the local policies and 
the policy settings is followed by comparative analysis in terms of congruen-
cies and horizontal relations. Subsequently, we will describe the respective 
national policies and their policy settings, finished by a congruence analysis 
of each case and the multilevel relations. This enables us to assess the localist 
and national models thesis.
Local integration policies and horizontal relations 
between Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam
Berlin
Since 1981 Berlin has known a Commissioner for Integration and Migration 
whose office is part of the Ministry for Work, Integration, and Women. Since 
the mid-2000s, two major integration policies have been developed: In 2005, 
the first Integrationskonzept, entitled ‘Encouraging diversity – Strengthening 
Cohesion,’ was formulated by the Senate and updated in 2007 (Der Beauftragte 
für Integration und Migration 2005, 2007). This policy can be characterized 
by a multiculturalist approach with universalist traits. ‘People with a migra-
tion background’ are a specific policy target group. A State Advisory Board 
on Integration and Migration was initiated in 2003 including representatives 
from various immigrant groups. It participates in the city-state’s agenda-set-
ting and policy development. The Integrationskonzept specifies eight issues of 
migrant integration. Two of the latter can be attributed to the socio-economic 
2.4
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domain (labor market participation and education), one to the socio-cultural 
(international attractiveness and cultural diversity), three to the legal–politi-
cal (interculturality of the public administration, participation in civil society, 
refugee integration), and one to the spatial domain of migrant integration 
(socio-spatial cohesion) (Der Beauftragte für Integration und Migration 2007: 
8–90).
In 2010, the Senate enacted the ‘Partizipations- und Integrationsgesetz’ 
(PartIntG), a law mainly regulating the institutional setting in the policy 
field of migrant integration, as well as striving to remove obstacles for equal 
participation of migrants in all social areas such as institutional discrimina-
tion (Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin 2010). PartIntG clearly concerns the le-
gal–political domain of migrant integration. It aims to increase what is called 
the ‘interculturality of the city administration,’ by means such as increased 
employment of applicants with a migration background and training of staff. 
Furthermore, PartIntG focuses on the political participation of migrants, for 
example, by the appointment of commissioners, advisory boards, and com-
mittees on the district level, thereby reinforcing the city’s multiculturalist 
institutional setting.
Berlin’s districts (Bezirke) each have their own administration and are led 
by district councils that differ in terms of political composition. In a similar 
manner as the city-state, most districts have advisory boards and commis-
sioners for integration. As one of our interviewees indicated, this institutional 
setting provides a challenge to policy coordination and coherence in Berlin. 
Districts focus mostly on the socio-economic domain of integration, reveal-
ing a accommodative approach to integration (diverse policy documents 
and interviews). However, socio-economic measures are often mentioned by 
interviewees as a condition for socio-cultural integration: ‘Education is most 
important. We do not have enough jobs for unskilled workers. […] Migrants 
have to enter the regular job market. Where should they meet other people? The 
counter of the employment agency is not a good place for this. The workplace 
is an engine of integration.’ Policies on the district level are often the result of 
multi-stakeholder policymaking. Rather than including migrants fully into the 
democratic process by providing them with voting rights as many demand for 
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and as a more universalist approach would propose, policymaking in Berlin 
in the realm of migrant integration is rather multiculturalist in the sense 
that migrants are given a separate voice, that is listened to by policymakers 
(Borkert & Bosswick 2007).
In sum, the main integration policies in Berlin indicate an emphasis on the 
legal-political domain of migrant integration, but do not neglect other do-
mains. On the district level the socio-economic and socio-cultural domains are 
most prominent. A multiculturalist approach is most apparent in the policies, 
but interviewees noted struggles with universalist principles, for example, in 
case of the city’s affirmative action in hiring staff.
Malmö
The city of Malmö has a policy of integration mainstreaming. The 1999 ac-
tion plan for integration understands integration as participation in society 
and mutual understanding between people with different backgrounds 
(City of Malmö 1999). Malmö envisions a city where all citizens are treated 
equally and where diversity is regarded as a benefit. Ethnic differences in 
labor market participation, spatial segregation, and school performance are 
considered to be current major integration issues. Malmö fears that the ethnic 
and socio-economic cleavages coincide and segregate the city. Most measures 
therefore target the social-economic domain of integration, for example, by 
labor market programs, language courses, and improving the quality of local 
schools.
The Commissioner for Employment and Adult Education is responsible for 
integration policies in Malmö. The Unit for Integration and Labour Market 
(INAR) develops and coordinates integration policies. Relevant municipal 
service providers are immigrant services (guidance and civic orientation for 
newly arrived humanitarian migrants); JobbMalmö (labor market measures); 
the Education Department (Swedish for Immigrants courses) and the ten 
city districts. Civil society organizations play just a marginal role (Scuza-
rello 2010). Sometimes they are a partner in specific projects or sometimes 
private companies are contracted for specific projects. For example, local 
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football club FC Rosengård is funded for organizing projects focusing on 
education and employment for youth and adults.
Malmö aims to increase economic growth and to reduce ethnic segregation 
by implementing comprehensive welfare programs (GEFAS 1997–2000, Wel-
fare for all 2004–2008 and the Commission for a socially sustainable Malmö 
2010). As a senior civil servant at INAR puts is ‘What we used to call ‘inte-
gration projects,’ is no longer supported, unless there is a particular focus on 
work.’ Many measures also have a specific geographical focus. Neighborhood 
programs (City of Malmö 2011), health policies (City of Malmö 2010b), and 
infrastructure measures often target specific areas of the city where problems 
are the largest.
Few measures other than socio-economic integration measures get 
introduced and most are in theory aimed at the entire population and not 
specifically at migrant groups. An example is the action plan antidiscrimina-
tion (City of Malmö 2010a). Humanitarian migrants are the only group, that 
is targeted with specific measures. Legal–political and socio-economic issues 
are perceived to be most salient among this group as they are often struggling 
to enter the labor market. Therefore, specific policy measures aim to improve 
the introduction programs for humanitarian migrants. In general, Malmö 
has a universalist approach to migrant integration with a focus on the socio-
economic domain of integration.
Rotterdam
Except for a short episode of assimilationist policies in the 1970s (interview 
with a senior policymaker), Rotterdam has long had an accommodative policy 
toward migrant integration that focused primarily on the socio-economic in-
tegration of migrants in the local housing- and labor market and in education 
(Rotterdam City Executive 1978; Governmental Board Rijnmond Area 1981; 
Rotterdam City Executive 1991). In the period 2002-2006, right wing party 
‘Livable Rotterdam’ gained a majority in the city council and has remained 
a powerful presence in local politics ever since. The party drew attention to 
popular resentment with diversity, in particular with Muslim immigrants. This 
enforced a more assimilationist approach to migrant integration (interviews 
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with a policymaker and former politician). Rotterdam took new measures to 
promote dispersion of migrants across the city, to further inter-ethnic contact 
and to implement a local code of conduct (the so-called ‘Rotterdam Code’).
Since 2006, Rotterdam has been mainstreaming its integration policies to 
various policy sectors. In fact, apart from the name of the coordinating admin-
istrative unit, ‘Immigration and Integration,’ Rotterdam no longer speaks of 
integration policies. The focus is not on integration of ethnic minorities but on 
participation of all citizens in society (interview with policymaker). Political 
shifts in 2006 marked a turn to policies with a more universalist character. 
Some policies still have particular attention for immigrants or address issues 
that mostly concern immigrants.
Policy measures – except for the organization of civic integration courses 
– are executed by NGOs that are subsidized by the municipality. Immigrant 
self-organizations and support organizations used to play a major role in 
agenda-setting and execution of Rotterdam’s integration policies. However, 
subsidies for migrant organizations have been cut over the past years. Cur-
rently, the subsidy infrastructure is limited to four areas of expertise: diver-
sity, emancipation, non-formal education, and antidiscrimination (Rotterdam 
City Executive 2011a). Organizations had to reform in order to achieve more 
general participation goals and to yield measurable results (Rotterdam City 
Executive 2011a; interview with policymaker).
Rotterdam considers major integration issues to be minorities’ labor market 
participation (primarily of women and youth), participation in non-paid vol-
untary work, language deficiencies, discrimination, delinquency (primarily of 
Antillean and Moroccan youth), acceptance of Dutch norms, and values such 
as tolerance toward homosexuality, ethnic segregation, and identification with 
Rotterdam’s society (Rotterdam City Executive 2011a, 2011b). Policies are 
clearly shaped in their local political setting and focus on the socio-cultural 
and socio-economic domain of integration with a universalist approach.
Comparative analysis of local policies and relations
The local dimension thesis would expect congruencies between local integra-
tion policies despite the existence of diverse national policy traditions. Our 
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analysis has provided very little evidence for this thesis. There are significant 
differences in the target groups, domains, and approaches of local policies of 
the three cities, and they do not represent a singular accommodative or ex-
clusionist policy frame. In Rotterdam, politicization at the local level triggered 
an episode of more assimilationist policies, followed by a current universalist 
approach. The policy now combines a socio-cultural and socio-economic focus. 
In Malmö, there is also a policy paradigm of universalism. However, the policies 
here are primarily addressing the socio-economic domain of integration. Ber-
lin explicitly aims to streamline socio-economic and socio-cultural integration 
policies in the city districts by a legal–political policy frame on the city level. 
The policy can be characterized as multicultural with universalist traits.
In terms of horizontal exchange of knowledge and best practices, we did in-
deed found a number of international city networks, in which the three cities 
were involved. For instance, all three cities are part of the IntegratingCities 
network, although they did not always participate in projects from this net-
work together. Malmö and Rotterdam are involved in the ImpleMentoring and 
Inti-cities project, while Berlin participated in the DIVE project. Only Malmö is 
involved in the CLIP project (Cities for Local Integration Policy 2014; Integrat-
ingCities 2014). Our interviews show that this kind of knowledge exchange is 
appreciated, but current policies do not indicate significant policy learning. 
This suggests that the framing of local integration policies in these cities was 
driven primarily by specifically local circumstances and that horizontal policy 
learning was instrumental at best.
National integration policies and multilevel 
dynamics in Germany, Sweden, and the 
Netherlands
Germany
National integration policies in Germany evolved bottom-up from the local 
level, with a strong involvement of (local) civil society (Heckmann 2003; Bom-
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mes 2010). Germany was for a long time reluctant to concede to the fact that 
it had become a country of immigration. A national policy that contained a 
clear recognition of Germany’s status as an immigration country has evolved 
only recently. The Schröder government set up a multi-partisan committee 
of representatives of significant societal groups (churches, labor unions, 
employer associations, local public administrators, etc.), and researchers 
led by the opposition politician and former president of the Bundestag Rita 
Süßmuth to prepare a national immigration and integration policy in 2000. 
Thränhardt (2009: 165) interprets this consensus strategy in times of politici-
zation of immigration and integration issues as a form of ‘staged corporatism.’ 
In the political context of the 9/11 attacks in the US and of national elections 
in Germany in 2002, an all-party agreement was reached on the first national 
law on immigration and migrant integration (Zuwanderungsgesetz) to come 
into effect in 2005 (Deutscher Bundestag 2005). This law for the first time 
regulates immigration to Germany, as well as obligatory civic integration of 
newly arrived migrants and therefore has a pivotal role in this policy field 
(Heckmann & Wiest 2013; Schneider & Scholten 2015).
The Merkel government continued this strategy of consensus to draft 
the Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration: The commissioner for migration, 
refugees, and integration organized a series of summits on migrant integra-
tion (Integrationsgipfel). In these summits, again stakeholders including em-
ployer associations, labor unions, migrant communities, scientists, religious 
communities, etc. and government representatives of all levels of government 
were involved. This current national executive program defines eleven policy 
areas: (1) primary education; (2) secondary education, vocational training, 
and professional development; (3) labor market and working life; (4) minor-
ity hiring in the public sector; (5) health and care; (6) local integration; (7) 
language training; (8) sports; (9) civic engagement and integration; (10) 
media and integration; and (11) culture (Bundesregierung 2012: 19-197). 
Multi-stakeholder groups, each dealing with one of the areas, formulated 
strategic policy goals as well as operational aims, measures, instruments, 
responsibilities, time frames, and indicators for measuring progress.
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Based on the process leading to Germany’s national integration policy and 
the characteristics of this policy, we can define Germany’s integration policy 
as multiculturalist with universalist traits according to our heuristic ideal 
types. On the one hand, the policy presupposes distinct cultural groups who 
shape the everyday reality of society and address multiple domains of migrant 
integration (five policy areas are part of socio-economic, three socio-cultural, 
two legal–political, and one of the spatial domain). On the other hand, it does 
not stimulate the development of distinct groups, but rather pragmatically and 
stresses on welfare-state integration. Despite the assimilationist rhetoric in 
German politics, the policy itself is neither demanding migrants to undertake 
all integration efforts by themselves (as an assimilationist approach would 
require), nor does it refer to migrants as only one of many target groups of the 
policy (as a purely universalist approach would do).
Sweden
The Swedish government structure is a combination of a unitary state with 
strong local politico-administrative and fiscal capacities (Sellers & Lid-
ström 2007). This relationship also characterizes Sweden’s integration poli-
cies that evolved in a more centralized way. The national government decides 
on the general integration policy through laws and regulations, supervision, 
and fiscal incentives. At the same time, local government is given administra-
tive and fiscal capacities to implement policies and also to decide on policies 
of their own. In Sweden’s central government, the Ministry for Employment is 
responsible for integration, but the policy is supposed to permeate all govern-
ment agencies.
On the national level, a new integration policy was introduced in December 
1998 (Ministry of Interior 1997). It signaled a change away from a multicultur-
alist to a universalist policy focusing on individual rights and civic integration 
(Borevi 2012). The goal is equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities for 
all regardless of ethnic or cultural background (Ministry of Finance 2008). 
This is to be achieved through general measures for the whole population 
supplemented by targeted support for migrants during their first years in 
Sweden. Despite the new policy direction, many multiculturalist policy pro-
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grams were kept, such as the support for religious organizations and mother 
tongue language classes in schools (Dahlström 2004).
The introduction program for humanitarian migrants is the most important 
integration measure as it accounts for over 95 percent of the state integration 
budget (Ministry of Finance 2013). The goal is for participants to learn Swed-
ish, find work, and support themselves financially, and learn about the rights 
and obligations of Swedish citizens. Since 1986, the responsibility to offer 
these services has been delegated to municipalities and financed by the state 
(Broomé et al. 2007). In December 2010, the responsibility and coordination 
of the introduction programs were shifted back to the national government – 
specifically the employment service. Reasons that were given for this are the 
poor results on labor market integration and too large differences between 
the programs of various municipalities (Ministry of Integration and Gender 
Equality 2010). However, the municipalities are still responsible for the imple-
mentation of services such as language courses and civic orientation for which 
they receive state funding. Most other integration measures on the national 
level have a focus on employment. One example is subsidized employment 
intended to strengthen migrants’ competitiveness on the labor market.
The Netherlands
Migrant integration policies in the Netherlands were first developed in a cen-
tralized way, similar to the Swedish case. In the 1980s, the Ethnic Minorities 
Policy for which the Dutch case has become internationally (in)famous was 
developed and coordinated in a top-down way. This involved a unitary and 
centralized structure for policy coordination, with the Home Office at its cen-
ter (Guiraudon 1997). In the 1990s, the integration policy gradually devolved 
to the local level. A direct connection was made between integration and other 
urban policies, and cities like Rotterdam and Amsterdam formulated their 
own policy perspectives on migrant integration. Since the early 2000s, policies 
on the national level have become more and more connected with migration 
and asylum policies and with abstract discussions on national values and how 
to protect these. This issue connection is also reflected in the development of 
(pre- and post-entry) civic integration programs for newcomers.
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While the Netherlands has long been typified as multicultural, over the past 
decennium integration policies have taken an assimilationist turn (Schol-
ten 2011). This was driven by a sharp politicization of migrant integration on 
the national level in the early 2000s. Past policies were denounced a failure 
and a new policy was installed (‘Integration Policy New Style’) that put more 
emphasis on the socio-cultural domain of integration and made a stronger 
connection between immigration and integration. The most recent policy 
memorandum was launched in 2011: ‘Integration, Cohesion, Citizenship’ 
(Ministry of Interior 2011). A sense of shared citizenship and community of 
all Dutch citizens is formulated as a policy goal. The policy document has an 
assimilationist as well as universalist tone as it encourages citizen’s responsi-
bilities and self-sufficiency.
The current national integration policy consists of three principles. The 
first is that integration is not the responsibility of the government but that 
of immigrants themselves. The second principle is that ‘not one’s background 
but one’s potential is what counts’ (Ministry of Interior 2011: 7). This implies 
that there are no targeted integration measures for ethnic minorities, but that 
there is a generic policy. The last principle is that generic policy measures are 
to facilitate every citizen’s participation on the labor market, housing market, 
and in education. When the policy is insufficient for some groups, no specific 
instruments will be developed, but the general policy will be changed. The 
latter reflects a mainstreaming of migrant integration policies throughout 
various government sectors that was also found in the Swedish case.
Comparative analysis of local and national policies and 
multilevel relations
We now turn to the localist thesis and the national models thesis that are 
more or less each other’s opposites. The national models thesis claims that 
local integration policies will resemble the national policy frames because of 
top-down hierarchical governance structures. Cities will first and foremost 
have an executive role in integration policies. The localist thesis states that 
local policies will be shaped primarily by the specific local problem and policy 
context and are thus independent of national policies.
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While comparing Berlin’s integration policies on the city and district level 
with those on the national level, we found both congruencies and incongru-
ences. On all levels of governance in Germany, we found a similar approach 
to integration that can best be described in terms of our ideal type of multi-
culturalism, yet with important universalist traits. This becomes apparent in 
the process leading up to the policies, as well as in the content of the policies 
themselves. Integration policies are not only directed toward migrants, but 
also toward the majority society, which should be understood as a universal-
ist trait. Nevertheless, migrants are perceived of as a diversity of groups who 
have different requirements and face various challenges. Migrant groups are 
identified as particular stakeholders who should not as regular citizens, but 
as representatives of a migrant population be included in the policy process. 
While we found a tendency to focus on socio-economic and socio-cultural 
areas of migrant integration on the national level, we found that the policies in 
Berlin – particularly in the districts – have a broader focus, with an emphasis 
on the legal–political and socio-economic domains of integration. The policy 
levels are thus not fully congruent.
Institutional factors contribute to congruencies between the different 
levels of government. BerlinsIntegrationskonzept was developed almost half 
a decade before the Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration and was certainly 
perceived as a model for the latter. They have a similar format in terms of 
defining goals, measures, responsibilities, and indicators for success. The 
institutional and communicative setting of the Integrationsgipfel encouraged 
frame alignment among senior public administrators on different levels of 
government. This facilitated consensus among the different stakeholders in 
the integration policy field. The Länder and the umbrella organization of the 
German municipalities had to and did commit to the goals of the Nationaler 
Aktionsplan Integration along with the national government. The document 
constitutes a rare example of vertical multi-level policymaking in Germany, or, 
as Heckmann and Wiest (2013: 8) put it ‘a coordinated commitment by politi-
cal and civil society actors at all levels of government and civil society to initiate 
certain integration policies in their field of responsibility.’ Thus, the German 
case supports the national models thesis in the sense the both policies follow 
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a similar approach ideologically as well as content wise. However, it is very 
clear that this is not due to top-down policy enforcement. Instead, we came 
across examples of bottom-up multilevel dynamics.
In the case of Malmö and Sweden, formal and informal institutional ar-
rangements have led to congruencies between the two policy levels. Both lev-
els of government share the ideology and the goals of the integration policy, 
that is, based on a universalist philosophy with some multicultural features 
(support of the frame alignment is evident in all interviews). There is general 
agreement of the main principles of the integration policy in Sweden rather 
than any specific national policy effort. National–local interaction regarding 
integration policies has been governed through soft policy measures. In the 
mid-80s a system of negotiation was created, based on agreements between 
central government and the municipalities (cf. Qvist 2012). These agreements 
have, together with other organized professional networks, created common 
professional norms and practices that influence the local organization and 
content of introduction programs.
In 2001, the Swedish Integration Board initiated a more institutionalized 
collaboration to improve coordination of the introduction programs. The 
strategy was based on different voluntary agreements of policy coordination 
between actors at different administrative levels. After the closure of the Inte-
gration Board in 2007, this collaborative strategy is coordinated by the county 
administrative boards. These represent the state and serve as a link between 
the central government and municipalities. In the field of integration, they 
have the responsibility to coordinate, monitor, and develop integration mea-
sures for newly arrived migrants from a regional perspective. Local policies 
are organized in the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 
who safeguard the interests of Swedish local and regional authorities.
An example of national–local congruence is that when integration issues 
moved from the Ministry for Integration and Gender Equality to the Ministry 
of Employment at the government level in 2010, the city of Malmö decided 
to do the same and make integration issues a part of the policy area ‘labor 
market and adult education.’ Other domains of integration converge at the 
national and local level in their lack of policy measures. For example, there 
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are no formal consultation bodies representing migrants in neither Malmö 
nor the central government and both levels of governance have reduced the 
financial support to minority organizations. Their voices should, according 
to the logic, be channeled through the same democratic process as those of 
the rest of the population. The focus on general policies, mainstreaming, and 
an avoidance of any policies that emphasizes ethnic or cultural difference 
is evident in both levels of governance, which shows that the philosophy of 
integration is more universalist than multicultural.
A top-down approach does not fully explain national–local congruencies 
in Sweden, despite the more centralist government structure. The localist 
thesis is also partially supported. The precarious socioeconomic position of 
Malmö has led to an even stronger focus on socioeconomic issues than on the 
national level. The overall strategy has been to increase economic growth by 
city branding and large investments in infrastructure and to simultaneously 
counteract socio-ethnic segregation by general welfare measures. Incongru-
ences are mostly found regarding the asylum regime. Malmö has repeatedly 
criticized the asylum reception policy that allows asylum seekers to live in own 
accommodations while their asylum application is processed. Overcrowding 
and ethnic segregation due to this policy have, according to the municipality, 
negative effects on integration.
In Rotterdam, many bottom-up multilevel dynamics have also been at play 
while the national models thesis is supported at first glance. During the last 
decade, national and local policies have converged toward a universalist 
approach to integration. Migrant integration is primarily framed in terms of 
socio-economic and socio-cultural participation and migrant groups are not 
addressed separately in policy measures. However, also incongruences exist 
between the national and local policies. In contrast to the issue connection 
with immigration and the focus on national identity in Dutch national integra-
tion policies, the local policies of Rotterdam have been much more concerned 
with concrete integration issues in spheres like education, housing, and labor.
Especially in earlier years, Rotterdam’s political setting enforced divergent 
integration policies, giving support to the localist thesis as well. Our inter-
views and policy documents reveal many instances where the city of Rotter-
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dam played an active role in national policy developments as well. Rotterdam 
did not simply fulfill a role as implementer of national policies, it has been 
a key policy entrepreneur in the multi-level governance setting of migrant 
integration, influencing national policies in a concerted effort to broaden 
the scope for local policies (see also Scholten 2013). Policies such as the Rot-
terdam Law were picked up nationally after an intensive policy lobby (Dutch 
Government 2005), later only to be implemented in Rotterdam. Also, over 
the past five years Rotterdam has become a key policy entrepreneur on the 
topic of inclusion of EU labor migrants, especially from Central and Eastern 
Europe. In this respect, it has exerted significant influence not just on national 
policies but on European policies as well. In 2008 arrangements of multi-level 
cooperation were formalized in a ‘Collaborative Integration-Agenda’ between 
several municipalities and the central government (Ministry VROM 2008; 
Twynstra Gudde 2012). In 2012, this was continued as the ‘Collaborative Inte-
gral Approach’ (Ministry of Interior 2012). This approach sets only the general 
contours of a policy to be implemented in different sectors and increasingly 
at the local level.
All in all, our analysis shows that the integration policies in Berlin, Malmö, 
and Rotterdam are to a large extent congruent with their respective national 
policy frames. However, an important finding from our analysis is that while 
the national models thesis seems to hold best, we also encountered many 
examples of bottom-up policy entrepreneurship. Multi-level governance 
interactions play a role in all cases and promote frame alignment between the 
national and local level.
Conclusions
Multi-level governance of integration issues and the question whether there is 
a distinctive local level of integration policies gained more attention over the 
past years. In this study, we have brought together three theses on the charac-
teristics of local integration policies and we have qualitatively evaluated them 
with a comparative case–study of three city cases. We compared integration 
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policies of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam on the local level and we compared 
the local policies with their respective national policy contexts.
By conducting a congruence analysis, we aimed to go beyond evaluating 
the theses with a simple yes or no. We conclude that the local dimension 
thesis does not hold for Berlin, Malmö, or Rotterdam. Neither are the policies 
structurally more accommodative or exclusionist toward migrants than the 
national policies, nor do they resemble each other in that way. Also, there are 
indeed horizontal networks for policy learning between cities throughout 
Europe, yet the impact of horizontal policy learning on policymaking appears 
to be limited.
Evidence supports both the national models thesis and localist thesis to a 
certain extent, but both explanations are not fully supported. Local integra-
tion policies resemble their national policies to a great extent, but not due 
to top-down hierarchical government structures. Rather, what we found are 
various forms of two-way multilevel interaction. Formal and informal insti-
tutional arrangements exist in which knowledge and practices are exchanged 
and frame alignment is fostered. We found many examples of bottom-up 
processes influencing national developments in accordance to the local policy 
philosophy. In line with the localist thesis, we found that local problem and 
political settings matter as well. However, political ideologies are not always 
followed up in concrete measures and local policies are not developed totally 
independent from the national policy frameworks. The congruency on the 
national-local axis is remarkable, and the multilevel interactions in all three 
cases reflect universalist traits.
Our analysis thus shows that there is not a single, distinct local dimension 
of integration policies, but that multilevel interactions promote mutual ex-
changes between local and national level policies. This speaks to the broader 
debate in the migration literature on national models of integration and the 
growing interest for city-level integration policies. Our study suggests that 
we should not treat these two levels, and perhaps also the European level, 
as too distinct from each other. Rather, we must focus attention much more 
to the complex forms of interaction that exist between different policy levels 
(vertical modes of interaction), as well as between different cities and coun-
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tries (horizontal modes of interaction). This will help migration studies reach 
beyond reifying images of so-called national models of integration as well as 
beyond insulating the local dimension of integration policymaking too much 
from the broader institutional context in which these local policies evolve.
Expanding this line of research involves further research in how these ver-
tical and horizontal relations are configured under different circumstances. 
Several national–local comparisons show different levels of congruence 
under different institutional circumstances. For example, we know that the 
integration policies in Amsterdam differ from Rotterdam by reflecting the na-
tional policies to a lesser extent (Scholten 2013). In the German city of Halle/
Saale, Glick Schiller and Çağlar (2009) found no evidence of a multiculturalist 
approach to migrant integration as there were no resources for migrant-
specific assistance and ethnic-based organizations. By this, Halle/Saale does 
not adhere to the national integration policy paradigm. There is a need for 
further research on to what extent frame alignment between national and 
local policies also holds for different cities in the same national context, for 
instance, cities with different socio-economic backgrounds, different migra-
tion histories, and different political leadership.
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Abstract
Policy frames are understood as the outcome of a policy process in which mul-
tiple frames are contesting, but where one frame prevails and characterizes 
policies. Policy frames are therefore perceived and studied as coherent inter-
pretations of a policy issue containing a problem definition and a matching 
strategy to solve it. This rather fixed understanding of policy frames contrasts 
with other interpretive approaches which recognize a more dynamic and 
sometimes ambiguous character of policy language. The aim of this article is 
to analyze whether policy frames may be ambiguous and if so, how this can be 
understood by the problem context and political context of the policy issue. 
This study conducts critical frame analysis of local migrant integration policies 
in Antwerp and Rotterdam over the past 15 years. The analysis demonstrates 
presence of frame ambiguity in this controversial policy domain in the form 
of incomplete frames, solely focusing on the policy strategy while leaving the 
problem definition open to interpretation, and inconsistent frames in which 
the problem definition and policy strategy do not match. Ambiguous frames 
indicate a ‘strength of weak frames’: in a context of problem complexity and 
political contestation ambiguous frames can serve to overcome a deadlock in 
policy-making.
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Introduction
Frame analysis has become a popular methodology in policy sciences fol-
lowing the linguistic or constructivist turn in policy sciences that took place 
during the 1990s (Fischer & Forester 1993). Most constructivist approaches 
– such as discourse analysis – have a rather fluid conceptualization of policy 
as ‘language in use’. They recognize ambiguity in policy language, for example, 
in the use of certain expressions or metaphors. Frame analysis, in contrast, 
assumes that policies communicate a rather coherent and singular frame the 
policy problem. Frames are considered to be interpretive packages providing 
a consistent causal story of how the problem came about and how it should 
be solved (Gamson & Modigliani 1987; 1989; Entman 1993). Policy frames are 
understood to resolve ambiguity in social reality rather than being ambiguous 
themselves. In a critical frame analysis of policies related to the policy domain 
of migrant integration, this study argues that policy frames can be much less 
coherent and unitary with regard to problem definition and proposed policy 
actions than what theory so far suggests. Furthermore, this study seeks an 
understanding of when frame ambiguity emerges.
The conceptualization of policy frames as internally coherent structures 
of which one at a time is present in policies is somewhat different from the 
notions of framing in other scientific disciplines such as social movement 
studies (cf. Benford & Snow 2000), public opinion and representation (cf. 
Chong & Druckman 2007) and media and communication (cf. Vliegenthart 
& Van Zoonen 2011). Frame analysis in these fields of study shares a more 
dynamic conceptualization of frames as it primarily focuses on the process of 
framing in which frames are jointly constructed and reconstructed by actors 
and their audiences (Polletta & Ho 2006: 189–192; Snow et al. 1986: 467). 
While it is understood that frames in interpersonal communication, politics 
or the media can be incomplete or ambiguous, this has been less described 
with regard to policy frames as they are considered to be the product of con-
siderate political and bureaucratic processes.
This article aims to critically evaluate the assumptions of unicity and coher-
ence with regard to policy frames in an in-depth case study of local migrant 
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integration policies. Frame ambiguity is understood as the state of policy 
frames consisting of incoherent problem definitions and policy strategies. Am-
biguous frames are therefore open to multiple interpretations. Subsequently, 
it aims to contextualize under what conditions frame ambiguity is likely to 
emerge. Studies recognizing ambiguous qualities of policy language direct 
us to a theoretical understanding of when policy frame ambiguity emerges 
(Jones 1999; Stone 1988). To these aims, the following research question is ad-
dressed: In what ways does frame ambiguity occur in local migrant integration 
policy frames and how can this be understood?
The analysis focuses on migrant integration policies in two city cases: 
Antwerp in Belgium and Rotterdam in the Netherlands. The policy field of 
migrant integration provides a suitable case to study frame ambiguity as it 
is generally perceived to be an intractable policy controversy characterized 
by uncertainties in the problem definition and political controversy. These 
qualities have been pointed at by interpretive policy analysts as circumstances 
under which ambiguity emerges in policy. Earlier studies already pointed at 
ambiguous language in immigration and integration policy texts (Teitelbaum 
1992; Chock 1995; Boswell et al. 2011). Based on a typology of frames that 
are commonly distinguished in migrant integration policies, I study whether 
and how frame ambiguity may exist. I specifically focus on the unicity and 
coherency of frames in terms of problem definition and policy strategy. Mu-
nicipal policies are studied because at the local level, problem definitions are 
combined with specific policy strategies.
The theoretical section of this paper first discusses the literature on policy 
frames that generally assume coherency and unicity of policy frames. In order 
to theorize the existence of frame analysis, we subsequently discuss interpre-
tive studies that recognized ambiguity in policy language. This literature re-
view provides us with theoretical expectations on the context in which frame 
ambiguity may emerge. In the methodological section of this paper, the data 
and methodology are further introduced, including a typology of integration 
policy frames that is used for critical frame analysis. The findings of this study 
indicate that policy frames are much less coherent and unitary with regard 
to problem definition and proposed policy actions than what theory so far 
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suggests. Frame ambiguity was encountered in the form of incomplete and 
inconsistent policy frames. In both cities, similar complexities in the problem 
context and political context existed that according to interviews with key 
policy actors played a key role in the ambiguous framing of local integration 
policies. Frame ambiguity is a sensible policy outcome in a complex problem 
context and in a situation of political controversy.
Frame ambiguity in public policies
Policy frames
Frame analysis made its way into policy science during the 1980s and 1990s 
following the ‘linguistic’, ‘interpretive’, ‘argumentative’ or ‘constructivist’ turn 
in policy sciences (Fischer & Forester 1993). This turn entailed a focus on 
the linguistic and nonlinguistic symbols in politics and policy (White 1992; 
Fischer & Forester 1993). Instead of departing from the notion of an inher-
ent nature of policy problems, many policy scientists today acknowledge a 
(partly) socially constructed nature of policy issues (Edelman 1988: 13; Stone 
1989: 299). These socially constructed problem definitions guide the policy 
actions that are taken. Different practices of policy analysis spring from this 
turn in policy science – one of which is frame analysis.
Framing, in the interactionist tradition of Bateson (1955) and Goffman 
(1974), is about making a difference between what is important and what is 
not, regarding a particular issue or situation. Frames arise when people are 
encountered with a situation and ask themselves: ‘What is going on here?’ 
(Goffman 1974: 8). In policy sciences, this key characteristic of frames is 
applied in the collective setting of policy-making (Baumgartner & Mahoney 
2008). Policy actors are making sense of a policy problem and hereby adhere 
to a certain perspective of reality. As Hajer and Laws (2006: 252) state, ‘policy 
practitioners seek stability and act in a social world that is a kaleidoscope of po-
tential realities’. Frames are interpretive schemata and ordering devices that 
are needed by policy-makers to structure the reality of a policy issue. Frames 
allow people to make sense of a reality and attach a meaning to it, besides 
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possible alternative meanings: ‘Whatever is said of a thing, denies something 
else of it’ (Rein & Schön 1977: 239).
Apart from structuring our perception of reality, frames promote a certain 
course of action as well. They have normative-prescriptive implications by 
outlining not only what is but also what ought to be (Rein & Schön 1977: 240; 
see also Schön 1983: 40). Only when interpretation enables actors to make 
sense of a situation, they can imagine what should happen next (Rein & Schön 
1977). The well-known definition of frames by Rein and Schön (1993: 146) 
acknowledges the normative leap that is taken in frames: policy frames are 
ways of ‘selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex 
reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting’. 
While discourses can take any form and are more dynamic, frames – as Rein 
and Schön (1977; 1996) have argued – take the form of a causal story with 
a normative component (Stone 1989: 300; 2006). They place responsibility 
with certain actors and call for a certain policy response, including a specific 
objective, type of solution and instruments that are considered most effective 
(Stone 1988; Gamson & Modigliani 1989; Weiss 1989).
A key assumption is thus that policy frames are coherent in terms of prob-
lem definition and proposed policy action or strategy (Hajer & Laws 2006: 
257). This internal coherency contributes to the strength of a frame. ‘Strong 
frames’ are effective in communicating a set of beliefs to the public (Chong 
& Druckman 2007). Tewksbury and Scheufele (2009: 24) state that the most 
effective or powerful frames are the ones that communicate all four of the 
elements described by Entman (1993: 52): a problem definition, causal inter-
pretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation. As the end result 
of lengthy political and bureaucratic processes, policy frames are expected to 
be well elaborated and less ambiguous than, for example, frames in day-to-
day communication or media frames.
A second assumption about policy frames is that policies are shaped by 
one dominant frame at a time that directs policy action. This assumption is 
closely related to the assumed coherency of frames. In case of intractable 
policy controversies – when there is debate over the existence and nature of 
the policy issue – a multiplicity of frames exists in the policy process (Schön 
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& Rein 1994: 240). Different (groups of) stakeholders in the policy process 
maintain a different issue frame and there are ‘struggles over the naming and 
framing of a policy situation [. . .] (as well as) symbolic contests over the social 
meaning of an issue domain, where meaning implies not only what is at issue 
but what is to be done’ (Schön & Rein 1994: 29). Actors involved in the policy 
process uphold certain frames and strive for their framing of the issue to 
become the dominant interpretation in policy. According to Baumgartner and 
Jones (1993), ‘policy monopolies’ act upon a unitary dominant frame. Domi-
nant frames become vested in political and administrative institutions and 
the broader culture through both the instrumental effects of policies – such 
as new rules and new organizations – as well as the rhetorical or symbolic 
effects (Ingram et al. 1999). It is assumed that policy frames do not change 
incrementally and fluidly but they are only replaced in situations of policy 
change. This may be caused by political power shifts or to external events that 
provide new information on the policy issue at hand.
In contrast to political positions or interests, frames are not negotiable 
stands. Schön and Rein (1994) have outlined how frames are cognitive sche-
mata that incorporate the worldviews of policy actors and become part of 
their identities. It is therefore hard to think outside frames and be reflexive of 
one’s own frame. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) claim that reframing a policy 
issue involves reconceptualising not only vested interests, but also personal 
identities that are interwoven with beliefs that the world is or ought to be as 
one perceives it. Policy frames are therefore not considered to be the outcome 
of political negotiation, but in policies one frame has prevailed and is com-
prehensively elaborated. Policy frames are thus assumed to be singular and 
coherent.
Ambiguity in policies
Recognizing ambiguous elements in policies is not a novelty in the interpre-
tive tradition of policy analysis. In fact, the interpretive approach recognizes 
ambiguity of policy language as a rule, rather than an exception (Yanow 1996: 
228). However, while it is often considered a property of linguistic expressions, 
it has not been connected to the construct of frames. Scholars among whom 
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Stone (1988), Yanow (1996) and Hajer and Wagenaar (2003), for example, 
pointed at ambiguity of policy narratives by use of certain expressions and 
metaphors. In order to gain a better understanding of why ambiguous frames 
emerge, literature on ambiguous elements in policy helps to theorize ambigu-
ity of policy frames and to develop theoretical expectations on when frame 
ambiguity emerges. Two types of explanations for ambiguity are provided, 
related to the problem context and to the political context of the policy issue.
First, related to the problem context, scholars encountered ambigu-
ity in policies as a result of ‘bounded rationality’ (Simon 1957; March 1978). 
Bounded rationality assumes that individual or collective decision-makers 
are intendedly rational but deal with limited information on complex policy 
issues and cognitive limitations in processing this information (Jones 1999). 
Ambiguity may be a satisfactory solution when available information about a 
policy issue is limited and uncertain. Ambiguous framing is thus sensible when 
it reflects uncertainties in the future consequences and preferences related 
to the problem (March 1978). According to Baumgartner and Jones (1993) 
bounded rationality is an inherent quality of the policy-making process. It is 
not only an attribute of the policy problem, but also of the policy-makers’ acts 
of meaning making. Policy-makers engage in disproportionate information 
processing as they attend selectively to information dependent on whether 
it complies with the current policy frame. Ambiguity is thus more likely to 
exist in policies related to issues on which information is limited, uncertain 
or contradictory.
Second, interpretive policy analysts recognize partisan drivers of am-
biguity in policies. Stone (1988: 157), for example, describes how in the 
decision-making process ambiguity allows policy-makers to placate multiple 
political actors in a policy controversy. Yanow (1996: 228) as well shows 
that ambiguity is purposively used to resolve conflict and to accommodate 
political differences. Newman and Clarke (2009) consider ambiguity – next 
to articulation and assemblages – to be a key concept in understanding how 
publics and public services are constituted. Ambiguity results from contesting 
political understandings of citizenship and exposes alignments of political 
power (2009). Newman (2013: 105) demonstrates how the language of politi-
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cal contestation sometimes is reappropriated in policy texts with ambiguous 
meaning. This results in political opposition losing power. Ambiguity is thus 
likely to exist in policies related to politically contested issues. Based on this 
literature review, the analysis of understanding the emergence of frame 
ambiguity will be focused on the problem context, including complexity and 
bounded rationality, and the political context, specifically controversy over 
problem definition and policy solutions.
Methodology
Local migrant integration policies in Antwerp (Belgium) and Rotterdam (The 
Netherlands) were analyzed in order to study in what forms frame ambiguity 
may be present and how this can be understood. The policy field of migrant 
integration was chosen as a strategic case. Migrant integration has been 
described as an intractable policy controversy (Scholten 2013). How migrant 
integration is defined and what policy strategies are chosen varies and is 
often subject to frame shifts (Scholten 2011; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). It 
is a complex and politically contested issue characterized by discussion about 
the problem definition, how to measure it and the effectiveness of policy 
measures. The struggle over interpretation of the issue is not overcome by ap-
peals to evidence or facts, and competing issue frames remain present in the 
policy process. The problem context and political context of this policy field 
thus makes a suitable case for studying frame ambiguity in policies. Indeed, 
scholars have already pointed at ambiguous language in immigration and 
integration policy texts (Teitelbaum 1992; Chock 1995; Boswell et al. 2011). 
This makes migrant integration a suitable policy field to study the ambiguity 
of frames as well.
The local level of policies is chosen because on that level policies often 
include concrete strategies. Antwerp and Rotterdam are cities with long 
histories of migrant integration policies. Both are large, industrial port cit-
ies that have attracted many immigrants over the past decades. The cities’ 
integration policies often functioned as an example for other cities and their 
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respective regional and national contexts. The time period from 1998 to 2013 
was chosen as the integration policy field became controversial due to a 
multicultural backlash (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). Both cities departed 
from their multiculturalist policies during the early 2000s and several frame 
shifts took place in the years after. This enables us to study frame ambiguity 
in relation to different policy frames within a relatively short time period. 
Critical events during this time period became clear from the interviews and 
are addressed in the empirical section of this article. Important critical events 
in Antwerp include a racist murder in 2006 and the election victory by the 
Flemish nationalist party ‘N-VA’ in 2012. In Rotterdam, the election victory by 
right-wing nationalist ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’ in 2002 and shortly thereafter the 
political murder of their party leader Pim Fortuyn was mentioned frequently 
as a turning point in migrant integration policies.
I conducted critical frame analysis of integration policy documents from 
the past 15 years, focusing on problem definitions and policy strategies. For 
this purpose, I operationalized a typology of commonly distinguished migrant 
integration policy frames in the literature. This includes an assimilationist, 
multiculturalist, differentialist and universalist policy frame of migrant inte-
gration (Castles & Miller [1993] 2009; Koopmans & Statham 2000; Scholten 
2011: 38–42). Table 3.1 provides a short overview of the problem definitions 
and policy strategies that are elaborated in these four policy frames.
Assimilationism problematizes various aspects of the presence of minorities 
in society and aims for unidirectional integration of the immigrant in the host 
society while focusing primarily on the sociocultural domain of migrant inte-
gration. Assimilationist policies encourage adaptation of immigrants to domi-
nant cultural norms, values and behaviors. Differentialism (also described as 
segregationism) facilitates the presence of immigrants in society by organiz-
ing minority group identities and needs outside mainstream society. They 
are excluded from mainstream arrangements and different arrangements are 
created for them – with fewer citizenship rights than the dominant popula-
tion. Ethnic groups live alongside each other rather than with each other. 
Multiculturalism promotes cultural pluralism and encourages emancipation 
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of immigrant groups while accommodating specific group identities. Finally, 
a ‘universalist’ frame concerns a more liberal egalitarian view on immigrant 
integration and aims for ethnic equality. It is closely related to the ‘intercultur-
alist’ model of Wood (2009) and Cantle (2012). The policy strategy is not only 
targeting immigrants. Instead, it is ‘mainstreamed’ aimed at ‘citizenship’ or 
‘participation’ of all citizens to overcome group thinking and engage in a two-
way process of sociocultural adaptation. This goes along with mainstreaming 
of policies and policy institutions integration permeates all government’s 
policies and activities as opposed to being a stand-alone policy field (Scholten 
et al. 2016). This means that governments adopt generic instead of targeted 
measures – a practice that has its roots in gender policies (Booth & Bennett 
2002).
I evaluated the coherence and unicity of local integration policy frames by 
coding different frame elements (including problem definitions and policy 
strategies) in policy documents and evaluating their fit with the theory-based 
typology of integration frames. This concerned an iterative process in which 
empirical data was confronted with our theoretical expectations. In addition, 
interviews with municipal policy-makers and civil society partners were 
Table 3.1: Operationalization of integration policy frames
Policy frame Problem definition Policy strategy
Multiculturalism Problematizing socio-economic 
deprivation of immigrants
Specific measures such as group 
arrangements and activities 
promoting cultural pluralism
Differentialism Presence of immigrants is 
temporary and should be 
accommodated in separate 
arrangements
Specific measures such 
as limited legal-political 
arrangements preventing 
integration
Universalism Ethnic equality should be 
promoted as a result of two-way 
cultural adaptation and individual 
participation
Generic / mainstreamed 
measures requiring all citizens 
to participate
Assimilationism Deviant socio-cultural and socio-
demographic characteristics of 
migrant groups
Immigrants should adapt to 
the socio-cultural values and 
behaviors of the host society
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conducted in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the context in 
which the policies were developed. Six interviews were held in Rotterdam, 
five interviews in Antwerp. The interviews in Antwerp were conducted by the 
author and were taped and transcribed ad verbatim. Four of the interviews 
in Rotterdam were conducted by research assistants who provided interview 
summaries. Two of the interviews were held by the author and were tran-
scribed ad verbatim. After the main argument of this article was developed, 
some interviewees in both cities were recontacted to check the validity of the 
argument and to get an update on the latest policy developments.
The following section describes first the findings of this analysis per city 
case. These case analyses reflect policy language that was used in policy 
documents and interviews. This language is not neutral: terms used to refer 
to ethnic groups and processes of migrant integration differs over time and 
in relation to different policy frames. This is made explicit at several points 
in the discussion of our findings, for example, by the use of quotation marks. 
Subsequently, instances of frame ambiguity are discussed more in general and 
understood from the context in which they emerged.
Results
Integration policy frames Antwerp
Until the mid-2000s, Antwerp employed a multiculturalist migrant integra-
tion policy that was embedded in the Flemish integration decree of 1998. 
Migrant integration was framed as a lack of recognition and accommodation 
of ‘diversity’ (Flemish Parliament 1998). This issue definition was coupled 
with targeted measures to ‘empower’ minorities such as municipal interpre-
tation services and adjustment of certain welfare provisions to fit the needs 
of ethnic minorities. The municipality actively safeguarded minorities’ access 
to services – an arrangement called the ‘interculturalization’ of municipal 
services. A designated representative organ for immigrants was installed, the 
‘minority forum’ that still exists today (minderhedenforum.be). Issue defini-
tions and policy strategies in Flanders were unequivocally multicultural. In 
3.4 
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this period, the city of Antwerp was under social democratic rule of the SP.a 
(Socialistische Partij Anders/Socialist Party Differently), a party that was a 
strong supporter of the multicultural policy frame.
Under the last social democratic city executive of mayor Janssens (2006–
2012), the policy frame shifted remarkably. Instead of actively accommodat-
ing different minority groups, group provisions were revoked except for civic 
integration programs for recently arrived immigrants (cf. Van Puymbroeck 
2011). The common denominator for integration policies from this period 
was ‘equal opportunities’ with regard to socioeconomic aspects of integra-
tion, and ‘interculturalization’ or a ‘diversity policy’ in terms of sociocultural 
integration (Antwerp City Executive 2007; Department of Social Cohesion 
2009). The problem definition focused on unequal opportunities of citizens 
and intolerance toward minority groups, including the ethnic minorities. 
Policy goals were to create equal opportunities, encourage active citizenship, 
participation and shared responsibility among all citizens of Antwerp. Inte-
gration meant a mutual process of adaptation and development of cultural 
plurality (Department of Social Cohesion 2008). Diversity was not problema-
tized, but promoted as beneficial (De8 Centre for Integration 2008). This fits a 
universalist issue definition.
The policy strategies of this period were framed generically – that is, 
targeting all members of the urban society. This means that the government 
does not want to differentiate and institutionalize differences between ethnic 
minorities and the majority population by targeting ethnic minorities specifi-
cally. However, some group provision remained, as characteristic for ‘target-
ing within universalism’ (Flemish Parliament 2009: 3; cf. Skocpol 1991). The 
goal of ‘interculturalization’ from the previous policy period was upheld with 
regard to the municipality’s own organization and services. However, instead 
of accommodation, these services were now framed in terms of ‘cultural sen-
sitivity’ toward diversity. The municipality aimed to make their own services 
and personnel sensitive to and competent in dealing with culturally diverse 
citizens. Executive integration organization ‘De8’ was issued to pursue this in 
other organizations such as schools, elderly care, police and health care.
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A mainstreaming strategy that fits the universalist approach was 
implemented in the coordinative structures of the integration policy (Flemish 
Parliament 2009). Until 2007/2008, the municipality of Antwerp had a depart-
ment of integration services (DIA – Dienst Integratie Antwerpen). This was 
split up and different tasks of this organization were redistributed over other 
governmental departments. Minority integration became a horizontal goal of 
the entire organization. Some targeted departments for minorities remained 
(Interview policy-maker Antwerp). For example, the hiring of minority per-
sonnel in the city’s administration by the ‘diversity management’ bureau of 
the municipality.
The approach to minority integration as a generic goal became more 
‘quid pro quo’ (Janssens 2011; Interview policy-maker Antwerp). It stressed 
citizens’ obligations as well as rights. Saeys et al. (2014) define this policy 
approach in Flanders as ‘new assimilationism’. The political discourse in 
Flanders and Antwerp in particular with the emergence of right-wing nation-
alist parties as ‘Vlaams Blok’ (Flemish Block) (1979–2004), ‘Vlaams Belang’ 
(Flemish Interest) (2004–current) and N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie/New 
Flemish Alliance) (2001–current), indeed showed assimilationist traits. 
However, these were not (yet) present in policy framing. The policy strategies 
fit a universalist policy frame: no dominant culture is promoted, but cultural 
diversity is treated as a fact and approached neutrally by the government.
Only recently, the definition of integration problems in Antwerp’s inte-
gration policy gained more assimilationist traits. The onset of this was the 
electoral win of N-VA during the 2012 local elections. While promoting respect 
for diversity, the policies strive for a unitary urban community in sociocultural 
terms (Antwerp City Executive 2013: 3). Most prominent is the emphasis on 
sociocultural aspects of integration such as Dutch language proficiency and 
adherence to Antwerp’s or Flemish history and cultural norms and values. 
Exemplary of this is a paragraph about education: ‘The city executive sees 
diversity as enriching. However, in schools we accentuate common basic values: 
mutual respect, freedom, democracy, universal human rights such as free choice, 
equality of men and women, freedom of religion, separation of church and state 
and independent scientific research’ (Antwerp City Executive 2013: 31). Dutch 
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language proficiency is no longer optional: ‘Who refuses to learn to speak 
Dutch, will be sanctioned’ (Antwerp City Executive 2013: 12). Sociocultural 
integration is considered to be a necessary condition for integration in other 
domains of social life. The city executive specifies a common language and 
common values in which immigrants should integrate. The emphasis on so-
ciocultural domain of integration is characteristic of an assimilationist policy 
frame.
The current policy strategy is not fully developed yet – and according to our 
interviewee at the municipality, it is not clear yet whether this will happen at 
all: ‘We know that they absolutely want attention for civic integration and lan-
guage, but the remainder is a big question mark. It is left to the administrative 
level’. To date, many universalist strategies are maintained and are expected 
to remain present. For example, measures to promote equal labor market ac-
cess and access to municipal services. Integration is a horizontal policy goal 
that is executed by generic measures. Even the city’s diversity management 
bureau has been cancelled. Within the municipal department of ‘social cohe-
sion’ (Dienst Samenleven) there is no specific team working on integration. 
This universalist policy strategy fits the institutional arrangements that were 
decided upon in the latest decree (Flemish Parliament 2013). The Flemish 
government now regularizes integration via an ‘external government agency’ 
(EVA – Extern Verzelfstandigd Agentschap) in most Flemish cities. As a large 
city, Antwerp remains excluded from this arrangement. Integration is now 
managed by a new centralized municipal association of integration partners 
(VZW Integratie en Inburgering).
In conclusion, we can see how Antwerp’s local integration policies initiated 
as targeted, multiculturalist policies. From 2006 onward, this multicultural 
approach was replaced by a universalist approach under the label of ‘inter-
culturalization’. However, the policy strategy of mainstreaming was much 
more pronounced than the problem definition of unequal opportunities as 
problematic. Today, under N-VA rule, mainstreamed policy strategies are 
further developed, but the problem definition and goals can be characterized 
as assimilationist.
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Integration policy frames Rotterdam
From 1998 to 2002, Rotterdam’s integration policies had a multicultural out-
look. Cultural diversity was promoted as a strength (Rotterdam City Executive 
1998; Project Multicolored City 2000) and the municipality aimed to decrease 
socioeconomic deprivation of minorities in terms of education, labor market 
participation and housing conditions. Rotterdam navigated between a generic 
and targeted policy strategy. On the one hand, they urged immigrants to make 
better use of existing welfare arrangements, on the other hand specific 
measures were developed to prevent downward social mobility and promote 
self-sufficiency (City of Rotterdam 1998). Priorities of the policy program 
‘Multicolored City’ were (1) to enhance the participation of ‘allochthonous’ 
citizens in subsidized organizations and initiatives, (2) for the administration 
of Rotterdam to hire more allochthonous personnel, particularly in higher 
positions, (3) to change the cultural policies of Rotterdam in order to fit the 
new cultural diversity of the population and (4) to promote and encourage 
ethnic entrepreneurship and labor market participation (Rotterdam City 
Executive 1998: 12–13). The term ‘allochtones’ is commonly used in Dutch 
migrant integration jargon to refer to ethnic minorities.
In 2002, the right-wing nationalist party ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’ (‘Liveable 
Rotterdam’) won the local elections and for the first time in many years, the 
social democrats were not part of the city executive. The new city executive 
announced a radical break with previous integration policies. An assimi-
lationist issue definition of migrant integration was outlined in integration 
policy documents (Rotterdam City Executive 2003). The executive program 
stated that newcomers are not yet at home, while at the same time native 
citizens feel less at home in Rotterdam. Social cohesion in Rotterdam was lost 
over the past decennia when new immigrants arrived in the city (Rotterdam 
City Executive 2002: 33). Priority of the city executive was to enhance the 
identification of citizens with (a preexisting definition of) Rotterdam and 
thereby to reinforce ‘social integration’. This indicates a monistic view on 
society of integration into a majority culture. Integration problems were often 
connected to safety issues: it was expected that more social integration would 
contribute to public safety and vice versa.
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However, policy measures were not always as assimilationist as would be 
expected based on the problem definition of the policy frame (cf. Uitermark 
& Duyvendak 2008). Instead, the policy measures can be characterized as 
universalist rather than assimilationist. Many of the local measures aimed 
to increase social cohesion and stimulate interethnic contact without assimi-
lationist emphasis. The program ‘Mensen Maken de Stad’ (People Make the 
City), for example, aimed to enhance ‘social cohesion’ and ‘active citizenship’ 
in specific neighborhoods of Rotterdam. Integration goals were developed 
bottom-up and in coproduction with citizens of these neighborhoods. It often 
entailed addressing other issues in the neighborhood as well such as litter, 
nuisance, youth delinquency and health issues in order to pave the way for 
social cohesion and integration. Representation of diversity in neighborhood 
activities was deemed important in these measures.
From 2006 onward, the assimilationist issue definition was abandoned 
after the social democrats regained a majority in the city council. We can 
observe a turn from integration policy to ‘participation policy’ which was 
targeting all citizens of Rotterdam. Integration was hardly mentioned as such 
in policy documents. The participation policy stressed that citizenship not 
only comes with rights but also with obligations and responsibilities for each 
citizen. A dual notion of citizenship was maintained: Whilst the government 
will support people who are ‘willing but unable’ to participate, the ones who 
are unwilling will be approached with repressive measures. The participation 
policy targeted all citizens: ‘The policy has an inclusive character. No distinction 
is made based on ethnicity. Mono-ethnic activities are not eligible for subsidies, 
unless there are strong arguments for doing this’ (Rotterdam City Executive 
2011, 24). This indicates a mainstreaming of integration policies from a uni-
versalist paradigm.
The policy strategy of mainstreaming was however more pronounced than 
the problem definition to which it relates. The policy defined four focus areas 
in need of improvement – women’s emancipation, gay emancipation, discrimi-
nation and diversity – but the policy did not specify what policy problems 
exist. Instead, the end goals of equal chances and participation of all citizens 
were emphasized. Four ‘Kenniscentra’ (centers of expertise) consisting of 
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key civil society stakeholders in these areas were subsidized to develop and 
implement measures. Even though these policy measures target all citizens 
of Rotterdam, there were still some programs that were specifically targeting 
ethnic minorities. There was, for example, the policy program ‘Participation 
through Language’ (Department of Youth, Education and Society 2007) and a 
program that particularly focusses on ethnic minorities with a Muslim iden-
tity: ‘Building Bridges’ (Department of Youth, Education and Society 2008).
Most notable is the continuation of a policy program particularly focus-
ing on Moroccan and Antillean youth. Rotterdam as well as 21 other Dutch 
municipalities received funding from the national government to specifically 
target the overrepresentation of Antillean and Moroccan youth in welfare de-
pendency, school dropout, unemployment and crime. Rotterdam had already 
started this policy before national funding was initiated from the viewpoint 
that ethnic background and cultural identity – next to age and socioeconomic 
position – were important factors in the overrepresentation of Antillean and 
Moroccan youth in these four areas (Rotterdam City Executive 2010). That is 
why targeted measures were chosen despite the dominant approach of uni-
versalism and a fear of stigmatization. In 2012, the effectiveness of the policy 
was evaluated and it was concluded that on most aspects, the targeted policy 
did not achieve its goals. The policy was neither continued in Rotterdam, nor 
elsewhere.
In sum, we can see how in Rotterdam the universalist frame (2006–2013) 
was ambiguous in the sense that the strategy was more pronounced than the 
accompanying problem definition. During the period when the assimilation-
ist frame was dominant in integration policies (2002–2006), universalist 
strategies were combined with an assimilationist problem definition. These 
two instances of frame ambiguity are similar to the frame ambiguity that was 
encountered in Antwerp. In the following paragraph, I will further outline 
the characteristics of frame ambiguity and address the question how frame 
ambiguity can be understood from the political context and problem context 
in both cities.
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Two forms of frame ambiguity and their context
Antwerp and Rotterdam were both characterized by a tradition of multicul-
turalist migrant integration policies. Coherent with the broader European 
backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010), we observe 
that both cities departed from their multiculturalist policies during the early 
2000s. Frame analysis of problem definitions and proposed strategies dem-
onstrates that subsequent frames of migrant integration policies have been 
ambiguous in two ways (Table 3.2).
First, ambiguous framing of migrant integration was present in the period of 
2002–2006 in Rotterdam and 2012–2013 in Antwerp when proponents of an 
assimilationist frame toward migrant integration were in power. Policy docu-
ments of these periods show an emphasis on an assimilationist problem defi-
nition. This problem definition marked a frame shift with previous policies. 
However, this problem definition was not combined with an assimilationist 
policy strategy. Instead, universalist policy strategies were proposed. In Rot-
terdam, the central policy program ‘Mensen Maken de Stad’ explicitly targeted 
all citizens of the city and their social cohesion while not promoting one cul-
ture over another. In Antwerp, targeted policies and organizations such as the 
new executive agency dealing with migrant integration increasingly focused 
on their core task of civic integration. Integration measures for ethnic minori-
ties in general were explicitly mainstreamed and organized by other bodies 
of government. Policy strategies were not just a continuation of the previous 
Table 3.2: Overview of frames
City Timeframe Problem definition Policy strategy
Antwerp
1998-2006 Multiculturalism Multiculturalism
2006-2012 - Universalism
2012-2013 Assimilationism Universalism
Rotterdam
1998-2002 Multiculturalism Multiculturalism
2002-2006 Assimilationism Universalism
2006-2013 - Universalism
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multiculturalist policy period, but concern newly initiated universalist policy 
strategies despite the assimilationist problem definition. Frame ambiguity is 
thus recognizable here in the form of frame inconsistency in terms of problem 
definition and policy strategy.
A second form of frame ambiguity was encountered in Antwerp from 2006 
to 2012 and in Rotterdam from 2006 to 2013. During these periods, policy 
documents showed an overemphasis on a universalist policy strategy of main-
streaming, while leaving the problem definition open to interpretation. A 
universalist problem definition would entail defining diversity as an asset of 
the urban society, problematizing ethnic inequalities and encouraging mutual 
cultural adaptation to a new urban culture. Diversity is recognized in both cit-
ies as a fact, but it is not defined in policy documents in a positive or negative 
sense. The policies almost exclusively focused on what ought to be while not 
defining what is. Targeted measures were avoided and also the coordinative 
administrative structures in both cities were mainstreamed: departments 
particularly focusing on migrant integration were sized down or disappeared 
and the responsibility for migrant integration policies was distributed over 
other departments. Without defining a problem context, the policy strategy 
of mainstreaming became a goal in itself. This form of frame ambiguity can be 
seen as frame incompleteness.
How can these two forms of frame ambiguity be understood from the political 
context and problem context in both cities? Several similarities in both cities 
with regard to the problem context and political context were pointed out in 
the interviews with policymakers. In the period in which frame ambiguity 
first emerged (2002–2013 in Rotterdam; 2006–2013 in Antwerp), both cities 
were coping with an increasingly complex problem context. Both cities have 
a relatively large and diverse immigrant population: Antwerp is home to citi-
zens of 174 different nationalities, together making up a share of 45.8% of the 
population (Antwerpen Buurtmonitor 2015). Rotterdam inhabits over 170 
nationalities that constitute 49.5% of the population (Centre for Research and 
Statistics Rotterdam 2015). The population has internally become increas-
ingly differentiated, including new immigrant groups, immigrant descendants 
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of the third or fourth generation and interethnic marriages (Thomson & 
Crul 2007). In terms of Vertovec (2007), Antwerp and Rotterdam cope with 
a situation of superdiversity in which targeted measures – as characteristic 
of multiculturalist or differentialist policy frames – are hard to implement. 
It became increasingly difficult to demarcate the target group of integration 
policies (cf. Chock 1995). Frame ambiguity emerged as a sensible option to 
cope with such issue complexities (cf. March 1978).
At the same time both cities were confronted with a need for significant 
budget cuts during the late 2000s. No longer funding targeted integration 
measures became a compelling choice. Since the late 2000s, in both cities 
many provisions and services for immigrants and immigrant organizations 
started to disappear, just as the administrative departments that governed 
them. A universalist policy strategy was practically and financially advanta-
geous for both cities at that time. Ambiguous policy frames are suitable in 
such a situation of bounded rationality and limited resources to manage the 
complex problem context (March 1978; Baumgartner & Jones 1993).
The political context in both cities has had an evident influence on the 
emergence of frame ambiguity as well. Both cities knew a long tradition 
of multiculturalist integration policies under social democratic rule. This 
tradition was criticized and challenged in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when there was a broadly shared opinion of failed multiculturalist policies 
(Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). Even within the social democratic majorities 
that traditionally promoted a multiculturalist integration policy frame, this 
led to a shift toward a universalist policy frame. In Antwerp, this happened 
under the second term of Mayor Janssens and in Rotterdam early universalist 
policies can be recognized in the policy program ‘Multicolored city’. However, 
the political struggle over the replacement of the multicultural frame was 
thereby not yet decided.
In both cities the support for right-wing nationalist parties grew in the early 
2000s. They became a powerful political player in both city councils. In Ant-
werp, the radical right-wing party Vlaams Blok was forced to disband in 2004 
after a trial ruled that the party was repeatedly encouraging discrimination. 
The party was reinstated under a new name ‘Vlaams Belang’ with a revised 
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statute. Vlaams Belang is a far right, Flemish nationalist party that advocates 
the independence of Flanders and strict limitations on immigration, while 
immigrants are obliged to adopt the Flemish culture and language. The party 
rejects multiculturalism and takes an openly assimilationist stance toward 
integration. Vlaams Belang gained a significant share of votes in the municipal 
and federal elections in the 2000s, but never had executive power. Like Vlaams 
Blok, Vlaams Belang was subjected to a cordon sanitaire when all other Flem-
ish parties agreed to systematically exclude the party from participating in 
coalitions on the federal or municipal level. However, our interviewees note 
that the voice of Vlaams Belang was very strong in the city council and in 
the public debate of Antwerp (interviewees municipality and De8). A policy-
maker states: ‘Vlaams belang posed great pressure on integration policies until 
recently. Not a single piece of policy went unnoticed. Every week they asked 
questions in the city council about all kinds of subjects: How many mosques are 
there? Who are visiting them? You name it.’ The party was a latent but strong 
influence on integration policies. As a result of this, the 2006–2012 social 
democratic city executive already put a large emphasis on the obligations of 
minority citizens to participate (Interview De8; Janssens 2011).
In Rotterdam, the right-wing nationalist party ‘Leefbaar Rotterdam’ started 
in 2001 under political leadership of Pim Fortuyn. The party won the 2002 
municipal elections and led the city executive in the period 2002–2006 
while making migrant integration a priority issue. Even before and after this 
political reign, the quick rise and popularity of Pim Fortuyn and his political 
views pressured the political majority in the city council into taking a more 
assimilationist approach toward migrant integration. In the elections of 2006 
and 2010, Leefbaar Rotterdam remained the largest opposition party in the 
city council, but the social democrats again won the elections and led the city 
executive. Nevertheless, Leefbaar Rotterdam remained a powerful presence 
in the city regarding integration issues; in 2014 it would again win the local 
elections and lead the city executive.
The use of ambiguous universalist framing of migrant integration was useful 
in the sociodemocratic executive periods in Antwerp from 2006 to 2012 and in 
Rotterdam from 2006 to 2013. A mainstreaming strategy enabled announcing 
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harsh measures related to participation, while focusing on all citizens and 
not immigrants specifically. This incomplete frame enabled policy-makers 
to accommodate a broad range of political opinions in the local city councils 
(cf. Stone 1988; Yanow 1996; Newman & Clarke 2009). This policy strategy 
appeased the right-wing nationalist opposition that pushed for assimilation-
ist measures, as a multiculturalist or universalist policy definition was not 
elaborated. The problem definition was left ambiguous. A universalist policy 
strategy of ‘mainstreaming’ is a glove that fits a universalist as well as an 
assimilationist problem definition. Similar to what Stone (1988) and Yanow 
(1996) have argued, ambiguity allowed policy-makers to placate multiple 
political actors in a policy controversy. Frame ambiguity is a strategy to deal 
with and increasingly complex problem context and political controversy.
Conclusions
Frames in policy are the result of lengthy and thorough processes of political 
negotiation and bureaucratic labor. While in other disciplines studying, for 
example, social movement or media frames sometimes incomplete, fluent and 
ambiguous frames have been described, policy frames are generally perceived 
to be well elaborated and unambiguous: They consist of a compatible problem 
definition (what is) and policy solution (what ought to be), while one frame at 
a time guides policy action. Policy frames are assumed to be ‘strong frames’ 
in the sense that they consist of a uniform, explicit and coherent problem 
interpretation and policy strategy.
This frame analysis of policy frames related to the intractable policy con-
troversy of local migrant integration problems demonstrates that this is not 
always the case. I encountered two distinctive forms of frame ambiguity. First, 
an incoherent problem definition and policy strategy exists. In both cities this 
entailed an assimilationist problem definition combined with a universalist 
policy strategy of mainstreaming at a time when the cities were under rule of 
right-wing nationalist parties. Second, an incomplete frame was encountered 
consisting of only a universalist policy strategy of mainstreaming while lack-
3.5 
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ing a problem definition. In Antwerp, this can be recognized from 2006–2012 
and in Rotterdam between 2006 and 2013. Other forms of frame ambiguity 
that were not encountered, are thinkable. For example, merely symbolic poli-
cies could entail providing a problem definition without elaborating a policy 
strategy.
Analysis of the local problem and policy context demonstrates that the frame 
ambiguity is not a result of poor policy-making, but a way out of a deadlock 
caused by problem complexity (cf. March 1978) and political controversy (cf. 
Stone 1988). In both cities, the problem context became increasingly complex 
with a situation of superdiversity and the need for budget cuts. Targeted 
policies were no longer possible according to the main policy actors, forcing 
reframing to a generic policy strategy without many benefitting subsidies. Am-
biguous policy frames are suitable in such a situation of bounded rationality 
and limited resources to manage the complex problem context (March 1978; 
Baumgartner & Jones 1993). Also, the political context became increasingly 
contested with the emergence and popularity of right-wing nationalist parties 
and a broadly shared belief that multiculturalist policies had failed. When the 
right-wing parties came in power, in both cities an assimilationist problem 
definition was strongly put forward. However, this was combined with a 
universalist policy strategy of mainstreaming. There is unexpected alignment 
between these two frame elements. This was a sensible outcome in a situation 
of political polarization of integration issues (Stone 1988; Yanow 1996).
Overall, a universalist policy strategy was present in all instances of frame 
ambiguity. As our analysis has shown, this policy strategy became a goal 
in itself and could be paired with and legitimized from different problem 
definitions. It proved a glove that fits multiple problem interpretations. This 
warrants integration researchers that when a mainstreaming policy strategy 
is encountered, this does not always indicate a coherent universalist policy 
framing, including the definition of diversity as a benefit. As mainstreaming 
practices are also popular in other policy fields – including gender policies – 
policy analysts should be sensitive to frame ambiguity in those fields as well.
Ambiguous frames should not necessarily be interpreted as weak frames, as 
some literature would presume (cf. Tewksbury & Scheufele 2009). Our analy-
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sis shows that in complex policy realities and political controversy, we can 
speak of a ‘strength of weak frames’. Similar to Granovetter’s (1973) argument 
of the ‘strength of weak ties’, I find that strong and weak frames serve different 
purposes. Weak frames may not be the most efficient in steering policy action, 
but can be sensible in situations of uncertainty and successful in compromis-
ing between competing information and interests (cf. March 1978; Stone 
1988; Yanow 1996). Weak frames enable policy-making in a deadlock. This 
conclusion with regard to frame ambiguity is similar to what scholars already 
described to ambiguity in policy language in general (March 1978; Stone 
1988). This analysis shows that ambiguity may also exist in the construct of 
policy frames. These findings contribute to theorization about policy frames 
and methodologies of policy frame analysis. Sensitivity to frame ambiguity is 
needed, especially when studying intractable policy controversies.
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Abstract
Policy agenda-setting studies usually focus on the correspondence of quanti-
ties of media attention with changes on the policy agenda. Recent studies 
suggest that also taking into account qualitative aspects of media coverage 
will provide for a more encompassing understanding of policy agenda-setting. 
This study analyzes media coverage of sixteen focusing events related to Dutch 
immigration policies – a controversial policy domain that is regularly under 
media scrutiny. With a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) design we 
study what configurations of conditions related to media coverage are associ-
ated with changes on the policy agenda. Next to quantity of media attention, 
we take into account whether the majority of media coverage is contesting the 
current policy frame and whether the framing in the media is consonant. Our 
analysis indicates that frame contestation is a necessary condition for policy 
agenda-setting. Media attention and frame consonance are only relevant indi-
cators of changes on the policy agenda when the majority of media coverage 
is contesting the current policy frame. Media coverage on focusing events is 
more likely to be associated with changes on the policy agenda when multiple 
conditions are present. However, frame consonance is unlikely to go hand in 
hand with high levels of media attention.
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Introduction
Media attention for public policies is often initiated by focusing events that 
put policies up for debate. Focusing events are sudden, relatively rare events 
that spark intense public attention and media attention (Birkland 2011: 116). 
How media report of policy-related focusing events provides an important 
form of feedback to processes of public policymaking (Wolfe et al. 2013). Me-
dia reports can provide new information on the development of policy issues 
and the effects of policy measures. As such, media coverage is a form of infor-
mation by which policies are informed, next to for example official statistics, 
expert advice and stakeholder lobby. Aside from being an important source of 
information on policy issues, media coverage informs policymakers on how 
policy issues are perceived by the public. Media coverage is both formed by 
and formative of public opinion. Policymakers tend to be responsive to media 
coverage as they presume its representativeness of public opinion (Walgrave 
& Van Aelst 2006).
Agenda-setting studies generally agree that the salience attributed to policy 
issues in the media influences prioritization of these issues on the policy 
agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Soroka 2002; Yanovitzki 2002; Tan & 
Weaver 2009; Melenhorst 2015). Studies however come to different conclu-
sions with regard to the strength of this policy agenda-setting effect (Nowak 
2013). Recent studies suggest that the quantity of media attention does not 
fully account for changes on the policy agenda and that qualitative aspects of 
the media coverage are contingent factors in policy agenda-setting (Walgrave 
& Van Aelst 2006; Wolfe et al. 2013). This entails taking into account the ‘fram-
ing’ of the issue in the media. Issue frames concern different interpretations 
of the issue at hand, leading to different implications with regard to policy 
consequences (Entman 1993: 52; Rein & Schön 1993: 146). Media frames can 
support current policies, but also be critical and push for policy change (Wolfe 
et al. 2013).
Studying such contingent processes of policy agenda-setting by media 
coverage requires a change in the traditional agenda-setting research designs 
in three ways. Firstly, we need to take into account the issues frames that are 
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communicated in media publications. We analyze what types of frames exist 
around certain issues, whether they agree or disagree with the policy frame 
and the extent to which media framing is consonant or dissonant. Secondly, we 
need a broader and more qualitative conceptualization of the agenda-setting 
effect on the policy agenda. Macro studies usually operationalize quantitative 
changes in government spending as an indicator of a change in prioritiza-
tion of issues on the policy agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). An agenda-setting effect, particularly concerning specific 
focusing events, can also take minor forms in terms of changes of the issue 
frame on the policy agenda. Thirdly, scholars assert that policy agenda-setting 
by the media is not a linear process but entails complex causal interactions 
with feedback effects and multiple contingencies (Boydstun 2013; Wolfe et 
al. 2013). Qualitative aspects of media coverage are likely to interact with 
quantitative measures of media attention. This should be taken into account 
in the choice of research design and the assumptions on which it is based.
We focus our study on a specific policy domain which often gains media cov-
erage and around which a multiplicity of frames exists: the policy domain of 
immigration. Focusing events related to this policy domain are used by policy 
actors as windows of opportunity to put current policies up for public debate. 
For example, some policy actors argue in favor of generous policies while oth-
ers propagate more restrictive immigration laws. We analyzed attention and 
framing related to sixteen recent immigration-related focusing events in the 
Netherlands (2011-2015) in the media and on the policy agenda. In order to 
study the role of framing in policy agenda-setting by the media, we formulated 
the following research question: Under what conditions is media coverage 
for policy issues associated with changes on the policy agenda? A qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA) methodology allows us to study configurational 
explanations of changes on the policy agenda including qualitative aspects of 
media attention.
In the following paragraphs we first provide an overview of recent literature 
on policy agenda-setting that points at a contingency of media-characteristics 
in this process. Based on this literature we formulate configurational hypoth-
eses on when media coverage will have policy impact. This type of hypotheses 
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includes multiple characteristics of media coverage. Qualitative comparative 
analysis demonstrates that media coverage on focusing events is more likely 
to be associated with policy change when multiple conditions are present. 
Frame contestation in particular proves to be a necessary condition for policy 
change. Furthermore, our analysis shows that large amounts of media atten-
tion are unlikely to go along with frame consonance. These research findings 
speak to two research traditions: firstly, research on policy agenda-setting by 
the media and secondly to literature on media and policy-framing dynamics 
related to immigration issues.
Theoretical framework
Policy agenda-setting
An effect of media on public policy is difficult to establish. Firstly, many dif-
ferent forces are at play in the policy process, making it difficult to isolate a 
media effect. Secondly, correspondence between the media agenda and policy 
agenda is not necessarily the result of agenda-setting. The policy agenda also 
influences the media agenda and in some cases external factors cause varia-
tion on both agendas independently. Media sometimes lead and sometimes 
lag policy (Baumgartner & Jones 1993: 125; Wolfe et al. 2013). Studies search-
ing for linear causality have often failed to capture a policy agenda-setting 
effect by the media. Exchanges between the media agenda and policy agenda 
should be understood as reciprocal causal interactions with feedback effects 
and multiple contingencies (Soroka 2002; Wolfe et al. 2013).
Generally, research findings point at an agenda-setting effect of media 
coverage on the policy agenda. However, findings differ with regard to the 
strength of this effect and scholars assume that there are contingent factors 
at play (Eilders 2000: 182; Yanovitzki 2002:445; Soroka 2002; Walgrave & Van 
Aelst 2006; Wolfe et al. 2013). In policy agenda-setting not only the quantity 
of media attention is relevant, but also how the issues are interpreted: the 
issue framing. According to Schön and Rein (1994), divergent framing of the 
policy issue in the media can lead to frame reflection among policymakers. 
4.2 
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The agenda-setting effect that is under scrutiny in this study is therefore not 
just prioritization of the issue on the policy agenda, but also continuity and 
change of the issue frame on the policy agenda. As Van Aelst et al. (2014: 204) 
argue, changes on the substantive policy agenda have a very direct impact on, 
or are policy. This study takes a micro-perspective on policy agenda-setting 
in which policy change is conceptualized as changes in the issue frame on 
the policy agenda. We do not take into account the prioritization of immigra-
tion policies in relation to other policy domains. Instead, we focus on agenda 
changes in relation to specific issues, for example changes in policy decisions 
or implementation that are reflected in changing issue frames on the policy 
agenda.
Frames are social constructions describing an issue in terms of a specific 
problem definition, casual rationale and proposed solution (Entman 1993: 52; 
Rein & Schön 1993: 146). We developed a typology of four ‘master-frames’ 
(Snow & Benford 1992) to guide our analysis of the media and policy agenda 
related to immigration. This analytic framework is issue-specific for immigra-
tion issues, but can be applied to various types of cases including frames 
related to individual immigrants, immigrant groups, the built of asylum 
centers or policy initiatives. Based on earlier research on framing related to 
immigration and immigrants, we distinguish a human interest frame, a threat 
frame, an economic frame, and a managerialist frame (D’Haenens & De Lange 
2001; El Refaie 2001; Horsti 2003; Van Gorp 2006; Vliegenthart 2007; Benson 
2013).
For each master-frame we operationalized four elements of frames (cf. Ent-
man, 1993; Rein and Schön 1993; Scholten 2011). First, a problem-definition 
that gives a certain interpretation of the issue at hand. For example, immigra-
tion as a valuable addition to society or as an unwelcome threat. Second, a 
causal narrative of how to explain why the issue arose. For example, circum-
stances in immigrants’ countries of origin, or profitable welfare regimes in 
the countries of destination. Third, a frame defines one or multiple target 
groups. These may entail individual immigrants or immigrant groups who 
are subject of discussion or for example citizens in a municipality hosting a 
new asylum center. This concerns an attribution of responsibility and blame 
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(Iyengar 1990; Schneider and Ingram 1993). Fourth and finally, frames include 
a strategy for solving the issue. For example, more restrictive or liberal im-
migration policies.
 In order to resonate with socially shared cognitive frames of refer-
ence, frames include so-called ‘framing devices’ to communicate the message 
to the greater audience (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Van Gorp 2006: 83). 
Metaphors, catchphrases, examples, visual images and statistics are used 
to communicate the frame (cf. Edelman 1964; Stone 1988). These framing 
devices refer to a certain frame of the issue and resonate with interpretive 
schemata among audiences. Our analysis took into account framing devices 
referring to our four master-frames. A well-known example is the metaphor 
of a ‘tsunami’ of immigrants, appealing to a threat-frame. In some cases only 
one or two of these elements of frames are outlined in media coverage or in 
policies. However, based on reasoning devices and framing devices that are 
present, a frame can be recognized.
Configurational hypotheses
This paper qualitatively explores the contingent role of issue attention and 
issue framing in the media in policy agenda-setting processes. Based on 
agenda-setting literature we distinguish a number of factors related to me-
dia coverage of policy issues that may contribute to policy agenda-setting. 
Firstly, the quantity of media attention. This condition is central to most policy 
agenda-setting research and is expected be an important contribution to an 
agenda-setting effect. The more media attention and the longer it persists, the 
higher the likelihood of achieving a policy agenda-setting effect (Baumgartner 
& Jones 1993).
Secondly, we take into account the relation between the framing in media 
coverage and the issue frame on the policy agenda. When the majority of 
framing in media coverage is similar to the issue frame on the policy agenda, 
we consider there to be ‘frame agreement’. When the majority of framing in 
media coverage is different from the issue frame on the policy agenda, we 
speak of a situation of ‘frame contestation’. In this case, media coverage is 
predominantly critical toward the current policy frame. Frame contestation is 
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hypothesized to increase the likelihood of policy change (Boydstun et al. 2014: 
178). Information that does not fit the existing policy frame is likely to be ig-
nored at first when it concerns just a minority of coverage (cf. Baumgartner & 
Jones 1993; Schön & Rein 1994). When a contesting frame comes to dominate 
the media coverage, it becomes harder to ignore.
Thirdly, we will study whether the framing of the issue in the media is 
consonant or dissonant (cf. Eilders 2000; Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). The 
prevalence of frames in media coverage ranges from domination of one 
frame (frame consonance) to the coexistence of several frames that are given 
roughly equal attention (frame dissonance) (Entman 2003b: 418). In case of 
frame consonance, a frame is dominant throughout a broad selection of media 
outlets. Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011: 303) hypothesize that while individual 
media outlets are not very influential as such, mass media are a tremendous 
force ‘when the coverage is consonant across outlets and when the mass media 
are in ‘stampede mode.’’ We thus expect that the media coverage for a case 
is more likely to be associated with policy change when media coverage is 
characterized by frame consonance. When a variety of media outlets report 
on the same issue according to a singular frame over a relatively long time, 
then media coverage is more likely to influence policy decisions (Eilders 2000; 
Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006).
 In correspondence with our QCA methodology we formulate con-
figurational hypotheses including multiple conditions. First, we expect the 
three individual conditions described above to correspond positively with 
policy change and to be mutually reinforcing. We hypothesize that the more 
conditions are present, the more likely that this is associated with policy 
change.
H1: The more conditions are present (quantity of media attention, frame con-
testation and frame consonance), the more likely it is that the case is associated 
with policy change.
A second hypothesis is that we expect frame contestation to be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for policy change. Media attention alone, even 
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if it is very consonant, will not correspond with policy change when media 
attention is characterized by frame agreement with the policy frame. On the 
other hand, we hypothesize that frame contestation in media coverage is 
not a sufficient condition for policy change. Frame contestation should gain 
substantial amounts of attention and/or be consonant throughout media 
coverage in order to correspond with policy change.
H2: Frame contestation is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for policy 
change.
Methodology
Data
This study comparatively analyses mass media coverage and the policy agen-
da related to sixteen immigration cases in the Netherlands that took place 
between 2011 and 2015 (Table 4.1). These cases were purposefully selected 
to be heterogeneous in terms of quantity of media attention and type of case. 
Each case entails a focusing event that generated media coverage (Birkland 
2011). Our sample for example includes individual immigrants facing de-
portation, specific immigrant groups in the Netherlands, the built of asylum 
centers and new policy initiatives. This heterogeneous selection of focusing 
events within one policy domain enables us to comparatively analyze cases 
with different amounts of media attention and generating different frame 
allocations in media coverage.
We chose the policy domain of immigration because it can be characterized 
as an ‘intractable policy controversy’ around which a multiplicity of frames 
exists (Schön & Rein 1994). This is the case in the Netherlands, similar to 
many other Western European countries. Focusing events related to immigra-
tion are used by policy actors as windows of opportunity to debate current 
immigration policies. Some policy actors will frame such events as evidence 
for the success and need of sustaining current policies. Others will frame such 
focusing events to contest current policies and push for policy change (Wolfe 
4.3 
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et al. 2013: 181). Due to this controversy, immigration issues regularly gain 
media attention and the policy agenda of this domain has witnessed several 
major and minor changes (Scholten 2011). These characteristics make the 
policy domain of immigration a likely case for media impact on the policy 
agenda (Koch-Baumgartner & Voltmer 2010: 215-224).
For each case, we quantitatively mapped the media attention throughout 
a selection of Dutch national media outlets over a period of six months. In 
our sample of media outlets we included the four main national newspapers 
(Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad, Telegraaf, De Volkskrant), three opin-
ion magazines (Elsevier, De Groene Amsterdammer, Vrij Nederland) and six 
television news and current affairs reports of the public television channels 
(NOS 20:00 Journaal, Nieuwsuur, EenVandaag, Pauw (en Witteman)/Knevel 
Table 4.1: Selected cases
Case ID Label
MAN Mauro Manuel
DOL Aleksandr Dolmatov
AHM Abdul Ghafoor Ahmadzai
BUT Dennis Butera
ERI Eritrese asylum seekers
HUN Hunger strike among asylum seekers in detention center Rotterdam
UGA LHBT-asylum seekers Uganda
RET Return of rejected asylum seekers to Rwanda/Burundi
AMS Rejected asylum seekers residing in Amsterdam ‘Vluchtkerk’
ORA Asylum centre Oranje
IJS Asylum centre IJsselhallen
CHI Regulation of reunification asylum children
POL Complaint website Eastern European immigrants ‘Polenmeldpunt’
COD Ministers’ official warning about EU-mobility ‘Code Oranje’
PAR Amnesty for asylum children ‘Kinderpardon’
AUP A new policy for au pairs
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en Van den Brink, De Wereld Draait Door, Pownews). This selection includes 
a large proportion of the Dutch news media with a variety of political and 
ideological backgrounds (cf. Bakker & Scholten 2014). Dutch media generally 
operate rather autonomously without partisan alignment and with high inter-
nal pluriformity in terms of framing (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart 2007: 407).
Relevant newspaper and opinion magazine articles were collected from the 
LexisNexis database including full-text publications. Video files of TV items 
were collected from the database of the Netherlands Institute for Sound and 
Vision. Queries for relevant TV items were made in a database with subtitles 
of Dutch public television programmes. Boolean search strings were devel-
oped for queries in the different databases in order to collect relevant media 
publications for each case. Different search strings were developed to ensure 
sensitivity and specificity of the queries for each type of media. For the sixteen 
cases in total, we collected 1455 media reports including newspaper articles, 
opinion magazine articles and TV items.
Furthermore, we studied the national Dutch policy agenda of immigration 
and asylum issues. We analyzed continuity and change in policy decisions 
and implementation by collecting letters from the government to parliament 
related to our cases. A focus on cases within a policy domain and operation-
alizing policy change as a change in policy framing of the issue makes for a 
feasible research design. Scholars have argued that analyzing full legislative 
change is difficult as the ‘issue attention cycle’ of the media is much shorter 
than the workings of bureaucracy (cf. Downs 1972; Walgrave & Van Aelst 
2006; Koch-Baumgartner & Voltmer 2010). This makes it difficult to relate 
agenda changes back to media coverage that probably has long vanished. We 
overcome this by analyzing changes on a micro scale in issue frames on the 
policy agenda.
Relevant policy documents were collected via a designated website by the 
Dutch government (‘zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl’). Based on similar 
Boolean queries, we collected data on developments on the policy agenda 
from the start of each case until one year after that date (N= 49). This ex-
tended time period in comparison to our collection of media coverage ensures 
taking into account later changes on the policy agenda due to a lag in time. A 
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minimum six months to maximum one-year lag time is sufficient to follow 
changes in issue framing (Nowak 2013).
Methods
Guided by our analytic framework of four master-frames we conducted frame 
analysis of the collected media content. We assume that a limited number of 
possible frames of immigration issues exists that can be promoted in media 
attention and policy communication addressing the issue. We furthermore 
assume that in most communication, one dominant frame will prevail, even 
though the issue can be portrayed from different viewpoints and by differ-
ent actors in one message. As frames resonate with cognitive structures, one 
cannot approach an issue from multiple frames at once (Van Hulst & Yanow 
2015).
In a first round of coding we specified for each case what frames were 
present in the media coverage and how they relate to our four master-frames. 
We coded all media content in ATLAS.ti based on reasoning devices (problem 
definition, causal reasoning, target group and proposed solution) and framing 
devices (Metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, statistics and comparisons/
examples). This way, we established a maximum of four most prevalent frames 
in media coverage per case and we defined them in relation to our typology 
of master-frames. In some cases, multiple case-specific frames relating to one 
master-frame exist. In a second round of coding, we annotated each piece of 
media content based on the dominant framing of the message according to the 
operationalization of the case-specific frames. Publications in which multiple 
frames were present without one being dominant and publications in which 
the framing was unclear, were coded as such. Likewise, the dominant issue 
framing in policy-letters to parliament was coded.
The validity of frame analysis of media content was safeguarded by 
inter-coder reliability tests of a sample of media publications. After an initial 
round of coding, this was 0.6 which is considered to be an acceptable rate in 
social sciences. This first inter coder reliability test was used to increase the 
convergent validity (Friese 2012:111) by establishing new coding rules after 
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discussion of coding differences. Inter coder reliability based on these new 
rules was 0.9.
In order to establish to what extent different aspects of media coverage were 
relevant conditions in explaining changes on the policy agenda, we used the 
method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987; Rihoux & 
Ragin 2009; Schneider & Wagemann 2012). This method allows us to system-
atically compare characteristics of cases and uncover patterns in this data. It 
is a suitable method to compare a relatively small number of cases, usually 5 
to 50. The aspects on which the cases are compared are named ‘conditions’ 
and combinations of conditions are ‘configurations’. Next to analyzing con-
figurational explanations, an additional advantage is that the method goes 
beyond linear notions of causality by assuming equifinality and multifinality 
(Verweij & Gerrits 2012: 27). This entails taking into account that different 
conditions can produce similar outcomes, and that the same condition can 
produce different outcomes in different contexts (or configurations). This fits 
our theoretical assumption that policy agenda-setting by the media is not a 
linear causal process but entails complex causal interactions (Boydstun 2013; 
Wolfe et al. 2013).
The outcome that is studied in this research is change in the issue frame on 
the policy agenda. We study such policy change in relation to three conditions 
related to media coverage: the quantity of media attention, frame consonance 
and frame contestation (Table 4.2). We operationalized these conditions in 
Table 4.2: Operationalization of conditions for analysis
Outcome: Policy 
change
Change in issue frame on the policy agenda within a period of 
maximum 1 year after initiation of media coverage of the case.
Media attention Over 100 publications in our selection of newspapers, opinion 
magazines and TV programmes within 6 months after the onset 
of media coverage of the case.
Frame contestation When the framing of over 50% of media coverage is different 
from the initial issue frame on the policy agenda.
Frame consonance When one frame is dominant in over 50% of all media 
publication.
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terms of presence or absence of each condition in the case and conduct ‘crisp 
set’ QCA (Table 4.2). We used specialized software package ‘Tosmana’ (Tool 
for Small-N Analysis) for the analysis (Cronqvist 2011).
The strength of QCA lies in not only simplifying the richness of cases in 
terms of conditions, but also re-interpreting the results of the QCA in terms of 
the specific case-characteristics. The process of QCA can be visualized as an 
hourglass. First, in-depth qualitative analysis of the cases collects a large and 
rich body of data on each case. Second, QCA entails a reduction of the complex-
ity by summarizing the cases on relevant conditions and the outcomes and 
looking for patterns of co-occurrences (configurations) that are compared to 
configurational hypotheses. Other than quantitative methodologies, QCA does 
not strive for full explanation and significant correlation of certain conditions 
with the outcome. Instead residual complexity and exceptional ‘black swan’ 
cases are assumed to be present and used for more in-depth interpretation 
of the findings.
Results
Dynamics of interaction between immigration frames on 
the policy agenda and in media coverage
The Dutch policy agenda initially frames the majority of cases as manageri-
alist (11 of 16 cases). This policy frame is often explicitly communicated in 
cases concerning individual immigrants (MAN, AHM, BUT), specific immi-
grant groups (HUN, AMS, CHI) or new asylum locations (ORA, IJS). This frame 
maintains a depoliticized and pragmatic approach toward immigration issues. 
It considers certain rules and regulations related to immigration as neces-
sary and justified. The central argument is that to be able to accommodate 
immigrants, the government needs to be selective in who may enter and in 
the services that are provided. This frame furthermore argues that each rule 
creates cases that do not match the rules. This however does not mean that 
the rules should be bent in each case. ‘A rule is a rule’, it is argued. Pragmatic 
4.4 
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policy measures are proposed which are judged based on effectiveness in-
stead of moral implications.
In the remaining five cases the policy agenda is initially characterized by a 
human interest (3 cases) or threat frame (2 cases). These cases mostly con-
cern policy initiatives by the government. A human interest or threat frame is 
used to politically motivate the proposed policy change. This is for example 
the case with the influx of large numbers of EU workers to the Netherlands 
(COD), the new regulation for au pairs (AUP) or the proposal for more lenient 
treatment of asylum requests of Ugandan gay immigrants (UGA). Immigration 
and asylum are framed as a threat in relation to proposals for stricter regula-
tions and framed as issues of human interest in relation to proposals for more 
lenient immigration policies.
Media coverage of each case included a multiplicity of frames of which the 
dominant frame was different over various types of cases. In nine of sixteen 
cases, mostly cases of individual immigrants or specific immigrant groups, 
a human interest frame dominates in media coverage. In most cases when 
a human interest frame was dominant in media coverage the government 
is faced with public attention and mobilization around issues that were not 
(high) on its agenda yet. The human interest frame is propagated in the media 
by the lawyers of the immigrants, politicians, NGO’s, or others supporting 
immigrants and pushing for policy attention and change. This frame asserts 
that in these specific cases immigrants are treated unjustly as a result of re-
strictive immigration rules. The policies and government officials have no eye 
for unique circumstances in the case that require attention. This frame calls 
for a special – more lenient – treatment in these cases or for more generous 
policies towards immigrants in general.
For example in the case of the hunger strike in Rotterdam, asylum seekers 
in detention and organizations supporting them put current regulations up 
for debate by gathering media attention for the living situation of asylum 
seekers in detention. These actors promoted a human interest frame of the 
situation: ‘placing rejected asylum seekers under custody is inhumane’. At the 
same time, the government met this critique with a managerialist response: 
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‘the current regulation is necessary and the hunger strike is sabotaging the 
rules’.
When a managerialist policy frame is contested by media coverage domi-
nated by a human interest frame, a ‘David versus Goliath’ dynamic emerges 
(cf. Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud 2014). This co-occurrence of frames reinforces the 
image of a powerless individual fighting a ruthless ‘system’ and is in the dis-
advantage of the policy frame. In many cases, this led to changes on the policy 
agenda. For example in the case of Dennis Butera, the State Secretary initially 
decided that Dennis should leave the Netherlands for his family’s country of 
origin Kenia. The case gained media attention when this decision was chal-
lenged by local support from his school, friends and neighbours. They framed 
the government’s decision as having no eye for individual circumstances, 
while Dennis himself was portrayed as a boy who deserves to stay in the 
Netherlands. Eventually the policy decision changed and the State Secretary 
granted Dennis a residence permit.
When the cases were more abstract, entailing not specific individuals or 
groups but anonymous categories or (policy) initiatives, a managerialist 
frame generally dominated in media coverage of cases (5 of 16 cases). In 
some cases, the managerialist frame was introduced in the media by govern-
ment actors and gained broader support in media coverage. In other cases, a 
managerialist policy frame was met with a managerialist counter-frame in the 
media by policy actors contesting the policy frame. In these latter cases, policy 
initiatives were not objected altogether based on moral reasons (e.g. by using 
a contesting human interest or threat frame), but policy actors negotiated 
the policy frame on its own terms. A dynamic of negotiation emerged. This 
was for example the case with the asylum center in Oranje and with the new 
regulations for international au pairs. The managerialist counter-frame put 
the feasibility of the initiatives up for discussion and proposed changes to the 
proposed regulation. An economic frame was an important side-discussion in 
media coverage of a number of cases, but was not dominant in media coverage 
of any of the cases, nor on the policy agenda.
In nine of the sixteen cases in total, the dominant frame in the media 
coverage was contesting the initial policy frame. This indicates that models 
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of agenda-setting maintaining that media coverage primarily follows the 
government agenda do not hold when it comes to framing of specific issues. 
Alternative frames overshadowed the policy frame in media coverage of these 
cases. The following section describes the results of our QCA of when media 
attention for immigration and asylum cases is associated with policy change.
Conditionality of policy agenda-setting by the media
In nine of sixteen cases, the policy frame remained the same over one year 
after the onset of media attention for the cases. We understand this as no 
agenda-setting effect having taken place. In seven of the sixteen cases, the 
framing of the issue on the policy agenda changed within a period of one year 
after the onset of the issue. This includes four cases of individual asylum seek-
ers, one case of an asylum center and two cases concerning policy proposals. 
We understand this as the occurrence of an agenda-setting effect, however it 
is important to note that this cannot be directly ascribed to media coverage of 
the case. In some cases, a media influence was evident because it was explicitly 
recognized, but in most cases the causes of agenda change remained implicit.
Based on QCA we analyzed what configurations of media-conditions corre-
spond with policy frame shifts. We used the QCA configurations as a first step 
toward more in-depth comparative analysis of the cases. Based on literature 
of agenda-setting by the media, we hypothesized that three characteristics 
of media coverage of policy-related focusing events will play a mutually rein-
forcing role in stipulating a policy agenda-setting effect. First, the quantitative 
scale of media attention, second whether or not the majority of media framing 
is contesting the current policy frame and third whether or not the framing of 
media attention is consonant. The data matrix below (table 4.3) shows how 
our cases scored on these conditions.
According to the QCA methodology, we organized these cases over the 
logically possible configurations in a so-called ‘truth table’. Our truth table 
has 8 logically possible configurations (2^3). Each configuration is presented 
as a row (Table 4.4). We minimized the truth table by pairwise comparison 
of the configurations that agree on the outcome and differ in but one other 
condition (Ragin 1987). This entails logically summarizing the information 
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by restatement of information that is contained in the truth table in terms 
of a proposition or sets of propositions. The results are reported in Table 4.5. 
Contradictory configurations are not included in this minimization process 
but are described as such.
As assumed within QCA methodology, the configurations resulting from the 
analysis do not provide unanimous support for our hypotheses. Instead they 
reflect the complexity of empirical reality and provide a first step toward 
more in-depth comparative analysis of the cases, reconnecting with the rich 
empirical data.
Table 4.3: Data matrix ‘Policy change’ and three conditions (crisp set)
Case ID
Media 
attention 
(1=Large)
Frame 
contestation 
(1=Yes)
Frame 
consonance 
(1=Yes)
Policy
change 
(1=Yes)
MAN 1 1 0 1
DOL 1 1 0 1
AHM 0 1 1 1
BUT 0 1 1 1
ORA 0 1 0 1
PAR 0 1 0 1
AUP 0 1 1 1
ERI 1 0 0 0
UGA 0 0 0 0
RET 0 0 1 0
AMS 1 1 0 0
IJS 0 0 0 0
HUN 0 1 1 0
CHI 0 1 1 0
POL 1 1 0 0
COD 0 0 1 0
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The configurations indicate that cases characterized by more than one of our 
media-conditions are more likely to correspond with frame change on the 
policy agenda. This supports the first configurational hypothesis of our study. 
None of our cases scored 1 on all three conditions, but cases with two condi-
tions present are more likely to correspond with policy change than cases in 
which zero or only one conditions were present. The hypothesis that the three 
conditions are mutually reinforcing is however not fully supported. The logical 
remaining configurations indicate an important exception: frame consonance 
is unlikely to correspond with large amounts of media attention. This finding 
Table 4.4: Truth table policy change according to conditions media attention, frame 
contestation and frame consonance (C=Contradictory row; R= Logical remainder)
Media 
attention 
(MA)
Frame 
contestation 
(FT)
Frame 
consonance 
(FS)
Policy 
change 
(PC)
Cases
0 1 0 1 ORA; PAR
1 0 0 0 ERI
0 0 0 0 UGA; IJS
0 0 1 0 RET; COD
1 1 0 C MAN; DOL; 
AMS; POL
0 1 1 C AHM; BUT; CHI; 
AUP; HUN
1 1 1 R -
1 0 1 R -
Table 4.5: QCA minimization results (lower case= absence of condition; *=AND; 
+=OR)
Outcome (PC) Configuration N
C MA*FT*fs +
ma*FT*FS
9
1 ma*FT*fs 2
0 ft*FS +
ma*ft
5
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can be understood by literature on news values and media logic asserting that 
controversial issues are more likely to receive media attention as a focus on 
conflict is an important news value and media format (cf. Semetko & Valken-
burg 2000). Controversy around the issue will be reflected in dissonant media 
framing and will usually gain large degrees of media attention.
The second hypothesis assumes frame contestation to be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for policy change. This hypothesis is also partly 
confirmed by the analysis. In all cases corresponding with policy change, the 
condition of frame contestation was present. This coverage score indicates 
that frame contestation is a necessary condition in configurations associated 
with policy change. The cases of the asylum center in Oranje and the amnesty 
regulation for asylum children indicate that frame contestation alone is also 
associated with policy change. This suggests that frame contestation is a suf-
ficient condition for policy change. However, unique to these cases is that the 
policy change which took place was motivated by related issues as well. For 
example, the amnesty regulation was already proposed in the earlier case of 
Mauro Manuel. In the case of the asylum center in Oranje, issue linkages were 
made with other small municipalities that were asked to host relatively large 
numbers of asylum seekers. This mobilized broader media coverage in sup-
port of policy change. Thus, an important contextualization of this finding is 
that issue linkage and broader media attention was necessary for these cases 
to have an impact. Therefore we would not conclude that frame contestation 
was a sufficient condition for policy in these cases. Due to issue linkages with 
related cases, the amounts of media attention are actually higher.
Reconnecting the QCA results to the findings of our in-depth case analyses, 
two types of cases can be distinguished that are usually associated with policy 
change and two types of cases that usually are not associated with policy 
change. First of all, there are cases with large quantities of media attention in 
combination with contestation of the policy frame (MAN, DOL). As explained 
in the previous paragraph, the cases of the asylum center in Oranje (ORA) 
and the amnesty for asylum children (PAR) can also be considered to be part 
of this group. The two cases concerning individual immigrants were in the 
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media for weeks with new developments in the case leading to new coverage 
and alternative issue frames. The framing of the cases was not consonant. For 
example in the case of Aleksandr Dolmatov, a research report was published 
that led to a shift in the prevalence of media frames. In the case of Mauro 
Manuel, political developments shed a new light on the case. Furthermore, the 
long duration of media attention for these cases also required media to invite 
alternative opinions to the debate. As pointed out before, frame consonance 
in combination with large amounts of media attention was not encountered in 
any of the cases and does not seem to uphold within the media logic of striving 
for adversary coverage and looking to report on new information on the case.
A second type of cases that can be distinguished gains less media attention, 
but frame contestation occurred in combination with a high degree of frame 
consonance (AHM, BUT, AUP). This configuration of conditions generally cor-
responds with policy change as well. In our research, there are two cases of 
individual immigrants and one case of a policy proposal characterized by this 
configuration. In these cases, powerful coalitions of stakeholders pushed for 
a change in policy decisions. This contestation not only existed within media 
but also other lobby channels were used. In case of the individual immigrants 
Abdul Ghafoor Ahmadzai and Dennis Butera, public support in combination 
with civil society actors and political actors made for a strong opposing coali-
tion. In case of the proposal for a new regulation for international au pairs, 
families hosting au pairs next to an employers’ organization and political 
parties from the opposition shared a frame contesting the frame by which 
the new regulation was proposed. This group of cases indicates that large 
amounts of media attention for a case are not a necessary condition for policy 
change to occur. A consonant counter-frame, brought forward by a strong 
coalition of stakeholders in the media can be effective – likely in combination 
with other lobby channels.
Third, we can distinguish a group of ‘black swan’ cases which are character-
ized by similar conditions as the cases in group 1 and 2, but are not associated 
with policy change. This first group includes the cases of Vluchtkerk and 
Polenmeldpunt (AMS, POL), which are characterized by high levels of media 
attention and frame contestation but are lacking consonance. Secondly, this 
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includes the cases ‘hunger strike by asylum seekers in detention’ and ‘fam-
ily reunification of children of asylum seekers’ (HUN, CHI). What sets these 
four cases apart is that – even when a human interest frame was dominant 
– the subjects of discussion did not acquire a consistent image as victims in 
the debate. The absence of consonant media framing in combination with 
political support for current policies created a situation in which the policy 
frame became highly contested, but policy change eventually did not occur. 
The in-depth analysis of the cases suggests that the political playing field is an 
important intervening factor in policy agenda-setting by the media. Political 
controversy around issues can prevent media framing from becoming conso-
nant and political actors need to be mobilized for policy change.
Fourth and lastly we can distinguish a group of cases in which frame contes-
tation was absent and which are not associated with policy change (ERI, COD, 
RET, UGA, IJS). Even though some of the cases gained large quantities of media 
attention (for example the case of Eritrean asylum seekers), they did not lead 
up to policy change. All five cases concern policy proposals or public statements 
of Ministers. Some proposals were legitimized with a human interest or threat 
frame (Code oranje, Eritrean asylum seekers, Ugandese gay asylum seekers) 
while others were presented as managerialist (Asylum centre in IJsselhallen, 
Return migration to Rwanda and Burundi). The cases have in common that 
the policy frames by which they were introduced in the media did not become 
contested and remained dominant throughout media coverage. The actor that 
is able to first frame the focusing event, is often able to maintain the upper 
hand in the framing of the media coverage. This group of cases once more 
indicates that frame contestation is a necessary condition for policy change.
Conclusions
Scholars of political communication and policy sciences generally find that 
media coverage of policy-related focusing events is an important factor in 
policy agenda-setting. They however come to different conclusions with 
regard to the strength of this effect. Recent studies suggest that in addition to 
4.5 
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quantitative measures of media attention, qualitative aspects of media cover-
age – related to framing of the issue – are relevant conditions in achieving a 
policy agenda-setting effect. In order to achieve a more encompassing under-
standing of policy agenda-setting dynamics by the media, this study applied 
a QCA design to examine how configurations of quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of media coverage associate with changes on the policy agenda. This 
study took into account whether media coverage predominantly promoted a 
frame that was different from the initial policy frame (frame contestation) and 
whether the media coverage was unitary in promoting a single issue frame 
(frame consonance).
We studied the policy agenda and media coverage on sixteen focusing events 
related to the policy domain of immigration. In the Netherlands, similar to 
many other Western European countries, immigration is a highly controver-
sial policy domain. This implies that focusing events related to this domain 
regularly gain media coverage, that media coverage often is characterized 
by a multiplicity of issue frames and that frame shifts on the policy agenda 
occur frequently. Our frame analysis of media coverage and the policy agenda 
is based on a typology of four immigration related master-frames: a human 
interest frame, a threat frame, a managerialist frame and an economic frame.
In qualitative comparative analysis of the conditions under which media 
coverage is associated with changes on the policy agenda, we addressed two 
configurational hypotheses. Firstly, we hypothesized that media attention, 
frame contestation and frame consonance of media coverage are mutually 
reinforcing determinants of policy change: the more conditions present, the 
more likely policy change becomes. Secondly, we hypothesized that frame 
contestation is a necessary condition for policy change: without frame 
contestation, high levels of media attention and frame consonance will not 
correspond with policy change. Our findings support these hypotheses: in 
cases with two conditions present, changes of the issue frame on the policy 
agenda was more likely to occur and especially frame contestation proved a 
necessary condition for policy change. An important additional finding is that 
in none of the cases all three conditions of media coverage were present. This 
is the case because large amounts of media attention and frame consonance 
120 Chapter 4
are not likely to co-occur: issues with a variety of competing frames are more 
likely to keep media engaged as a focus on conflict is an important news value 
and media format.
The dominant frame in media coverage was contesting the initial policy 
frame in a majority of cases. Our frame analysis demonstrates that there are 
specific dynamics by which policy frames and counter-frames of immigration 
address each other. Related to cases of individual immigrants or specific 
immigrant groups, generally a human interest dominates in media coverage. 
When this frame opposes a managerialist policy frame, a ‘David versus 
Goliath’ dynamic emerges (cf. Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud 2014). Related to more 
abstract cases, entailing not specific individuals or groups but abstract issues 
or (policy) initiatives, a managerialist frame generally dominates media cov-
erage. When this is contested by a managerialist policy frame, this initiates a 
dynamic of ‘negotiation’.
As usual in QCA, there were notable exceptions to the general patterns 
that were encountered. The configurations resulting from QCA were used 
as a starting point for the re-interpretation of the in-depth qualitative data 
of the cases. Furthermore, cases associated with a contradictory policy 
outcome shed light on additional factors that were relevant in explaining 
the relation between media and policy change. Firstly, frame promotion by a 
strong coalition of policy stakeholders in the media proved important. These 
stakeholders were using media besides other lobby channels to influence 
the policy agenda. Furthermore, the role of the political ‘vestibule’ to policy 
change should not be underestimated. Political actors were often present as 
sources in contesting media coverage. They made issues public via the media 
in order to gain support for their policy alternative. Also, parliamentary de-
bate was often an intermediary step to policy change. Lastly, the stability of 
the government coalition behind the current policies was an important factor 
in policy agenda-setting.
The findings of this study speak to two literatures: firstly, research on policy 
agenda-setting by the media. It demonstrates that qualitative characteristics 
of media coverage are important to take into account in future policy agenda-
setting studies, in particular whether the dominant framing of the issue in 
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the media is contesting the current policy frame. Secondly, the findings of 
this study speak to research on media and policy-framing dynamics related 
to immigration issues. It gives insight in the prevalence of dominant frames 
in media coverage related to various immigration cases and shows that 
certain patterns of interaction exist between frames in media coverage and 
frames on the policy agenda. This qualitative case study design allows for 
theoretical generalization to similar settings. We believe that the conclusions 
on media coverage and policy agenda-setting related to immigration issues 
can be generalized toward other controversial policy domains, for example 
environmental or health policies, within democratic systems with relatively 
autonomous media.
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Abstract
This article studies the practices that policy entrepreneurs develop to influ-
ence media-framing of policy issues as a form of policy feedback. We ask how 
and why policy entrepreneurs develop specific framing practices in the media 
to promote positive and negative feedback toward policy frames. Through a 
qualitative embedded case study of sixteen cases of media attention in relation 
to immigration policy in the Netherlands, we analyse media framing practices 
by various policy entrepreneurs. We conclude that besides their authoritative 
position, their feedback aims are an important explanation of their use of 
framing practices and eventually their media influence.
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Introduction
Media coverage of policy issues plays an important role in policy processes 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Wolfe et al. 2013). It can put new issues on the 
policy agenda and push for policy alternatives, but it can also ignore alter-
native issues and issue interpretations and be essential to the survival of a 
policy status quo. As such, media coverage is an important form of feedback 
on policies, particularly in policy domains dealing with intractable policy con-
troversies (cf. Schön & Rein 1994). One such policy domain is that of immigra-
tion and asylum which in recent years was in the centre of public attention in 
Western Europe. Policy entrepreneurs are increasingly aware of the pressure 
that media put on the policy process and they have adapted their professional 
behaviour to this mediatized environment (Klijn et al. 2014; Schillemans & 
Pierre 2016). By having a voice in media coverage, policy entrepreneurs gain 
power in policy processes (Tresch 2009; Kunelius & Reunanen 2012; Kortha-
gen 2015). Managing media coverage has become an integral part of the policy 
process. This research article connects literature on media logic and framing 
of media coverage to that of policy dynamics and studies how various actors 
in the policy process engage in different framing practices.
Policies and media publications alike inevitably approach policy issues from 
a certain issue frame (Van Hulst & Yanow 2015). This gives an interpretation 
to the issue and its causes and also promotes a course of action to resolve the 
issue (Entman 1993; Schön & Rein 1994). Usually, multiple frames of an issue 
will be present throughout media coverage. To influence media coverage in 
favour of a specific issue frame, policy entrepreneurs use a variety of ‘framing 
practices’ to communicate their frame toward the media. Framing practices 
make one’s issue frame fit media logic and news values of news media (cf. 
Altheide & Snow 1979; Gans 1979; Harcup & O’Neill 2001). This includes for 
example providing images and catchphrases that support one’s frame or 
stressing the expertise of actors supporting this frame. Framing practices 
stress the validity of a certain issue frame while at the same time diverting 
attention from or actively discrediting alternative frames. Because media 
framing influences public attitudes on policy issues, media are a suitable plat-
5.1 
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form for mobilization of bias (Schattschneider 1960). If policy entrepreneurs 
are able to gain media attention for their frame of the issue, they can swing 
momentum to their side and exercise pressure on the policy process (Tresch 
2009: 68). This is done via traditional mass media, but increasingly also via 
social media (McKenna 2007).
The framing of policy issues in media coverage can relate to policy frames 
in two ways (Baumgartner & Jones 2002). On the one hand, media framing can 
exercise positive feedback by challenging the current policy frame and creating 
momentum for policy change toward an alternative issue frame. On the other 
hand, media framing can publicly legitimize current policies and thereby sup-
port a policy status quo. In this case, media framing decreases public attention 
for political conflict and policy alternatives. Elaborating on this distinction, 
we differentiate in policy entrepreneurs’ use of various framing practices in 
the media. Usually, media framing practices are connected to the authoritative 
position of the policy entrepreneur (Shehata 2010; Hopmann et al. 2011). It is 
assumed that less authoritative actors have to rely more on framing practices 
in order to gain media coverage for their message than authoritative actors.
This study aims to develop a more thorough insight in how and why the 
media framing practices of policy entrepreneurs differ by distinguishing the 
feedback that these actors wish to exercise toward a policy frame (positive or 
negative feedback). We will study this by addressing the following research 
question: How and why do policy entrepreneurs develop specific framing 
practices in the media to promote positive and negative feedback to policy 
frames? We study this in a qualitative embedded case study of sixteen cases 
of media coverage for policy issues within one policy domain: immigration. 
This policy domain makes a suitable case because it can be characterized as 
an intractable policy controversy. This entails that the current policy frame is 
highly contested and that policy change occurs relatively frequently (Schön 
& Rein 1994; Scholten 2011). Each case constitutes a ‘focusing event’ that 
policy entrepreneurs used as a window of opportunity mobilize attention for 
a certain issue frame (Birkland 1998).
The following section of this article introduces relevant literature on the 
influence of policy entrepreneurs on media coverage. We develop a typology 
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of five framing practices that was used in as an analytic framework in qualita-
tive content analysis of media coverage. These framing practices were opera-
tionalised to capture coalitions of entrepreneurs pushing both positive and 
negative feedback toward the current policy frame. In the results section of 
the article we describe how the use of certain framing practices corresponds 
with these two types of feedback. Finally, we conclude that the feedback 
aims of policy entrepreneurs (positive of negative feedback) is an important 
explanatory factor in policy entrepreneurs’ use of framing practices and 
eventually their media influence. Next to the authoritative position of policy 
entrepreneurs, this factor should be taken into account in future studies of 
media influence.
Media framing as policy feedback
Whenever an incident or event takes place, policy entrepreneurs aim to spark 
or suppress media attention for this event and attribute a specific mean-
ing to the event in accordance with their issue frame (Gans 1979; Birkland 
1998). Kingdon (1984) describes policy entrepreneurs as actors that hold 
specific ‘solutions’ and lie waiting for the problems to connect them to. Policy 
entrepreneurs can thus be conceptualized as idea- and interest-driven ac-
tors that seek to influence policy in a specific direction (Mintrom & Vergari 
1996). As John (1999) states, this does not necessarily always mean rational 
action. Sometimes policy entrepreneurship involves trial-and-error learning, 
networking and ideas brokerage that often make the outcome of entrepre-
neurship difficult to predict.
Policy entrepreneurs can contribute to the framing of policy issues in 
the media by acting as sources of information or by writing contributions 
themselves. According to Cook (2006: 162) policy actors are ‘co-authors of 
the news’, while the media are important gatekeepers in deciding who gets 
coverage (Cook 1998; Patterson 2000). As such, media have an important 
role structuring policy debate (Callaghan & Schnell 2001). Social media have 
also become important venues of policy discussion. They do not involve gate-
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keeping practices of journalists and editors, but come with other challenges 
for effectively communicating one’s frame and reaching a large public (Van 
Dijck 2013; McKenna 2007). Studies indicate that there are many intermedia 
exchanges between mass media and social media (Vliegenthart & Walgrave 
2008).
Thus far, the influence of policy entrepreneurs on the framing of media cov-
erage has been mainly explained by their authoritative position. It is argued 
that actors with a more authoritative position have more influence over media 
coverage, assuming that they less require the use of framing practices. This 
is also referred to as the ‘incumbency bonus’ (Hopmann et al. 2011) or the 
‘official dominance thesis’ (Shehata 2010). The bias toward the views and acts 
of authoritative officials is rooted in journalistic norms of democratic account-
ability (Bennett 1996; Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Shehata 2010; Hopmann 
et al. 2011). What more authoritative actors say and do is inherently more 
relevant to media (Berkowitz 1992; Tresch 2009). Furthermore, government 
organizations are very effective in ‘selling’ their message to the media and 
managing their public relations (PR) (Cook 1998; Ihlen et al. 2015). PR of-
ficials make information easily accessible and attractive to media, for example 
by publishing press releases, organizing press conferences or press events 
(Gandy 1982).
Elite models of media influencing therefore assert that political and admin-
istrative elites face few constraints to influence media coverage according 
their frame (Druckman 2001; Callaghan & Schnell 2001; Tresch 2009). The 
extent to which less authoritative actors are able to influence media coverage 
is disputed. The indexing hypothesis developed by Bennett (1996) asserts 
that under regular circumstances, the diversity of media frames is limited to 
those of governmental and political elites. Alternative frames can only emerge 
in media coverage once they are already circulating in the institutional policy 
process. This hypothesis does not expect non-authoritative policy entrepre-
neurs to have a direct influence on media coverage.
For our analysis we build on a model in which also policy entrepreneurs 
outside the institutional policy process can influence media coverage. The 
cascade model (Entman 2003a; 2003b) depicts the ability of a variety of policy 
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actors to influence media frames as a cascade. The cascade model maintains 
that framing of media coverage is primarily influenced by authoritative actors 
from government or politics. However – analogue to cascades - on lower levels 
of authority, frames can create ‘splashback’ in the form of alternative frames. 
These frames that are alternative to the official frame of the administration 
can move up in the cascade and influence media coverage, even though this is 
a more arduous process. ‘Frames moving downward in a cascade is relatively 
easy, but spreading ideas higher, from lower levels to upper, requires extra en-
ergy, - a pumping mechanism, so to speak.’ (2003b: 420). One such pumping 
mechanism would be the use of framing practices to promote one’s frame by 
adhering to news values and media logic.
Prior studies of immigration coverage outline several policy entrepreneurs 
who influence media coverage. Benson & Wood (2015) found that related to 
irregular immigration in the US, Norway and France , indeed government 
sources are quoted the most. Ihlen et al. (2015) come to the same finding 
and explain this by the professionalized PR-organizations of the government 
department dealing with immigration. Hänggli & Kriesi (2010) found in their 
study of the Swiss context that societal interest groups and organizations 
are often cited in the media as well. Studies indicate that pro-immigration 
organisations are cited more often than those who promote more restrictive 
immigration policies (Benson 2013; Figenschou & Beyer 2014). Furthermore, 
immigrants themselves are sometimes able to frame immigration issues in 
the media, especially in coverage emphasizing a human interest frame of 
immigration (Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud 2015). Lastly, private citizens are 
known to contribute to media framing of immigration issues, for example in 
letters to the editor or when they are asked about their opinion as ‘voxpop’.
The use of framing practices can explain instances in which also less au-
thoritative policy entrepreneurs gain media coverage for their issue frames 
– which are sometimes contesting the issue framing of government elites. We 
connect literature on media framing to that of policy feedback in order to de-
velop a typology of framing practices that serves as an analytic framework in 
our analysis. Framing practices function as a double edged sword: they help to 
promote one’s own frame while at the same time containing media attention 
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to other frames (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Rochefort & Cobb 1994). From a 
social constructivist perspective, we assume frames not to be interchangeable 
opinions, but interpretations which are structured by larger social schemata 
of interpretation (Yanow & Van Hulst 2015). Therefore, frames are relatively 
stable to actors as frame reflection is difficult and relatively rare (Schön & 
Rein 1994). Framing practices of communicating one’s frame in the media are 
more subject to agency of policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs are able 
to selectively use examples or engage in practices to gain in support of their 
frame.
First there is the use of framing devices for framing or reframing. Framing 
devices are rhetorical structures which communicate a frame by calling upon 
certain general beliefs and cultural stereotypes. Because they resonate with 
public knowledge, they adhere to media logic as well. We conceptualize fram-
ing devices as signifying elements which are based on more fixed cognitive 
structures of the frame and make a frame communicable through the media. 
Various framing devices can be distinguished of which the most prominent are 
metaphors, catchphrases, examples/hyperboles, statistics and visualizations 
(Gamson & Modigliani 1989: 3-4; Pan & Kosicki 1993: 59-64; Van Gorp 2006: 
83). Critical discussion and debunking of framing devices connected to other 
frames is used as a practice of reframing. This involves attempts to rebut or 
undermine alternative frames by addressing the information and underlying 
assumptions contained within these frames (Boscarino 2015: 6).
Second, we distinguish practices of emphasizing obtrusiveness or unob-
trusiveness of the issue in alignment with one’s issue frame. Obtrusiveness 
entails the likeliness of citizens to directly experience the policy issue (Soroka 
2002). Personalizing and dramatizing rather abstract issues or events are 
practices of emphasizing issue obtrusiveness (Patterson 2000). Emphasizing 
unobtrusiveness on the other hand, involves making issues seem distant, 
abstract or incidental. It frames the issue to be unassuming for the daily lives 
of citizens. These practices of emphasizing obtrusiveness or unobtrusiveness 
can enhance one’s own frame, while discrediting rival frames by implying that 
alternative frames are exaggerating or underestimating the issue at hand.
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Thirdly, there are practices of calling upon actor expertise. This practice 
emphasizes the expertise of certain actors in order to legitimize one’s frame. 
This can be done by pointing at professional qualifications, but also stress-
ing knowledge from personal experience. Toward a rival frame, this framing 
practice entails discrediting actor’s expertise: questioning the reputation 
and legitimacy of opponents in the debate (Boscarino 2015; Hänggli & Kriesi 
2010). This involves ‘ad hominem’ argumentation and revealing underlying 
interests of opposing actors in the debate.
Fourth, we distinguish acts of mobilization and suppression of public 
attention and support. The organization of events to mobilize the attention 
and support of others is considered an important practice of promoting one’s 
frame (Shoemaker & Reese 1996; Terkildsen et al. 1998). Mobilization may 
include petitioning, demonstrations, social media campaigns and advertising 
celebrity endorsements. The opposing act is to suppress public attention and 
support for alternative frames. This can be done by non-response or exter-
nalization. The first practice entails ignoring certain alternative issue frames. 
The second practice entails externalization of attention toward other issues. 
When policy entrepreneurs ignore the claims of others and try to direct the 
media attention toward their own frame, they engage in ‘non-contradictory 
argumentation’ (Baumgartner & Jones 1993). When this practice is employed 
by all sides in the debate, this behaviour results in ‘dual framing’ (Chong & 
Druckman 2013: 2) or a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1993: 
48).
Fifth and lastly, we distinguish venue-shopping as a media framing prac-
tice (Baumgartner & Jones 1993). This involves defining certain institutional 
arenas (for example national governments, local governments, certain gov-
ernment agencies, parliament or court) that should be responsible for dealing 
with the issue. ‘Vertical venue shopping’ takes place when issues are brought 
to higher or lower levels of government. Creating issue connection with other 
issues and affected groups in order to address other policy domains as venues 
can be considered as an act of ‘horizontal venue shopping’(Princen 2009; 
Jones & Jenkins-Smith 2009: 42). What institutional venues fit expansion of 
attention for one’s own issue frame, depends on the institutional structure 
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of a country. For example, ‘upscaling’ an issue to the supranational level does 
for example not necessarily mean an act of attributing more salience to the 
issue and exercising positive feedback. It can also be a way to divert national 
attention for the issue because accountability is placed with an external gov-
ernment body.
Methodology
This article describes an embedded case study of sixteen focusing events 
related to immigration policy in the Netherlands that gained media attention 
in the period between 2011 and 2015 (Table 1). These cases were purposefully 
selected to be heterogeneous in terms of quantity of media attention and type 
of focusing event. Our sample includes cases of individual immigrants, specific 
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Table 5.1: Selected cases
Repatriation of Mauro Manuel
Suicide rejected asylum seeker Aleksandr Dolmatov in detention
Asylum request of military interpreter Abdul Ghafoor Ahmadzai
Repatriation of Dennis Butera
Increase in numbers of Eritrean asylum seekers
Hunger strike among asylum seekers in detention center Rotterdam
Acceptance LHBT-asylum seekers from Uganda
Return of rejected asylum seekers to Rwanda/Burundi
Rejected asylum seekers residing in Amsterdam ‘Vluchtkerk’
Initiation of asylum centre in Oranje
Initiation of asylum centre in the IJsselhallen
Regulation for reunification of asylum children
Complaint website Eastern European immigrants ‘Polenmeldpunt’
Ministers’ official warning about EU-mobility ‘Code Oranje’
Amnesty for asylum children ‘Kinderpardon’
A new policy for international au pairs
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immigrant groups, the initiation of new asylum centres and policy initiatives 
related to immigration. This heterogeneous selection of focusing events 
within one policy domain enables us to comparatively analyse media framing 
practices related to a variety of cases, but all within one policy domain.
The policy domain of immigration was chosen because this is a policy 
domain that is controversial and issues related to immigration policies often 
gain media attention. In the Netherlands, similar to many other Western Eu-
ropean countries, immigration can be characterized as an ‘intractable policy 
controversy’ around which a multiplicity of frames exists (Schön & Rein 1994; 
Scholten 2011). Focusing events related to immigration are framed by policy 
entrepreneurs to debate current immigration policies. In this policy domain, 
various policy entrepreneurs are likely engaging in media framing practices 
(Koch-Baumgartner & Voltmer 2010: 224). Some policy entrepreneurs will 
frame such events as evidence for the success and importance of sustaining 
current policies. Others will frame such focusing events to contest current 
policies and push for policy change (Wolfe et al. 2013: 181; Baumgartner & 
Jones 2002).
For each case, we collected media coverage over a period of six months after 
the moment the focusing event took place from various media outlets: the 
four major newspapers, three major opinion magazines, television news and 
current affairs reports of the public television channels and social media con-
tent. This selection includes a large proportion of the Dutch news media with 
a variety of political and ideological backgrounds (Bakker & Scholten 2014). 
Dutch media generally operate rather autonomously without partisan align-
ment and with high internal pluriformity in terms of issue framing (Hallin & 
Mancini 2004).
Based on Boolean queries specific to each cases, relevant media coverage 
on the sixteen cases was collected. Newspaper and opinion magazine articles 
were collected through the LexisNexis database covering full-text publica-
tions. Video files of TV items were collected from the database of the Neth-
erlands Institute for Sound and Vision. Boolean queries for relevant TV items 
were made in a database with subtitles of Dutch public television programs. 
134 Chapter 5
Social media data was collected via a commercial social media monitoring tool 
that crawls over 430 000 of the most popular Dutch websites and stores the 
content and metadata in a database. This database was searched for relevant 
content and this content was exported for further analysis. For each media 
type, slightly different search strings were developed to ensure sensitivity 
and specificity of the queries. For the sixteen cases in total, we collected 1455 
traditional media reports including newspaper articles, opinion magazine 
articles and TV items. In addition, we collected 70246 pieces of publicly avail-
able social media content, mainly originating from Twitter, Facebook news 
websites, forums and weblogs. All media reports from traditional media 
and a random sample of social media content were imported in ATLAS.ti for 
qualitative content analysis of policy entrepreneurs as news sources and their 
framing practices.
In order to differentiate between framing practices of positive and negative 
feedback we studied the issue framing of the national Dutch policy agenda of 
immigration and asylum issues. We collected letters from the government to 
parliament related to our cases. Relevant policy documents were collected via 
a designated website by the Dutch government (‘zoek.officielebekendmakin-
gen.nl’). Based on similar Boolean queries, we collected data on developments 
on the policy agenda from the start of each case until one year after that date 
(N= 49).
Our content analysis included several steps. Guided by an analytic framework 
of four ‘master-frames’ (a human interest frame, a threat frame, an economic 
frame, and a managerialist frame ) we conducted frame analysis of the media 
content. In a human interest frame in favour of immigration, immigrants 
and refugees are portrayed as victims who require compassion and help 
(D’Haenens & De Lange 2001; Van Gorp 2006). Second, the threat-frame 
frames immigration as an inherently negative phenomenon in which immi-
grants are perceived as a threat to receiving countries (Horsti 2003) and im-
migration is framed as irreconcilable with the host society (Baker & McEnery 
2005). Third, the economic frame discusses immigration and asylum in terms 
of economic losses or gains for receiving countries of immigration (D’Haenens 
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& De Lange 2001). There is attention for immigration putting welfare state 
arrangements under pressure but also for economic gains of immigration 
(often distinguishing between ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ forms of migration). 
Lastly, the managerialist frame approaches to immigration as a depoliticized 
governance challenge, focusing how to best cope with the consequences of 
immigration beyond discussing whether this is a wanted phenomenon or not 
(D’Haenens & De Lange 2001).
In a first round of coding we specified for each case what frames were 
present in the media coverage and which actors were referenced in relation 
to these frames. We coded all actors that were named in the publications, 
including the journalists authoring the pieces. For our analysis of the most 
relevant actors related to media coverage on immigration in the Netherlands 
we combined counting which actors were referenced most frequently with 
qualitative methods of analysing the extent that they were able to elaborate 
their frame in media coverage. The authority of the policy entrepreneur 
was established by considering whether they were internal or external to 
the institutional policy process. Via frame analysis of the policy letters, we 
established what the initial policy frame of each case was. By this we were 
able to evaluate whether the frames in the media were providing positive or 
negative feedback toward the policy frame. In subsequent rounds of coding 
we further focused on correspondence between various frames and policy 
entrepreneurs in media coverage and we coded framing practices that they.
Studying framing practices by means of content analysis of media coverage 
comes with limitations. Most importantly, only overt framing practices in 
media coverage can be analysed, which are only the tip of the iceberg. We 
should assume that a large proportion of framing practices occurs prior to the 
media publication and is remains implicit in media content. Framing practices 
that remain invisible will in particular include acts of diverting attention for 
certain issues or issue frames. Our embedded case study design therefore 
does not allow for statistical generalization of findings on the prevalence of 
framing practices. It does however provide insight in explicit ways in which 
frames are communicated and responded to by policy entrepreneurs in the 
media coverage.
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Findings: Framing practices of policy 
entrepreneurs
Qualitative analysis of the cases demonstrates that media attention for im-
migration issues is initiated by policy entrepreneurs who frame the cases as 
focusing events to provide positive feedback and put current policies up for 
discussion. In most cases, these policy entrepreneurs were external to the 
institutional policy process, for example societal interest groups, individuals 
such as citizens or immigrants, or politicians of opposition parties. These pol-
icy entrepreneurs have relatively little influence over media coverage based 
on their authoritative position. In other cases, these were actors internal to 
the institutional policy process who proposed policy change. Furthermore, 
in some cases these policy entrepreneurs were framing a focusing event in 
order to push for more lenient immigration policies, while in other cases, they 
framed the focusing event arguing for stricter immigration policies. In this 
section we present our analysis of the framing practices of the former and the 
latter type of policy entrepreneurs, their frames and framing practices.
The most common coalition of policy entrepreneurs initiating media atten-
tion for immigration issues were actors who were external to the institutional 
policy process. This usually entailed a coalition of immigrants, their legal 
representatives, local support groups and societal organizations. This coali-
tion was for example present in the cases of Mauro Manuel and Dennis Butera 
whose impending repatriation was brought to the attention of the media, but 
also in cases where the rights of larger groups of immigrants were put up for 
discussion such as the case of the hunger strike of asylum seekers in detention 
in Rotterdam, the ‘Vluchtkerk’ group of asylum seekers, family reunification 
of asylum children and the amnesty regulation for asylum children. This 
coalition of policy entrepreneurs was often a very local networks of actors 
including family members, neighbourhood associations, sports clubs and 
schools who push for more lenient immigration policies or exceptions in these 
cases. Regularly, also local government representatives participated aligned 
with this positive feedback, thereby opposing their national counterparts. 
Individual mayors or partnerships of municipalities such as the Vereniging 
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Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) or the Landelijk Overleg Gemeentebesturen 
inzake Opvang- en Terugkeerbeleid (LOGO) brought forward a human inter-
est frame. Lastly, national policy entrepreneurs contributed to this framing 
of the focusing events in the media. This includes immigrant organizations 
and human rights organizations and political parties from left-wing opposi-
tion parties. They aligned with the local actors to push for more structural 
policy change. In the Netherlands, this often included organizations such as 
‘VluchtelingenWerk Nederland’, ‘Defence for Children’, ‘INLIA’ and ‘Actiegroep 
Deportatie Verzet’ and left-wing political parties including SP, GroenLinks and 
ChristenUnie.
Furthermore, in cases in which positive feedback was mobilized by actors 
external to the institutional policy process, authoritative experts including 
includes scientists, independent advisory boards and ombudsmen also en-
gaged in generating positive feedback in the media. They mostly used framing 
practices to discredit the frame that was used for negative feedback instead of 
actively promoting their positive feedback frame. They wrote opinion pieces 
in newspapers, appeared as guests in television shows or contributed to the 
debate on social media. In these contributions they for example revealed 
underlying interests or bad track records of other actors – thereby discredit-
ing their expertise. Furthermore, they often engaged in venue-shopping by 
pointing at certain (government) actors who should take responsibility in the 
situation. Who is an authoritative expert in immigration coverage was not a 
given, but became clear of how the media presented them and their opinions. 
In many cases, they were given the position of a ‘referee’ deciding over the 
outcome of a debate.
Lastly, there is a specific role for journalists and the media themselves. In 
some cases also specific journalists actively contributed to putting an issue 
and a certain issue frame on the media agenda. An example of this is the case 
of Ahmadzai which was first introduced in multiple articles in one newspa-
per resulting from investigative journalism. Very concrete and personalized 
cases – of immigrants or citizens - were generally popular topics for the media 
due to media logic. Framing devices including images, emotional quotes and 
popular sayings calling upon emotions were used to frame the issues. Even 
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newspapers or television broadcasters who were generally reporting from a 
right-wing or anti-immigrant stance, were reporting on individual cases from 
a human interest frame in support of the immigrant and the local community 
supporting them.
These coalitions of policy entrepreneurs provided positive feedback by 
bringing forward a human interest frame and arguing for more lenient immi-
gration policies. Framing practices that were commonly used by this coalition 
are the use of framing devices, emphasizing obtrusiveness and mobilization 
of attention and support. Common framing devices that are used are images, 
examples and catchphrases. An example is the catchphrase ‘No one is illegal’ 
in the case of the hunger strike of rejected asylum migrants in detention 
and the picture of Mauro Manuel’s tears that became iconic in Dutch news 
media. Obtrusiveness of these issues was emphasized by interviews with and 
pictures of a local community of schools, sports clubs and neighbourhoods 
who were confronted with and opposing the policy decision. Mobilization of 
attention and support was reached in various ways, for example with regular 
public demonstrations of the ‘Vluchtkerk’ group of asylum seekers, or the 
online petition for Dennis Butera to receive a residence status. With these 
framing practices, the coalitions of policy entrepreneurs were actively fram-
ing the focusing event in media coverage.
In other cases, policy entrepreneurs providing positive feedback pushed for 
stricter immigration policies arguing from a threat frame or a managerialist 
frame. This was for example the case with the asylum centre in Oranje and the 
‘Polenmeldpunt’ website. Interestingly, besides political actors promoting this 
frame, not many societal organizations were actively framing this toward the 
media. Besides anti-immigrant parties, there are not many established societal 
organizations in the Netherlands explicitly labouring for stricter immigration 
policies. In most of the cases, these were formed on an ad hoc basis and re-
lated to specific issues. For example, related to the case the asylum centre in 
Oranje there was the local opposition group ‘Actiegroep Leefbaarheid Oranje 
en Omstreken’ and the national platform ‘AZC Alert’. Instead of a threat-frame, 
these organizations formulated a managerialist frame to negotiate the terms 
under which immigrants would arrive and be housed. They relied on framing 
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practices of emphasizing obtrusiveness and the use of framing devices to con-
cretize the local situation and concerns. For example in the case of Oranje, the 
immigrant-to-resident ratio was frequently stressed as a statistical framing 
device to emphasize the urgency of local concerns. Lastly, mobilization in local 
settings and on social media supported coverage of the frame in the media.
In before mentioned cases - regardless of whether positive feedback was ex-
pressed in favour of more lenient or strict immigration policies - authoritative 
actors internal to the institutional policy process formed a coalition exercising 
negative feedback in the media. This included the responsible Minister or 
State Secretary, politicians from the government parties and representatives 
from executive agencies related to immigration such as Immigration Services 
(IND) or the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA). In 
most of the cases, the negative feedback entailed a managerialist frame. The 
government actors promoting this frame often pointed at the value of current 
practices and regulations and the competencies of government organizations 
handling the situation. The necessity of current regulations was stressed 
and it was repeatedly confirmed that each case had been evaluated very 
thoroughly. Giving in to the attention for very individual cases would lead to 
random implementation of policy.
These actors promoted frames of negative feedback in the media with 
framing practices of emphasizing unobtrusiveness, calling upon government 
expertise, venue-shopping and diverting of media attention for the positive 
feedback frame(s). Horizontal and vertical venue shopping was an important 
practice of government actors providing negative feedback. We encountered 
several cases where the national government shifted responsibilities to local 
or supra-national governments, to other governmental departments or to the 
judicial system. For example in the case of Ahmadzai, the government refused 
a debate with the State Secretary of Immigration about asylum regulations, 
but allowed a debate with the Minister of Defence about military interpreters. 
In the case of the Vluchtkerk, the national government repeatedly framed the 
case as an issue of the local government of Amsterdam. By these media framing 
practices, the policy entrepreneurs from government discursively transferred 
responsibility and prevented having to act according to the positive feedback.
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Notable is that these framing practices of negative feedback by government 
actors are often not directly addressing the positive feedback frame. There 
are no direct acts of re-framing the case by critical commenting on framing 
devices or responses emphasizing (un)obtrusiveness of the case. Instead, the 
negative feedback is framed relatively independently and there is not a true 
dialogue with the counter frame. In cases of individual asylum seekers, gov-
ernments have a general rule not to comment on individual circumstances. 
This created a situation of non-response and the formulation of negative 
feedback on a more abstract level.
Not in all cases media attention for immigration issues was generated by 
policy entrepreneurs external to the institutional policy process pushing 
for policy change. Our sample included also several cases in which positive 
feedback was exercised by authoritative actors from government in order to 
mobilize support for a new policy initiative. Positive feedback was promoted 
in the media by government actors such as the Minister or State Secretary, 
senior government officials or representatives of government agencies deal-
ing with immigration – all relatively authoritative actors. In these cases, 
policy proposals were framed as focusing events to initiate media coverage. 
This was for example the case with the ‘Code Oranje’ warning about labour 
immigration from Eastern Europe. A Minister published an op-ed article in a 
popular newspaper to warn citizens about the labour market consequences 
of EU mobility. Another example is the case of the new au pair regulation in 
which the conclusions of a research report were framed as a motivation for a 
new policy benefitting the needs of au pair’s. In these cases, the government 
and government actors were framing their policy initiatives in the media as a 
form of positive feedback toward prior policies.
Notable is that in these cases, government actors often chose a human 
interest or threat-frame. They did so to publicly explain and legitimize their 
intended policy changes. The use of framing practices by government actors 
providing positive feedback in the media was surprisingly similar to those of 
actors external to the government, particularly the use of framing devices and 
practices of emphasizing obtrusiveness. For example, in the case of the more 
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lenient policies for gay asylum seekers from Uganda, the humanitarian situa-
tion in the country was outlined with examples. In the cases of ‘Code Oranje’ 
and Eritrean asylum migrants coming to the Netherlands, the Minister and 
State Secretary chose metaphors as framing devices and they emphasized 
obtrusiveness.
In this type of cases, negative feedback was formulated in the media by 
policy entrepreneurs external to the institutional policy process who strived 
to prevent or reverse policy change. In these cases, we encountered framing 
practices of active re-framing. For example of this is the case of the return of 
rejected asylum seekers to Rwanda and Burundi. This case was introduced in 
the media by the State Secretary who claimed the success of new agreements 
with the governments of Rwanda and Burundi. These agreements would 
mean that rejected asylum seekers from Rwanda and Burundi could return 
to their countries of origin. A negative feedback frame however actively re-
framed this story of managerial success by stating that these asylum seekers 
would return to a corrupt and dangerous regime. In contrast to authoritative 
actors providing negative feedback, these framing practices were actively 
discrediting the rival frame, next to promotion on one’s own frame, creating a 
true dialogue between different frames in the media.
Analysis: Framing practices of positive and 
negative feedback
Our analysis shows how policy entrepreneurs employ various framing 
practices in making their issue frames more attractive to media in order to 
mobilize bias. Furthermore, it specifies how different framing practices are 
used by policy entrepreneurs with various authority in the policy process 
and how they match policy aims of positive and negative feedback. Focusing 
events do not exist outside of the framing that policy entrepreneurs attribute 
to them. They are constructed by certain policy entrepreneurs in media cover-
age to provide positive feedback toward current policies. Most cases in our 
sample were introduced in the media by (coalitions of) policy entrepreneurs 
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external to the institutional policy process. In other cases authoritative elites 
consisting of elected and non-elected actors from government were the actors 
initiating media coverage and providing positive feedback in the media.
External policy entrepreneurs exercising positive feedback used framing 
practices to mobilize attention for their alternative frame, either promoting 
more lenient or strict immigration policies. They used framing devices to 
frame the focusing event, emphasized obtrusiveness, and organized public 
mobilization. This makes their frame attractive to media logic in traditional 
media as well as social media. Social media prove to be important catalysts 
of positive feedback framing. The framing practices of policy entrepreneurs 
pushing for positive feedback match the media logic of social media very well. 
Particularly, framing devices are a very good fit with the media logic of social 
media, which stimulates the sharing of concise and visual information such 
as slogans, infographics and images. At the same time, social media do not 
offer many opportunities for critically questioning the validity of the framing 
devices and hence the frame itself. As a result, we found that the use of fram-
ing devices thrived on social media. Also, social media offer a new platform 
for mobilization of public support by enabling online petitions, sharing of 
information and by the use of hashtags. We encountered multiple instances in 
which framing practices on social media were an important reason for tradi-
tional media to report from a positive feedback frame. This was most relevant 
in cases where this frame was not (openly) supported by authoritative actors 
who could be referenced as a source in traditional media attention. This was 
often the case with the threat-frame. In these cases, broad public attention 
for a frame on social media was a legitimation for traditional media to report 
from this frame as a form of ‘voxpop’.
Government actors framing negative feedback in relation to these focus-
ing events were not very active in reframing, but framing practices were 
primarily focused on promoting a counter frame. These authoritative policy 
entrepreneurs responded to the positive feedback frame by emphasizing 
issue unobtrusiveness, calling upon expertise and deflecting attention by 
non-response and venue-shopping. Actively responding to counter frames 
was sometimes not possible, for example because government actors were 
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not allowed to respond to individual cases. In scarce instances in which they 
employed practices of re-framing and actively responded to the alternative 
frame, this was not very successful in discrediting the rival frame. The policy 
entrepreneurs who were pushing for positive feedback had already set the 
initial frame the issue in media coverage.
When authoritative actors from government introduced issues in the me-
dia and pushed for positive feedback, they choose a different set of framing 
practices which is similar to that of non-authoritative policy entrepreneurs 
framing positive feedback. Primarily, they made use of framing devices and 
emphasized issue obtrusiveness. In these cases, the authoritative actors were 
sometimes able to achieve frame alignment with a larger group of policy en-
trepreneurs who mutually strived for the proposed policy changes. This often 
included politicians from opposition parties and societal organizations. This 
indicates that the aims of promoting positive or negative feedback toward the 
current policy frame is an additional and sometimes more important explana-
tion of framing practices of authoritative policy entrepreneurs. In contrast to 
authoritative actors framing negative feedback, policy entrepreneurs external 
to the institutional policy process were more actively re-framing the frame of 
authoritative actors. In these cases the authoritative position of the policy en-
trepreneur formed a more prominent explanation of their framing practices 
than their feedback aims. For policy entrepreneurs who are external to the 
institutional policy process, their authoritative position is a more prominent 
explanation of their use of framing practices than their feedback aims.
Conclusions
The ways in which policy entrepreneurs contribute to media coverage is an 
important topic of study because struggle for media attention is part of more 
general contest for control over the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs are 
increasingly aware of the powerful role of media and are devoting substantial 
resources to media monitoring and management (Schillemans & Pierre 2016). 
We studied framing practices as a form of media influencing in a case study of 
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the policy domain of immigration. This policy domain can be characterized as 
an intractable policy controversy which is politically contested and regularly 
gains media attention. Framing of immigration issues in the media was stud-
ied as the mutual construction of issue interpretation by the logic of media 
and policy entrepreneurs. By using framing practices, policy entrepreneurs 
make their frame a better fit to media logic, while diverting attention for other 
frames.
Speaking to literature on the influence of policy entrepreneurs on media 
coverage, this study finds that the next to ‘official dominance’ based on 
authoritative position, another factor explains differential use of framing 
practices: whether policy entrepreneurs are providing positive or negative 
feedback toward the current policy frame. Our qualitative case study finds 
that particularly for authoritative actors, this factor is a more important expla-
nation for the use of framing practices than official dominance. Future studies 
into the role of political and policy actors influencing media coverage should 
take into account this ‘policy feedback thesis’ as an explanation of what fram-
ing practices are used and how much influence policy entrepreneurs have on 
media coverage.
While this study entails an embedded case study of sixteen cases within one 
policy domain, we believe that our findings are generalizable to other similar 
media and political systems including Western European countries and other 
intractable policy issue domains such as environmental policies and law and 
order (cf. Hallin & Mancini 2004; Soroka 2002). Future research should test 
our ‘policy feedback thesis’ on media influencing by policy entrepreneurs 
in other settings. Furthermore, while our research was limited to studying 
framing practices in media coverage itself, future studies should broaden this 
scope with framing practices behind the scenes in communication between 
policy actors and media actors, for example by in-depth interviews or obser-
vation of processes taking place in advance of media publications.
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Abstract
Some studies suggest that social media encourage interethnic contact by 
removing social and spatial boundaries between ethnic communities while 
offering new spaces for communication and redefinition of ethnic identities. 
Others contend that social media add an online dimension to intra-ethnic 
bonding, either within the ethnic community or transnationally. This paper 
aims to understand such mixed findings by contextualizing under what 
circumstances social media facilitate bridging and bonding behaviors. We 
conducted 52 semi-structured interviews with second-generation migrant 
youth in Rotterdam to inquire about their motivations and considerations 
concerning social media use. Results show that social media offer a new space 
for different orientations of interethnic contact. Interethnic contact as such 
is rarely deliberately pursued online but it is often constituted in venues 
organized around common interests. Engagement in intra-ethnic online com-
munities is motivated by struggles with identity and lifestyle. Migrant youth’s 
online and offline lives are very much integrated and online communication 
deals with very similar complexities as offline interactions.
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Introduction
The debate on migrant integration tends to focus primarily on the social and 
spatial dimensions of inter- and intra-ethnic contact, such as spatial disper-
sion, mixed schools and interculturalization. Yet, in contemporary society, 
social contacts are increasingly established and maintained online. Social 
media, characterized by user-generated content and interaction (Boyd & 
Ellison 2007), provide new opportunities for contact with various communi-
ties. They provide ethnic minorities with new ways to relate to their ethnic 
communities, to people in their country of origin and to other groups in 
their country of residence (Elias & Lemish 2009). Some scholars have argued 
that online communication has the potential to overcome spatial and social 
boundaries that are inherent to offline social contact (Ellison et al. 2007, 
Hampton et al. 2011).
Empirical studies have found mixed results regarding the implications 
of social media for interethnic contact. Social media may foster interethnic 
contact by providing new social network infrastructures that give access 
to bridging social capital that was previously unattainable. This would em-
power ethnic minorities through exchange of information and resources on 
life in the country of residence and by providing a sphere in which they can 
negotiate their position in the multi-ethnic society (Amichai-Hamburger & 
McKenna 2006). As such, social media would facilitate integration of ethnic 
minorities in their host societies.
Others contend that social media strengthen intra-ethnic contact and im-
pede interethnic contact by connecting ethnic minorities to their countries 
of origin within so-called ‘transnational communities’ or facilitating virtual 
parallel lives in the host country. Komito and Bates (2009) even describe the 
latter as ‘virtual ghetto’s’ or ‘enclaves’. Instead of bridging social capital, social 
media would only be used for bonding social capital – solidifying migrants’ 
marginalized position.
Such varying and sometimes contradicting findings concerning the implica-
tions of social media use by ethnic minorities create a need to contextualize 
interethnic contact theory in today’s digital age. In this paper, we explore the 
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implications of the widespread use of social media among minorities for inter-
ethnic contact. While not engaging in the discussion about the consequences 
of interethnic contact for migrant integration, this study aims to gain a better 
understanding of the varying and sometimes contradicting research findings 
with regard to the uses of social media use for interethnic contact. We focus on 
the circumstances under which social media foster interethnic, intra-ethnic or 
transnational contact, by asking second-generation migrant youth to motivate 
their choices in social media use. To this aim, we have formulated the follow-
ing research question: How can we understand the varying uses of social media 
for interethnic contact by second-generation migrant youth’s motivations of 
social media use?
In order to contextualize online interethnic contact, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with second-generation migrant youth in the Dutch 
city of Rotterdam about their social media use. We explicate how social media 
use relates to their ethnic identity. In what follows, we first elaborate on the 
interethnic contact hypothesis and existing findings with regard to social me-
dia use by ethnic minorities. As will be shown, studies have raised very gen-
eral conclusions that need contextualization and theoretical interpretation. 
We use the sensitizing concepts of social media affordances (Gibson 1979, 
Hutchby 2001) and inter- and intra-ethnic contact in order to evaluate under 
what circumstances migrant youth engage with different ethnic identities.
Interethnic contact theory in the context of 
social media
Interethnic contact is generally considered to be an important prerequisite 
for migrant integration. In the literature on contact theory that originates 
from social psychology (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998), two arguments can 
be distinguished that entail, respectively, socio-cultural and socioeconomic 
integration: the contact hypothesis and the isolation hypothesis. The contact 
hypothesis asserts that a lack of interethnic contact will enlarge socio-cultural 
differences between groups and will lead to ethnic polarization or even con-
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flicts. At the same time, it claims that acquaintance lessens prejudice and ste-
reotypes of the other. Thus, it supports socio-cultural integration. A competing 
hypothesis in this regard is the conflict hypothesis that states that interethnic 
encounter leads to competition and conflict between different groups over 
resources or values (Coser 1956, Dovidio et al. 2005, Esses et al. 2011).
The isolation hypothesis holds that ethnically segregated neighborhoods 
are an obstacle for the socioeconomic integration of migrants in society 
(Park 1926, Lewis 1969, Wilson 1987). Ethnic minorities have a marginalized 
position in society because their social networks are primarily ethnic and 
their access to resources is limited (Massey & Denton 1993, Musterd 2005). 
Ethnic segregation hinders the existence of ethnic bridges – the informal ties 
between ethnic minorities and the majority population or other minority 
groups (Van der Laan Bouma-Doff 2007). It is argued that this leaves minori-
ties in a disadvantaged position. Interethnic contact is therefore also a condi-
tion for socioeconomic integration.
Social media reduce the importance of spatiality for interethnic com-
munication by making ‘communities without propinquity’ possible (Van 
Doorn 1955, Webber 1963, Castells 1996, Wellman 2001). The internet has 
afforded this well before the emergence of social media during the 2000s, so 
this debate is not new. Yet social media have made online social networking 
more popular and for a majority of people it is now an integral part of every-
day life. Social media can be conceptualized as internet applications in which 
user-participation, content-sharing and social networking in (semi-open) 
network infrastructures is central. This adheres to a necessary condition for 
interethnic contact according to Allport (1954): an equal status of participants. 
Therefore, social media seem particularly suited to facilitate contact between 
people who would otherwise not have had the opportunity or inclination to 
meet. Social media users organize themselves in a plurality of networks that 
are shaped non-hierarchically and are not bounded by geographical borders 
(Haythornthwaite 2005).
Social media are not limited to social networking sites such as Facebook. 
Weblogs, forums and many other web spaces can also be considered as social 
media in the sense that they allow users to contribute and interact with each 
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other. Social network sites are organized around personal networks and other 
social media such as forums, weblogs and YouTube channels are organized 
around interest groups (Boyd & Ellison 2007: 219). Social media applications 
are commercial products and their design partly determines their use. A social 
constructivist approach, however, allows us to see a variety of appropriations 
within these technological boundaries: such as the affordances of social media 
that emerge in relation to their social context (Gibson 1979, Hutchby 2001).
Characteristic for social media is that they lay down an infrastructure of 
latent ties – ones that exist technically but have not yet been activated – and 
make weak ties more easily approachable (Hiller & Franz 2004, Ellison et 
al. 2007). Social media activity creates a continuous virtual co-presence of 
others and their social capital (Vitak & Ellison 2013). Users can selectively 
create communities based on interest or acquaintance rather than geography 
or social status (Haythornthwaite 2005: 140). These affordances are relevant 
with regard to interethnic contact theory. Social media may enable bonding 
as well as bridging social capital; either locally rooted or spanning geographi-
cal distances. In the next section, we outline the divergent views found in 
scholarly discussions on the implications of social media use for interethnic 
contact.
Hypothesised roles of social media for ethnic 
identification
As social networking and the allocation of resources in the network society 
increasingly take place in online networks, it is important to consider the 
online dimension of ethnic identification. The implications of social media for 
interethnic contact have been subject of scholarly debate in the field of migra-
tion and integration studies (Peeters & D’Haenens 2005, Van den Broek & De 
Haan 2006, D’Haenens et al. 2007, Elias & Lemish 2009, Lin et al. 2011). Before 
we turn to the hypothesised roles of social media for ethnic identification, it is 
important to first offer a more elaborate theorisation of the main concepts of 
this research: ethnicity and interethnic contact.
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In this paper, ethnicity is conceptualized as a dimension of identification. 
Identity is constituted along multiple dimensions of identification, such as 
gender or class. For second-generation migrant youth, having parents who 
were born for example in Morocco, this does not automatically mean that 
one’s ethnicity is ‘Moroccan’. Sometimes it is predominantly Berber, Arabic, Af-
rican, Dutch or European. Also hybrid identification occurs: Moroccan-Dutch, 
Dutch-Moroccan or Moroccan-Rotterdam. Ethnic identification is socially 
constructed in daily interactions (see Parker & Song 2006, Mainsah 2011, Ma-
rotta 2011). For ethnic minorities – who are often confronted with questions 
about their ethnicity – this dimension of their identity can become more 
prominent than it is for members of the majority population. Sameness or 
Otherness in case of minorities is often framed along ethnic lines. For some, 
ethnic identification proves more prominent than for others. For example, 
some identify more strongly along religious lines.
We should be wary of essentialist ethnic categories operating in notions 
of inter-and intra-ethnic contact; as ethnicity is a part of one’s identity that 
is constructed in daily interactions. What entails interethnic and intra-ethnic 
contacts is therefore dependent on someone’s ethnic identification and should 
not be presupposed based on, for example, nationality. In some cases, nation-
ality and ethnic identification correspond, in other cases, one’s construction 
of ethnicity differs from their nationality. Inter- and interethnic contact is 
however a useful heuristic distinction that is often used in the literature on so-
cial media, social networking and social empowerment (Amichai-Hamburger 
& McKenna 2006, Franz & Götzenbrucker 2012). We therefore chose to use 
the categories of interethnic and intra-ethnic contact as heuristic devices in 
this study as well to point at different modes of ethnic identification that are 
supported by social media use. Interethnic communication denotes commu-
nication of migrants with other ethnic groups in the country of residence – in-
cluding the native population. Intra-ethnic communication is communication 
within the ethnic community.
A first strain of literature claims that social media remove spatial boundaries 
and thereby facilitate interethnic contact. Amichai-Hamburger and McKenna 
(2006: 838) conclude that the internet has great advantages for intergroup 
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contact over traditional face-to-face communication. Hampton et al. (2011) 
conclude that the use of new media contributes to personal network diversity 
and access to social capital that is available through those networks. Lin et al. 
(2011) found that Facebook use is positively related to international students’ 
online bridging capital and social adjustments. It is argued that ethnic minori-
ties will establish online interethnic contact in their attempt to organize and 
facilitate their transition into society. Kahne et al. (2012) found that most 
youth visit online venues that expose them both to opinions that align to 
their own and to views that diverge from their own. Interethnic contacts and 
information helps ethnic minorities to make life choices and contribute to 
improving their position in the society of residence. Social media provide a 
secure environment for gradual social learning (Nedelcu 2012: 1348-1349).
Although ethnicity does not have to be disclosed in online interactions, 
studies have shown that ethnicity remains a relevant factor (Nakamura 2002, 
Leung 2005, Marotta 2011). Some studies point out that youth use the social 
media to negotiate their identities (Valkenburg et al. 2005, De Leeuw & Ry-
din 2007, Elias & Lemish 2009). As migrant youth are embedded in multiple 
social contexts, they often struggle with discorded and sometimes contesting 
identities. Via social media use, ethnic minorities are looking for compromises 
between different dimensions of their identity. They do this, for example by 
creating personal profiles on social network sites or keeping a diary on a blog, 
or by exploring alternative identities in virtual gaming worlds or on online 
forums (Mainsah 2011, Franz & Götzenbrucker 2012). In online communities, 
migrant youth can reflect on their own opinions by comparing them to those 
of their peers. Parker and Song (2006) refer to the process of negotiating 
ethnic identities as ‘reflexive racialization’. Ethnic identities still matter but 
they are redefined rather than erased or strengthened by social media use.
Other scholars hypothesize that social media are primarily used by ethnic 
minorities to relate to their country of origin and their own ethnic group 
instead of for interethnic contact. For example, Komito and Bates (2009: 
243) reach a remarkable conclusion with regard to social media use by labor 
migrants in Ireland: ‘while these migrants may no longer live in physical ghet-
tos, since they reside in dispersed locations in cities, they now live in ‘virtual’ 
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ghettos or enclaves, as they use new technologies to create separate lives 
within the wider society in which they work and live’. Social media are places 
where ethnic minorities can create their own communicative spaces and 
withdraw from society. Here, immigrants preserve their cultural heritage and 
strengthen the sense of intra-group solidarity within the ethnic community 
and broader diaspora. Rydin and Sjøberg (2010) argue that the internet has 
become a virtual substitute for migrants’ homelands.
Establishing intra-ethnic contact via social media adheres to the ‘homophilia 
thesis’ – also referred to as ‘cyberbalkanization’ or ‘echo chambers’ – arguing 
that people will avoid being exposed to alternative opinions and meeting 
Others online (Sunstein, 2001, 2007, Pariser 2011). With regard to interethnic 
contact theory, this would mean that minorities do not use virtual spaces to 
expand their networks over ethnic bridges, but rather to reinforce their ethnic 
identity among like-minded peers. When the social context of the country of 
residence is estranging, social media provide possibilities for minorities to 
explore their ethnic belonging.
The claim that intra-ethnic social media use by ethnic minorities would be 
problematic for integration is disputed. Some scholars point out that inter-
ethnic social media use can function as a source for social empowerment of 
minority groups (Elias & Lemish 2009). Ethnic homogeneous online venues 
can have empowering and emancipating consequences (Mehra et al. 2004). 
Parker and Song (2006) describe how online interaction has had offline conse-
quences in the form of social gatherings, charitable donations and campaigns 
against adverse media representations. Intra-ethnic social media interactions 
can give a voice to ethnic minority groups, thus performing a central integra-
tive function (Kissau 2012, Spaiser 2012). Social media that are intra-ethnic 
online, can thus lead to more interethnic interactions offline.
These mixed findings and conclusions regarding the implications of social 
media use for interethnic contact indicate that social media might serve 
different constructions of different ethnic identities and that inter- and intra-
ethnic contact is not mutually exclusive. This creates a need to contextualize 
under what circumstances social media support interethnic contact, under 
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what circumstances they facilitate intra-ethnic contact and the theoretical 
mechanisms that account for these differing outcomes.
Methodology
To study the implications of social media use for interethnic contact, this re-
search focuses on (second-generation) migrant youth. We focus our study on 
this group because they generally are avid social media users – like compara-
ble non-migrant age cohorts. The internet is, next to television and telephone, 
the most favorite technology for Dutch migrant youth, who are spending an 
increasing number of hours per day online and have access to internet via 
their PCs, laptops, tablets and/or smartphones (Van Summeren 2007). Next 
to this, it is particularly the youth who are exploring and establishing their 
position in society. It is asserted that this second-generation of immigrants is 
navigating between two ethnic identities: that of their country of origin and of 
their country of residence (Parker & Song 2006: 198, D’Haenens et al. 2007). 
Migrant youth need to find their way in the host society based on resources 
beyond the traditional authorities of parents and family as the latter did not 
grow up in the host society (Van Summeren 2007).
A total of 52 qualitative interviews were held with second-generation 
migrants in the city of Rotterdam. We count as second-generation migrants 
those respondents that indicated to have at least one parent born outside The 
Netherlands. Recognizing the socially constructed nature of ethnicity in every-
day life and in cyberspace in particular, we had respondents define themselves 
in ethnic terms. The interviews did not depart from an essentialist notion of 
ethnicity but allowed respondents to outline different aspects of their (ethnic) 
identity online. Conclusions on second-generation migrant youth engaging 
in interethnic or intra-ethnic contact online, are based on respondents’ own 
definitions of their ethnic identity that they brought forward in the interviews.
This focus on second-generation migrants, sampled in the city of Rotterdam, 
does have implications for analytical generalization based on this research. 
First, we can only draw inferences about second-generation migrant youth as 
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this was our research population. The choice of this group is a consequence of 
social media use that is primarily popular amongst youth. Yet, we believe that 
findings regarding this population may have a broader meaning that, in the 
future, may apply to more age cohorts. The focus on the second-generation 
also speaks to the importance of this category in current integration debates, 
where especially in The Netherlands much attention has been attributed on 
the ‘failure’ of the second-generation to establish interethnic contacts.
We sampled interviewees from Rotterdam because this city is one of the 
most ethnically diverse in The Netherlands and it has a relatively young popu-
lation. Research does not pinpoint significant differences in socio-cultural 
orientation or socioeconomic position between second-generation migrant 
youth in Rotterdam when compared to another city like Amsterdam (Crul 
& Heering 2009). Yet there is no comparable research from smaller or less 
diverse cities – which may involve factors that could not be controlled in 
this research – available with which to compare. Additional research would 
be need to identify the impact of variables such as size of communities and 
‘density’ of diversity on our inferences on the relation between social media 
use and interethnic contact.
Within these restrictions, we pursued a diverse sample in terms of gender, 
age and ethnicity (Table 6.1). The interviews took place in the period from May 
to October 2012. Instead of recruiting respondents via social media, we chose 
to approach them in an offline setting. As a result, we were able to speak to a 
large variety of social media users as well as non-users, in order to be able to 
analyze differences in access to and use of social media (only one respondent 
reported to be a non-user). For this sampling, we visited different types and 
levels of local educational institutes and approached potential respondents 
for an interview. The interviews took place in appropriate places in the school 
where the interview could be conducted without anyone overhearing. Some-
times we interviewed two or three friends at once, whenever the respondents 
would prefer this. As the respondents who wanted to be interviewed together 
were friends, they were generally open in responding to our questions. The 
presence of friends however may have prevented some from disclosing so-
cially undesirable information.
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Table 6.1: Overview of basic characteristics of our sample.
Respondent № Gender Age Parents’ country/countries of origin
1 v 21 Morocco
2 v 21 Suriname/Morocco
3 v 21 Suriname/Colombia
4 v 25 Suriname
5 v 24 Morocco
6 v 18 Morocco
7 v 21 Morocco
8 v 21 Morocco
9 v 27 Morocco
10 v 18 Morocco
11 m 23 Morocco
12 v 23 Morocco
13 v 25 Cape Verde
14 v 17 Morocco
15 v 17 Morocco
16 v 18 Pakistan
17 v 25 Antilles
18 v 24 Antilles
19 v 26 Antilles
20 v 17 Turkey
21 v 17 Morocco
22 m 23 Turkey
23 m 26 Suriname
24 m 25 Turkey
25 v 26 China
26 m 23 Afghanistan
27 m 21 Guinea
28 v 23 Morocco
29 v 23 Suriname
30 m 21 Suriname/Ghana
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Because we interviewed second-generation students, all respondents were 
proficient in Dutch and the interviews took place in Dutch. Before each 
interview, we ensured the respondents’ anonymity. With permission of the 
respondents, the interviews were recorded and transcribed ad verbatim. 
Other interviews were transcribed based on notes of the interviewers directly 
after the interview. All interview transcripts were anonymized and stored 
separately from personal information. References in this paper cannot be 
traced back to individual respondents.
Table 6.1: (Continued)
Respondent № Gender Age Parents’ country/countries of origin
31 v 35 Colombia/Aruba
32 m 21 Morocco
33 v 23 China
34 m 29 Cape Verde
35 m 23 Cape Verde
36 m 27 Antilles
37 v 22 Morocco
38 m 26 Morocco
39 v 21 Morocco
40 m 22 Morocco
41 m 24 Suriname
42 m 18 Suriname
43 v 17 Morocco
44 v 18 Morocco
45 v 20 Morocco
46 v 16 Morocco
47 m 20 Cape Verde
48 v 26 Morocco
49 v 25 Morocco
50 m 24 Turkey
51 m 23 Iran
52 v 19 Suriname
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The semi-structured interviews allowed the interviewees to elaborate on 
the interview topics and any other relevant experiences. Our interview topics 
and codebook are informed by expectations from the literature on social me-
dia use and interethnic contact. We asked all respondents about the intensity 
of their internet use, the online sites and applications that they are using, what 
activities and topics they are exploring there and what purposes and effects 
this had according to them. We purposely asked our respondents about their 
internet use in general and not about social media use specifically because 
it cannot be assumed that our respondents have a similar understanding of 
what social media are. It proved difficult to ask respondents about some-
thing as habitual as internet use. Respondents sometimes had difficulties 
remembering what activities they employ online and what online venues they 
visit. We solved this by asking about their daily life in general (school, work, 
hobby’s, social contacts and interests) and then prompting whether the inter-
net plays a role in this. We did not presuppose a certain ethnicity while asking 
respondents about inter- and intra-ethnic communication. The respondents’ 
own definition of their ethnic identity was coded during the analysis.
We conducted thematic content analysis of the interview transcripts using 
ATLAS.ti software. The main code-groups were entitled: (1) Intensity of social 
media use; (2) Type of media used; (3) Reasons/purposes of social media use; 
(4) Reasons for restricted use; (5) Strength of social ties; (6) Topics discussed 
online; and (7) Modes of communication (Interethnic/intra-ethnic). Via sub 
codes and further interpretation and discussion of the data, we found several 
patterns in the data with regard to interethnic contact that will be described 
in the next section.
Results
In this section, we describe under what circumstances second-generation mi-
grant youth are appropriating social media for inter- or intra-ethnic contact. 
Before we address social media use with regard to different modes of inter-
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ethnic contact in subsequent subsection, we first provide some basic insights 
on the extent and ways in which our respondents are using social media.
Social media use by second-generation migrant youth
All second-generation migrants that we interviewed are internet users. The 
majority of our respondents uses internet in multiple settings (home, school, 
work, etc.) and on different technologies (PC, smartphone, tablet, etc.). Only 
one respondent indicated that he had no internet access at home but used it 
at school and friends or families house: ‘I used internet quite a lot in the past 
but not anymore. At home we have no internet and now I am not in school any 
more I have to go to the library to go online’ (Hindustan Surinamese male, 24). 
We did not find evidence for a digital divide based on internet access. On the 
contrary: most of our respondents are avid internet users. Due to the ease and 
frequency with which our respondents are using internet, they do not really 
distinguish between their online and offline activities. For many, going online 
to contact friends or look up information has become a habit and it plays a 
central role for all kinds of needs and purposes. Many prefer internet sources 
over traditional sources such as books, newspaper or television.
All of our respondents are familiar with social media but they display differ-
ent patterns of use. Most respondents named Facebook and Twitter as social 
media they were – or were not – using. Next to this, respondents mentioned 
using LinkedIn, Hyves (a Dutch social network site similar to Facebook) and 
online forums. These proved to be the most popular social media among our 
respondents. Our respondents vary in the types of social media they are us-
ing, their frequency of use and the way they are using social media (actively 
or passively). In correspondence with the 90–9–1 principle of participation 
inequality in online communities (Nielsen 2006, Brandtzæg & Heim 2011), the 
active users constitute the smallest group. This group of users is involved in 
(multiple) social networking sites and/or posts content on weblogs, forums 
or news sites. The group of passive users is what Nielsen (2006) in the typol-
ogy defines as ‘lurkers’. They regularly visit social media and read content but 
hardly ever contribute to it. This group constitutes the largest group in our 
sample. Within this group of passive users, we can distinguish respondents 
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who know about social media but actively choose to use it as little as possible. 
They are for example not a member of social networking sites and rarely visit 
forums or weblogs. Their choice is based on either privacy concerns, disliking 
the banal characteristics of social media communication or a lack of time. The 
following statement of a Turkish respondent illustrates the concerns of pas-
sive users very well:
I don’t like Facebook and other social media. No-one calls each other anymore. 
Everyone is using Ping and Whatsapp. I think it diminishes mutual respect. You 
don’t hear each other’s voice and I find it very important to have real contact 
with my friends. Facebook messages are very superficial, pictures of people’s 
lunch and such. Social media are for people who are alone and who are only 
focused on themselves. (Turkish male, 24)
Interethnic contact
We found that social media use under certain circumstances indeed entails 
interethnic contact. When we asked our respondents whether they had 
used social media to meet new people (of their own ethnic group or other 
ethnicities) online, the answer was most of the times ‘no’. In cases where new 
contacts were established, they were rarely continued offline. However, bridg-
ing (interethnic) contacts were established for instrumental reasons such as 
finding a job or seeking information. In these cases, some respondents did 
report using social media:
I am not looking for friends online. I don’t visit sites where you can meet new 
people or something. No, that’s not for me. For job applications I do establish 
contacts with people I didn’t know before of course. But that is a different thing. 
(Turkish male, 23)
With regard to interethnic contacts specifically, most of our respondents re-
marked that in case they would want to, social media provide opportunities to 
meet peers from other ethnic groups. They say it is up to themselves to decide 
whether to establish interethnic contacts online or not.
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I think it is one of the purposes of social media to be able to meet new people, 
also Dutch people or Moroccan people. But if you do this or if you don’t, depends 
on what you want. If you think, I want to stick to my Hindustan group of friends, 
you can. Many of my Hindustan friends do this on Facebook or Twitter – they 
only follow fellow-Hindustanis. It all depends on what you want to do with social 
media. (Hindustan Surinamese female, 23)
Such citations show that migrant youth are appropriating social media ac-
cording to different needs that they may have. While interethnic contacts are 
hardly purposefully established, we encountered that interethnic contacts via 
social media often arise from common goals or interests. Respondents for ex-
ample told us that they have discussions on forums about gaming or cooking.
I visit general news forums and forums about gaming. I play an online soccer 
game. There is a lot of different people on this forum, an international public 
even. (Iranian male, 23)
In such online venues, organized around interests rather than personal net-
works, interethnic contacts are established unintentionally (Wellman 2001, 
Haythornthwaite 2005: 140, Boyd & Ellison 2008:219). In these cases, ethnic-
ity is not a relevant factor and often remains implicit.
Even though online interethnic encounters are not actively sought, often 
remain implicit and are rarely continued offline, we found that online inter-
ethnic encounters can strengthen interethnic understanding and solidarity. 
Many respondents indicated that they like to read and discuss other people’s 
opinion in social media venues where news and public opinions are discussed. 
For example, this respondent explains that she sees opinions of people with 
different (ethnic) backgrounds as enriching:
I like that on the forum you find people with different backgrounds. When you 
ask a question, you will get different answers. I think that it is interesting to 
know different viewpoints. (Moroccan female, 22)
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Many of the respondents were interested in other people’s opinions and ways 
of life and mentioned that it changed their image of the other.
[ … ] a big plus of such a forum is that you can find experiences and life stories 
from a variety of people. Young, old, male, female, Moroccan, Turkish or Dutch, 
religious. What attracts me is the variety of opinions and experiences that you 
find on the forum. You can learn from others and their experiences. I try to do so, 
I take into consideration and I hope to learn from what I read there. (Moroccan 
female, 24)
In such cases, social media support interethnic understanding. Even if inter-
ethnic contact is not purposefully sought for, it is sometimes established when 
actors from different groups seek similar information or interest online.
It is not always the case that interethnic contact leads to more understand-
ing and solidarity between groups. We encountered some evidence of online 
contact that involved interethnic tensions. This respondent for example 
describes how Dutch people sometimes visit a Moroccan-Dutch forum to ex-
press negative views of the Moroccan minority and provoke a fight (‘flaming’):
On Morocco.nl there are often Dutch people expressing themselves negatively 
about Moroccans. They visit Morocco.nl just to provoke. Sometimes I am inclined 
to think that all autochthonous Dutch people think this way, but that is not true. 
Then I need to put it in perspective that they are just these five people or so. 
(Moroccan-Surinamese female, 21)
In such cases, interethnic encounters online may reiterate interethnic ten-
sions that also exist in other settings. The online setting and intentions of the 
visitors thus explain whether and how interethnic contact is established.
Intra-ethnic contact
Our interviews show that migrant youth are also reinforcing intra-ethnic 
bonding contacts online. Ethnic, cultural and religious background is some-
times one of the purposes or goals of social media activities of migrant youth. 
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The following quote exemplifies how migrant youth purposefully search for 
one another in the online world:
I like to talk to fellow Moroccans online. I understand them. It is nice to read 
their opinions and experiences. Stories on Marokko.nl are recognizable. I think: 
oh, I experienced the same thing! You meet each other there. Even though you 
do not know the others, you have the same culture, the same norms and values. 
(Moroccan female, 17)
Via the interviews, we encountered a number of different intra-ethnic forums, 
Facebook communities and other online venues. About half of our respon-
dents indicate that they use social media to establish or maintain intra-ethnic 
contact. As the Moroccan girl describes, many youth find recognizable stories 
from ethnic peers online. They learn how to deal with daily issues by com-
paring others’ experiences and advice. This is particularly relevant in case of 
taboo subjects. For example, two respondents told us that they like to read 
forbidden love stories of others.
On Turkishplace.nl people write their love stories. It makes you very curious 
whether it will all end well. They are personal stories of what happened to 
people in real life. (Turkish female, 17)
Another respondent mentioned a story entitled ‘Yassin and I’ and she 
described how boys would place calls on the forum Morocco.nl about girls 
they met and would like to get in contact with. Furthermore, ethnic use of 
social media keeps our respondents up to date with the latest news about the 
country of origin and the ethnic community in the Netherlands. For example, 
Antillean parties are announced, Ramadan experiences are exchanged and 
information and events regarding Surinamese ‘keti-koti’ are shared through 
social media. One respondent described how vacancies for jobs are published 
on Moroccan forums. As such, advantages of the ethnic labour market are 
maintained (Portes & Rumbaut 1990).
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There were also respondents that mentioned the added value of ethnic 
social media when living in a multi-ethnic society such as Rotterdam. As a 
Moroccan-Dutch girl explains:
We are already integrating, aren’t we? We meet Dutch people everywhere. We 
live here in Rotterdam with nothing but other cultures. That is why it is good 
that Moroccans have their own spot on Marokko.nl. A place for ourselves. As 
Moroccans, you just understand each other. It is this we-feeling, a feeling of com-
munity. (Moroccan female, 17)
Such statements of respondents would suggest that intra-ethnic bonding on-
line is more relevant for people living in a multi-ethnic context. Other respon-
dents however indicated that their ethnicity is more important for them in a 
less multi-ethnic setting. This respondent for example indicated that ethnic 
social media use became less important when she moved to Rotterdam:
At the time when I lived in Brabant I was discussing my Chinese background on 
the internet much more than now when living in Rotterdam. Rotterdam is very 
multicultural and therefore I do not feel the need to do so. In Brabant, I was the 
only Asian girl. I was surrounded by nothing but Dutch society. But now I live 
here I do not feel the need to go online for this because you meet other Asian 
people anyway. (Chinese female, 26)
Underlying both citations is however the ability to discuss and inform them-
selves about their ethnic background offline. This is in accordance with Chen 
and Choi’s (2011) finding that migrants with a high availability of offline (eth-
nic) social support, are less likely to seek online social support of co-ethnics.
Another group of respondents mentioned that they avoid intra-ethnic 
social media use because they fear that it will hinder interethnic contact. For 
example, this Turkish respondent thinks that instead of retreating to intra-
ethnic social media communities, it is important to learn how to engage with 
people from different backgrounds:
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I am really against forums such as Hababam.nl or Marokko.nl where people will 
only meet people with a Turkish-Dutch or Moroccan-Dutch background. I think 
you need to learn to engage with different people. You need to be able to talk to 
people with different backgrounds. (Turkish male, 24)
All in all, we found that ethnicity is only one amongst many topics that mi-
grant youth discuss on social media, next to, for example, religion, sports or 
school. In some situations or life phases, when a respondent’s ethnic identity 
becomes prominent, they engage in intra-ethnic online communities; and they 
can relate to co-ethnics in their country of residence. At the same time, many 
respondents still invest in transnational intra-ethnic contact, with friends and 
family in the origin country. Social media facilitate these kinds of contact, as 
the next citation shows:
It is very convenient to keep in contact with my family abroad through Face-
book. When my aunt in Thailand posts something at four o’clock at night, we can 
read it the next morning. My brother just had a baby so everyone is curious to 
see what he looks like. Because of time differences Facebook is more convenient 
than telephone. Everyone answers when they can. Sometimes we use Skype as 
well. (Surinamese/Colombian female, 21)
Our respondents thus used social media to connect with family and friends in 
the country of origin, but they did not establish new transnational contacts 
through social media nor were they very interested in news and information 
about life in their (parents’) countries of origin. They were primarily inter-
ested in general culture, traditions and religion. They indicated that in this, 
their transnational contacts and engagement is different than that of their 
parents who often read newspapers from the country of origin.
I don’t often look for information about Morocco online. Only very general in-
formation about the region where my family originates from because we travel 
there regularly. I am not interested in what’s happening in other parts of Mo-
rocco. (Moroccan male, 26)
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Intra-ethnic social media use of migrant youth does not often concern the 
homeland but rather their home culture. They are interested in cultural and 
religious traditions from their country of origin but not so much in the daily 
news. The second-generation shows a more cosmopolitan outlook on their 
ethnic identity that goes beyond national categories (see, for example, Ne-
delcu 2012). Agglomerate identities such as ‘Asian’ or ‘Islamic’ were referred 
to. When using social media to read or discuss this, respondents preferred to 
interact with others from their ethnic community in the country of residence 
than with people from their country of origin. For our respondents, intra-
ethnic contact on social media is not a retreat to a virtual representation of 
the homeland of their parents. Instead, they are engaging with other migrant 
youth in exploring their ethnic identity as one of many topics they are explor-
ing on social media.
Conclusions
Prior studies have reached varying conclusions regarding the implications of 
social media use for interethnic contact. This is remarkable and urged us to 
contextualize these findings in an empirical study into the conditions under 
which social media contribute to different orientations of interethnic contact. 
We asked how varying uses of social media for interethnic contact can be un-
derstood. Our results show that interethnic and intra-ethnic contact in social 
media use results from the needs and motivations of the users. The type and 
purpose of social media use differs for youth and intra- and interethnic social 
media use is not mutually exclusive. While ethnicity remains a relevant factor 
online, not all social media use of migrant youth is ethnically oriented. Online 
communities of interest can result in unintended interethnic encounters. As 
Pettigrew (1998) posits, common goals are an important prerequisite for in-
terethnic contact. Users selectively visit social media based on interests rather 
than prior acquaintance or (ethnic) background (Wellman 2001, Haythornth-
waite 2005: 140, Boyd & Ellison 2007: 219). In some instances, ethnicity is the 
common interest that motivates and determines social media use.
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Many of our respondents valued intra-ethnic social media activities such 
as discussing cultural traditions on forums or hearing about upcoming ethnic 
events via social networking sites. Yet, in contrast to the intra-ethnic bonding 
thesis, the fear that ethnic minorities would retreat in virtual ethnic enclaves 
seems unfounded. Our research shows that migrant youth are using various 
types of social media and visit them for various purposes. Migrant youth visit 
certain social media venues when they have questions about their school or 
work, others when they want to discuss the latest soccer results and again 
others when they want to explore their own ethnic background.
Speaking to the broader literature on interethnic contact and migrant 
integration, our study shows that social media has indeed become a relevant 
sphere for the study of interethnic contact, supporting different ethnic orien-
tations. Our analysis rejects the thesis that social media would only support 
intra-ethnic bonding (cf. Putnam 2000). By contacting respondents offline, 
and studying the broader range of their social media activities, we found that 
social media support both inter- and intra-ethnic contact. Interethnic contact 
was mostly established in interest-based online venues. Intra-ethnic online 
contact was established when the interest guiding migrant youth’s online 
behavior was their ethnic ethnicity. Studies sampling respondents through 
ethnic online communities (for example ethnic forums or Facebook groups) 
or looking at content of such media, risk overemphasizing the scale and effects 
of intra-ethnic social media use. Furthermore, we found that bonding with 
migrant communities by second-generation migrant youth via social media 
is less oriented at the home-country than the home culture; the transnational 
dimension of social media activities appears very limited.
These findings add an important dimension to the current academic (and 
policy) debate on interethnic contact that often stresses the spatial (disper-
sal, gentrification) dimension rather than the virtual dimension. We should 
however avoid talking about online and offline life in binary terms. These 
lives are very much integrated and they co-construct notions of ethnicity and 
belonging (see, for example, Marotta 2011). Thus, it becomes clear that online 
communication deals with very similar complexities as offline interactions.
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Abstract
The influence of the virtual public sphere in the policy process is not only 
dependent on the power of online media and the stakeholders who are using 
them. The responsiveness of governments to online policy debate is important 
as well. While some studies show examples of governments’ responsiveness 
to the virtual public sphere, others find that online participation is largely 
ignored. Such contrasting findings point at a contingency of governments’ 
responsiveness to online public debate. This article offers a systematic lit-
erature review and meta-synthesis of empirical articles that provide insight 
in the factors accounting for governments’ responsiveness to the virtual 
public sphere. A theory-based analytical framework served as guideline for 
qualitative analysis of the findings of 39 studies. We found that institutional 
characteristics, characteristics of the policymaker, characteristics of online 
participation and characteristics of the policy domain are relevant conditions 
for governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere.
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Introduction
Online media have recently become popular platforms of civic engagement. 
Citizens are using online media to inform themselves about policy issues and 
government actions, form political opinions, mobilize support from others and 
voice their needs and preferences to policymakers (Bohman 2004; Coleman & 
Blumler 2009; Dahlgren 2013). While some examples of online activism were 
successful in influencing the policy process, many others have quietly van-
ished and did not spur policy change (Howard & Parks 2012). Policymakers 
thus are responsive to public opinion that is voiced online in some cases, but 
not in others. This raises the question under what circumstances online civic 
engagement is able to influence policies by communicating public opinion to 
policymakers, being politicians or administrators.
This question is at the core of public sphere theory. Structural characteris-
tics of the internet have spurred optimistic expectations for the emergence of 
a virtual public sphere as they provide a contemporary version of Habermas’ 
(1991) historical blueprint of the public sphere (Bohman 2004; Coleman 
2005; Dahlgren 2005). This democratic potential has been present during 
earlier years of the internet (often referred to as Web 1.0) in the form of on-
line discussion forums and bulletin boards. In recent years, the user-friendly 
design and popularity of social media or Web 2.0 has revived scholarly debate 
concerning a virtual public sphere (Dahlgren 2009; Loader & Mercea 2012). 
Even though Habermas’ concept of the public sphere has been criticized for 
its feasibility and Habermas himself never pointed at the web as the ideal 
platform for the public sphere, many other scholars did (cf. Dahlgren 2009: 
158). Dahlgren (2005: 151) for example refers to the net as the ‘vanguard’ of 
the public sphere.
From the 1990s onwards, when democratic legitimacy was perceived to be 
under pressure, the idea of a virtual public sphere emerged as a promising 
alternative. At that time, voter turnout and political participation via formal 
channels of representation in representative democracy was in decline. Some 
scholars have argued that the creation of a virtual public sphere would over-
come this ‘democratic deficit’ or ‘crisis in citizenship’ (Dahlgren 2005; Cole-
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man & Blumler 2009). Although the technological basis of the internet and 
online applications may allow for open and egalitarian debate among citizens 
and more direct exchanges with policymakers (Bohman 2004), the creation 
of a virtual public sphere could not be taken for granted. Many scholars 
questioned the quality of the online debates within this sphere, due to the 
fragmentation of online publics, inequalities in access and participation and 
levels of interaction (Dahlberg 2001; Papacharissi 2004; Albrecht 2006; Hind-
man 2009; Goldberg 2011).
Next to studying aspects of this ‘digital divide’ (cf. Norris 2001; DiMaggio 
et al. 2004) related to online civic engagement such as access to and quality 
of online public debate, it is important to study the links between this arena 
of the public sphere and the policy process. Dahlgren (2001: 37) stated that: 
‘the relationship of political structures and the decision-making processes to the 
public sphere is of central concern. […] A blooming public sphere does not guar-
antee a democracy; it is a necessary but not sufficient ingredient.’ There must 
be a structural link between online communicative spaces and the centers 
of decision-making in the form of processes of agenda-setting and feedback 
(Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner & Jones 2009). The virtual public sphere is not 
functional unless policymakers are responsive to needs, opinions and prefer-
ences that are voiced online.
The influence of the virtual public sphere on policymaking processes has 
been less explored and does not yet form a coherent research tradition. Schol-
ars have approached this question with diverse methodologies and have come 
to different results. Some studies demonstrate examples of governments’ 
responsiveness to the virtual public sphere while others find that online 
debate is largely ignored. Such contrasting findings point at a contingency 
of governments’ responsiveness to online public debate (cf. Manza & Cook 
2002). This calls for further research into the factors that account for govern-
ments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. Based on a meta-synthesis 
of empirical findings in the literature thus far, this paper aims to study under 
what conditions governments are responsive to online political participation 
by citizens.
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The following research question is used as a guideline for systematic litera-
ture review and meta-synthesis: What factors account for the responsiveness 
of governments towards policy debate in the virtual public sphere? Meta-
synthesis of earlier research findings allows us to construct a state-of-the-art 
of empirical knowledge and explicate theorization on this subject. In the fol-
lowing section, we develop an analytical framework to support our analysis of 
empirical findings with regard to three categories of factors. In section three 
we discuss our research design, being a meta-synthesis of a systematically 
collected sample of earlier studies. In section four the results of our analysis 
are presented. In section five conclusions are drawn and an outlook for fur-
ther research is given.
Government’s responsiveness to the virtual 
public sphere
At the core of democratic theory is the argument that citizens should be 
able to influence the policies that govern their lives (Held 1996; Dahl 2000). 
This requires that policymakers are responsive to public opinion. Respon-
siveness is defined as ‘the congruence of collective public attitudes towards 
political issues with the policy preferences and actions of elected representa-
tives’ (Hobolt & Klemmensen 2005: 380). This entails an outcome-oriented 
definition of responsiveness that is dominant in political representation and 
agenda-setting literature. It operationalizes responsiveness as the extent 
to which policymakers change their policy positions or spending based on 
shifts in public opinion (Stimson et al. 1995; Manza & Cook 2002; Burstein 
2003; Wlezien 2004; Baumgartner & Jones 2009). However, next to being an 
outcome in terms of policy change, responsiveness can also be defined as a 
policy practice which relates to a community of policymakers who share spe-
cific policy beliefs, routines and other practices, or to the attitude of individual 
policymakers (Aberbach & Rockman 1994). Responsiveness is then defined as 
the practice of taking into account the (variety of) changing needs, wishes and 
claims of citizens and societal groups, which is very often expressed through 
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issue saliences (Burstein 2003). Responsiveness as a policy practice can be 
recognized in processes of policymaking regardless of whether this eventu-
ally results in policy change. In our meta-synthesis of studies on governments’ 
responsiveness to the virtual public sphere, we will also take this forms of 
responsiveness into account.
Based on e-democracy and political representation literature we have for-
mulated an analytical model that can help us to analyze the relevant literature. 
This model is based on three types of characteristics that seem to be relevant 
in order to assess the government’s responsiveness to (online) public opinion, 
which are: policymaker, institutional and online participation characteristics 
(Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1: Analytical framework
 
 
Responsiveness 
of governments 
to the virtual 
public sphere 
Institutional 
characteristics 
Online participation 
characteristics 
Policymaker 
characteristics 
In the literature, three types of characteristics are deemed relevant determi-
nants of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. Firstly, it 
is expected that individual policymakers in politics and administration differ 
in their responsiveness to the public sphere. They are generally dealing with 
a ‘bottleneck of attention’ (Baumgartner & Jones 2009). They cannot attend to 
all information that reaches them, so they need to select and prioritize. Based 
on personal experience, skills and preferences they will attend differently to 
online participation. For elected representatives, responsiveness is relevant 
with regard to their political position. Politicians have the incentive to take 
into account the policy preferences of voters to reduce the risk of electoral 
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loss and the risk of public reprisals in the form of civic disobedience or pro-
tests (Brooks & Manza 2006; Hobolt & Klemmensen 2005).
Secondly, institutional characteristics of the policy domain also influence 
responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. By this we mean organizational 
practices as well as the structure of the policy domain. Government organiza-
tions have different formal and informal rules and knowledge infrastructures 
in dealing with online information (Mergel & Bretschneider 2013). Also, the 
availability of budget and technological tools in organizations is a factor that 
may explain responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. Political and admin-
istrative power relations, norms and values influence whether policymakers 
are responsive to online publics or not. Some policy domains are dominated 
by vested interests and interest groups who have created a certain policy tra-
dition, while other domains are more open to external voices (Manza & Cook 
2002: 653). Recent studies have also shown the relevance of differences of 
representative systems, level of decentralization, proportionality of electoral 
systems, the level of political contestation and government popularity (Hobolt 
& Klemmensen 2005; 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2012). They prove that insti-
tutional characteristics are important mediators of the connection between 
public opinion and policy.
Thirdly, characteristics of online participation are relevant as well. It can be 
expected that online media and uses of these media differ in agenda-setting 
power. Dahlgren (2005) argues that online media vary in the degree in which 
they comply with the structural, representational and interactional dimen-
sion of the public sphere. They have different designs and features (structural 
dimension), reach different publics and differ in popularity/participation 
(representational dimension) and differ in quality of argumentation and 
power to mobilize others (interactional dimension). Therefore, they will 
garner different degrees of government attention. With regard to the repre-
sentational dimension of the public sphere, Fraser (1992) makes a distinction 
between strong and weak publics. This can be linked to the three tier distinc-
tion that Miège (2010) makes when discussing a layered public sphere. At the 
top is the elite sphere, with the organs of the state together with legislatures 
and the upper echelons of the corporate sector. Political discussion is linked to 
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decision-making powers; it is a ‘strong’ public sphere or a strong public. The 
middle tier is the mainstream public sphere, mostly played out in the mass 
media; vested interests, parties, and other actors with varying power domi-
nate here. The lowest tier is the societal sphere, where private, unorganized 
citizens can participate in opinion-formation, but they are largely remote 
from the major centers or decision-making, and thus constitute a ‘weak’ pub-
lic or public sphere. Fraser (1992) and Dahlgren (2013) state that most public 
spheres are ‘weak’ in the sense that their links to decision-making are remote. 
Online participation may vary in this respect.
In a meta-synthesis of relevant literature, we will look whether and how 
specific policymaker, institutional and online participation characteristics in-
fluence the governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. We also 
consider the possibility of other factors being relevant. In the next paragraph, 
we outline our method of data-collection and -analysis.
Methodology
We conducted a meta-synthesis of a systematically retrieved sample of 
empirical academic literature concerning governments’ responsiveness to 
the virtual public sphere. A systematic literature review is a ‘systematic, ex-
plicit, and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating, and synthesizing 
the existing body of completed and recorded work produced by research-
ers, scholars and practitioners.’ (Fink 2010: 3). In contrast to a traditional or 
narrative literature review, a systematic review adheres to a set of principles 
that aim to limit biases in the sample of studies (Petticrew & Roberts 2006; 
Moher et al. 2009 & Booth et al. 2012). We followed the widely used PRISMA 
statement, ensuring transparent and complete reporting of the systematic 
literature review (Moher et al. 2009; Liberati et al. 2009).
We collected academic articles from seven different academic databases. 
Web of Knowledge, Scopus, ABI/Inform Complete and IBSS were chosen 
because they are four large scientific bibliographic databases in social sci-
ences, including articles from a large number of sub disciplines. In addition, 
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we selected three discipline-specific databases of disciplines relevant to the 
research question: Sociological Abstracts, Communication Abstracts and 
IPSA. The online databases cover the search period of our review from 1993 
onwards, entailing a 20-year period in which internet was available to private 
citizens. A well-defined search string based on the research question was 
used to ensure sensitivity and specificity of the literature searches (Petticrew 
& Roberts 2006: 81–2). The search query combines two types of search terms: 
The first relates to online participation, the second relates to policymakers, 
the political and policy process and responsiveness. During a number of initial 
rounds of searching the selected databases, we increased the sensitivity of 
the query by adding a number of keywords that appeared relevant. The final 
search string3 was used consistently in all seven databases.
To ensure scientific rigor, we only included peer-reviewed publications in 
academic journals. This excludes gray literature such as conference proceed-
ings and popular publications. Books and book chapters were omitted as 
they generally offer a less systematic description of methodology or are not 
empirical at all. We include only international literature that was published 
3 “internet” OR “world wide web” OR “on$line” OR “the web” OR “web 1.0” OR “web 2.0” OR “web 
3.0” OR “cyberspace” OR “digital” OR “user generated content” OR “social medi*” OR “new media” 
OR “social network* site*” OR “blogosphere” OR “blog*” OR “web$log*” OR “online discussion 
for*” OR “Twitter” OR “Facebook” OR “Usenet” OR “online communit*” OR “virtual communit*” 
OR “media monitoring” OR “opinion mining” OR “media surveillance” OR “crowdsourcing” OR 
“electronic petition*” OR “e$voting” OR “e$petition” OR “netizen*” OR “clicktivism” OR “digital” 
AND “municipal*” OR “public administrat*” OR “public organi$ation*” OR “bureaucracy” OR 
“agenda setting” OR “agenda building” OR “public agenda” OR “policy process” OR “policy for-
mulation” OR “policymaking” OR “policy design” OR “policy formation” OR ”policy evaluation” 
OR “policy co$creation” OR “policy co$production” OR “policy legitimacy” OR “political process*” 
OR “political decision$making” OR “political legitimacy” OR “legislative process*” OR “govern-
ment process*” OR “government legitimacy” OR “e-govern*” OR “government responsive*” OR 
“responsive governance” OR “interactive governance” OR “ interactive polic*” OR “governance” 
OR “democratic process*” OR “democratic legitimacy” OR “e-democracy” OR “teledemocracy” OR 
“cyberdemocracy” OR “digital town hall” OR “electronic town hall” OR ”democracy” OR “public 
sphere” OR “citizen participation” OR “citizen engagement” OR “civic engagement” OR “citizen 
co$creation” OR “citizen activism” OR “public participation” OR “public engagement” OR “public 
activism” OR “e-participation”
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in English as these publications have contributed to international scholarly 
debate. Database searches on March 31th, 2014 yielded a total of 1630 publi-
cations. This total included 775 duplicates that were deleted from the sample. 
We conducted three subsequent rounds of screening in order to exclude 
non-relevant articles (Figure 7.2; Table 7.1). In the first round, we screened 
the titles of the records based on relevance to our research question. In a 
subsequent round of screening, the abstracts of 313 articles were evaluated 
with particular attention to whether or not the records concerned empirical 
research.
Finally, 56 full-text articles were assessed for eligibility in the final round of 
screening. We removed 18 articles because they did not provide any explana-
tions for governments’ responsiveness to social media. We sent this reference 
list of 38 articles to fifteen academic experts in the field to inquire whether 
some important articles were missing. Based on review of their suggestions, 
one article was added (Evans-Cowley 2010). The final sample of 39 articles 
that was used for qualitative meta-synthesis is listed in Table 7.2.
We analyzed the findings of the systematically retrieved sample of articles 
via meta-synthesis which entails a qualitative comparison and translation 
of original findings from which new interpretations are generated (Walsh & 
Downe 2005). We did this by way of manually coding the findings of the indi-
vidual articles and comparing the studies based on the central concepts in our 
analytical model: governments’ responsiveness to online information and the 
factors that are named explaining presence or absence of this. We operation-
alized three categories of responsiveness: No mentioning of responsiveness, 
responsiveness as policy change (present/absent) and responsiveness as 
practice (present/absent). The latter type of responsiveness was operational-
ized as examples of policymakers answering to or taking into account online 
participation in their practices, while no changes in policy outcomes occurred. 
For example, Andersen et al. (2011) measured responsiveness as the timeli-
ness of governments’ responses to citizen complaints.
A limitation of meta-synthesis is combining and interpreting findings 
from studies with different epistemological perspectives. Zimmer (2006: 
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Figure 7.2: PRISMA fl ow diagram
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Table 7.1: Eligibility criteria for including articles in systematic literature review
Published in English, peer-reviewed journal
Published from 1993-2014
Empirical research based on original data
Relevance to the research question, excluded are articles:
· about internet governance
· about corporate governance
· about internet influencing offline political participation
· about e-government for public service delivery
· not reporting explanations for governments responsiveness to online public opinion
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315) argues that it is possible to synthesize across methodologies as long as 
careful attention is provided to the contextuality and methodological assump-
tions underpinning the primary studies. Therefore, we also coded and took 
into account what context (government organization, level of government, 
geographical context/social context, research methodologies and designs) 
the studies entailed. We discuss our aggregated findings in the context of our 
research question in order to explicate existing theories on governments’ 
responsiveness to the virtual public sphere (Walsh & Downe 2005). Contra-
dictory findings are also highlighted in the discussion of synthesized results.
Results
Diversity of research designs
Studies into governments’ use of online participation in the process of policy-
making show a great variety of research approaches and designs. Exemplary 
of this is the use different terms to capture the online public sphere, such as: 
‘virtual policy communities’ (Bekkers 2004), ‘cyber-organization’ (Brainard 
2003) or ‘cyber civil society’ (Chadwick & May 2003). A distinction between 
studies into the government-initiated (N = 24; 61.5%) and citizen-initiated 
online participation (N = 11; 28.2%) is notable in the sample of studies. The 
former refers to online participation venues or tools that are initiated by the 
government itself, while the latter concerns activities from weak and inter-
mediate public spheres based in existing online media venues. Four articles 
(10.3%) study both.
Studies into government-initiated participation demonstrate responsive-
ness in terms of policy change or practice more often than studies of citizen-
initiated online participation. Examples of studies into government-initiated 
online participation are Valtysson’s (2014) analysis of the online collaborative 
rewriting of Iceland’s constitution and Small’s (2012) analysis of Twitter use 
by the Canadian government. Examples of studies into citizen-initiated online 
participation are Brainard’s (2003) study into online HIV and DES-communi-
ties and Dutton & Lin’s (2001) study of the ‘Stop the Overlay’ online campaign. 
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We do not distinguish studies of government-initiated online participation 
and citizen-initiated online participation in discussing our findings related 
to specific categories of determinants. As online government initiatives are 
pre-organized, they better adhere to the determinants of our analytic model 
overall.
We cannot conclude that government-initiated online participation initia-
tives are more prevalent, only that the existing literature has a bias towards 
this type of online citizen participation. Two reasons can be given. First, 
government-initiated online participation is often subjected to an evaluation 
study. Second, it is generally organized in a designated online venue and con-
cerns a strictly defined policy issue. This makes the object of study fairly well 
demarcated as citizen-initiated online participation is often more dispersed 
over different online venues. That is why studies that focus on citizen-initiated 
online participation mostly choose a certain medium — for example Twitter 
— to delimit their data sample. Collecting data on policy discussions from a 
large diversity of social media requires specialized tools and expertise.
Furthermore, it can be noticed that studies of government-initiated and 
citizen-initiated online participation have different designs. Government-
initiated participation is studied through analysis of the online venues or 
government responsiveness measured through policy documents (e.g. Klang 
& Nolin 2011). Sometimes this is combined with interviews with policymak-
ers involved in the initiative. Articles studying citizen-initiated participation 
often study a specific online campaign that may be present in different online 
media (e.g. Bekkers et al. 2011; Dutton & Lin 2001), or conduct interviews or 
a survey among policymakers about their responsiveness to online participa-
tion in general (e.g. Davis 2010; Ellison & Hardy 2014).
The selection of relevant articles is of relatively recent date. The first 
relevant article was published in 2000 and the last are from 2014 and most 
articles stem from the mid-2000s onward (Mean: 2009; SD: 4.2). The articles 
are published in a large variety of academic journals. The two journals with 
most publications (4 each) are ‘Government Information Quarterly’ and the 
‘Journal of Information Technology and Politics’. Articles are cited on average 
32 times according to Google Scholar Citations (measured early May 2014). 
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Most articles (N = 17; 43.6%) focus on responsiveness of local governments, 
while a smaller number of articles (N = 9; 23.1%) focuses on the national level 
of governance. Other articles (N = 13; 33.3%) focus on regional governments, 
specific government agencies or supra-national governments. Most studies 
were situated in the US: a total of fifteen articles (38.5%) have a US govern-
ment as (one of their) cases. Twenty-two articles focus on cases in Western 
European countries (56.4%). Six articles (15.4%) focus on other countries. 
The numbers do not add up as some articles include multiple cases.
These first descriptive results thus show that the empirical study of govern-
ment’s responsiveness to the virtual public sphere is still a rather new field of 
study that still has to develop into a coherent empirical tradition. There is no 
agreement yet on central concepts and their operationalization or preferable 
research designs. This may account for varying findings. In the following sec-
tions, we describe what explanations for government’s responsiveness to the 
virtual public sphere are provided.
Responsiveness explained
In our analytical model we identified three categories of factors that may 
explain the responsiveness of government towards online participation. 
However, we also considered the possibility of other factors being relevant. 
Our analysis shows that the majority of articles (30 articles, 76.3%) focus on 
relevant institutional factors, while 7 articles (18.4%) focus on characteris-
tics of the involved policymaker and another 13 articles (34.2%) focus on 
characteristics of online participation. Issue complexity proved to be another 
explanation offered by the literature that did not fit one of the three categories 
of our analytical framework. It entails the complexity of the issue according 
to policymakers. They state that some policy issues require professional 
expertise and should not be steered by public opinion of ordinary citizens. 
Issue complexity was mentioned in four articles (10.3%) as an explanation 
for the degree of responsiveness. The percentages exceed 100% as some ar-
ticles name multiple explanations. From these descriptive results we cannot 
conclude that some explanations have more explanatory value than others. 
The relative popularity of different types of explanations was mainly a result 
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of research design. Institutional explanations constitute the main focus of 
research into responsiveness to the virtual public sphere as responsiveness 
was mostly operationalized on a systems level. The meta-synthesis however 
enables us to specify what explanations and mechanisms can be found in 
explaining governments’ responsiveness to online participation.
Policymaker characteristics
Skills and competences of individual policymakers are named as explanations 
for the responsiveness of governments to online participation (Table 7.3).
Carlitz & Gunn (2002) and Soon & Soh (2014) mention that responsiveness to 
online media requires an active role of policymakers. Instead of waiting until 
the news reaches them, they need to actively search for online citizen par-
ticipation and encourage it. Their ability and willingness to provide feedback 
to the contributions of citizens will motivate citizens to continue (Valtysson 
2014). This is an example of practice-based responsiveness. Responsiveness 
to online participation also requires the availability of different techniques 
and the abilities to work with them. ‘Media literacy’ (Seltzer & Mahmoudi 
2013; Soon & Soh 2014) is sometimes mentioned as a relevant factor. Policy-
makers need to be ICT-savvy in working with new media and high-tech tools 
(Evans-Cowley & Hollander 2010).
Table 7.3: Policymaker explanations of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual 
public sphere
Explanations Articles N (%)
Competencies and skills Carlitz & Gunn 2002
Soon & Soh 2014
Seltzer & Mahmoudi 2013
Valtysson 2014
Evans-Cowley & Hollander 2010
5 (13.6%)
Tensions professional role Klang & Nolin 2011
Soon & Soh 2014
2 (5.3%)
Position of policymaker in 
policy networks
Klang & Nolin 2011
Soon & Soh 2014
Bekkers et al. 2011
4 (10.5%)
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Secondly, responsiveness to online participation is dependent on how 
policymakers perceive their professional roles. Two articles found that poli-
cymakers perceive tensions between their private and professional roles and 
boundaries in dealing with online citizen participation (Klang & Nolin 2011; 
Soon & Soh 2014). Communication via online media creates a closer and more 
egalitarian relationship between citizens and policymakers. As Soon and 
Soh (2014: 53) write with regard to Facebook use by Singaporean ministers: 
‘Members of the public are included in ministers’ social networks based on 
the supposition of friendship.’ Communication via online media is generally 
less formal. On the one hand the unscripted and spontaneous character makes 
policymakers more accessible, but on the other hand policymakers feel that 
the communication needs to comply with their professional role. Due to these 
perceived public-professional tensions, guidelines for responsiveness to 
online participation are developed (Mergel & Bretschneider 2013).
Finally, some articles offer explanations based on the position of policymak-
ers in policy networks. Rethemeyer (2007) argues that online media can work 
as exogenous shocks or strategic surprises (cf. Bekkers et al. 2011) to actors 
in policy networks that may shift the power relations within these networks. 
As a result, policymakers may be reluctant to take online debate seriously as 
it might challenge in their position in networks where the policy is negotiated 
(Bekkers 2004; Ohlin & Becker 2006; Rethemeyer 2007).
Institutional characteristics
A majority of the reviewed articles name institutional characteristics as 
determinants of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere 
(Table 7.4). In the first place, several studies mention the availability of insti-
tutional resources or provisions. Policymakers sometimes do not have access 
to social media in their workspace. Monitoring and responding to online 
citizen participation requires more time than traditional media monitoring. 
Some studies have described a lack of resources to buy or develop a tool for 
(monitoring) online participation. Charalabidis and Loukis (2012) find that 
the creation of a new organizational unit is required to organize and manage 
multiple e-participation channels and to analyze the large quantities of both 
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Table 7.4: Institutional explanations of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual 
public sphere
Explanations Articles N (%)
Institutional values and practices Alfano, 2011
Charalabidis & Loukis 2012
Deligiaouri 2013
Fredericks & Foth 2013
Sutton 2009
Klang & Nolin 2011
Ellison & Hardy 2014
Brainard 2003
Hepburn 2014
Chadwick & May 2003
Saebo and Nilsen 2004
Deibert 2000
Bekkers 2004
Mergel & Bretschneider 2013
Evans-Cowley 2010
15 (36.8%)
Political motivations Larsson 2007
Borge et al. 2009
Davis 2010
Chadwick 2011
Hepburn 2014
5 (13.6%)
Institutional resources Charalabidis & Loukis 2012
Chadwick 2011
Evans-Cowley & Hollander 2010
Haug 2007
Hepburn 2014
Sutton 2009
Ellison & Hardy 2014
Garrett & Jensen 2011
Soon & Soh 2014
Polat 2005
Evans-Cowley 2010
11 (26.3)
Path dependency and isomorphism Andersen et al. 2011
Bonson et al. 2012
Ellison & Hardy 2014
Hepburn 2014
Polat 2005
Bekkers et al. 2013
Goodman 2010
7 (18.4%)
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structured data (e.g. citizens’ ratings) and unstructured data (e.g. citizens’ 
postings in textual form). Time, money and access to tools need to be available 
for successfully taking into account online citizen participation.
Secondly, many studies conclude that a change in institutional values and 
practices is required for governments to be responsive to online participa-
tion. Public organizations are used to dealing with citizens in a ‘technocratic’ 
(Brainard 2003), ‘law enforcing’ (Charalabidis & Loukis 2012) or ‘managerial’ 
way (Chadwick & May 2003), which does not comply with the reality of online 
citizen participation. This translates in a risk averse, hierarchical oriented 
government culture or — in terms of Hepburn (2014: 96) a ‘sclerotic institu-
tional anxiety associated with new ICTs’ — that does not fit with the rather 
open, egalitarian culture that is associated with new technologies. There is a 
mismatch between what online publics require of participation and the chan-
nels of participation offered by governments.
Some studies argue that this due to the fact that online publics and govern-
ment organizations adhere to different democratic models: the participatory 
model versus the representative model (Bekkers 2004; Saebo & Nilsen 2004). 
Government organizations have difficulties to get accustomed to the style and 
language of interaction in online media and the culture that characterizes 
them, that is quite different compared to traditional channels of participation 
and representation (Charalabidis & Loukis 2012). Deibert (2000: 271) con-
cludes that: ‘such a profound transformation in the world political landscape 
raises fundamental questions about the basic structures of political participa-
tion and representation’ Bekkers (2004) agrees with this analysis. He states 
that online participation challenges the primacy of elected representatives 
in political decision-making. Responsiveness to online media requires recon-
sideration of established practices, roles and power relations to enhance the 
viability of a virtual public sphere.
Thirdly, some articles conclude that responsiveness to online media is 
dependent on political motivations. Responsiveness to online media is advan-
tageous to smaller parties and back bench MPs (Davis, 2010). This might be 
explained by indications that the majority of online citizen participation is 
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opposing government plans (Evans-Cowley, 2010). Also, political color of par-
ties influences their preferences to the adoption of e-participation (Chadwick, 
2011). Larsson (2007) shows that leftist parties are more likely to use Face-
book. Borge et al. (2009) found that leftist councils are more responsive to 
participation in general, but this effect does not exist for online participation.
Fourth and finally, path dependency and isomorphism are named as 
determinants of the responsiveness to online participation. By path depen-
dency we mean the tendency of government actions and policies to reflect 
earlier actions and policies (cf. Pierson 2000). Bonson et al. (2012) state that 
marginal use of online media can be explained by prior negative experiences 
with e-government tools. This influence of prior practices is also recognized 
by Ellison & Hardy (2014) and Hepburn (2014). Polat (2005) concludes that 
governments that are already open to (online) participation, are more likely 
to continue doing so. When government organizations consider it to be an 
external pressure, they have difficulty to digest this change. They perceive of 
online participation as being ‘no part of the job’.
Polat (2005) mentions normative homogenization and isomorphism as ex-
planations. These concern copying actions of other governmental organization 
either by normative pressure or mimicking positive examples (cf. DiMaggio & 
Powell 1991). The external demand of adopting online participation practices 
accounts for differences between local and national governments (Andersen 
et al. 2011; Goodman 2010) and between departments dealing with policy 
development and implementation (Bekkers et al. 2013). Local governments 
are usually considered first-tier organizations for citizen-government contact. 
Also departments dealing with policy development will have a higher need for 
participation of citizens than department solely dealing with implementation.
Online debate characteristics
Characteristics of online debate – or at least how they are perceived by 
policymakers – constitute a third group of explanations for the governments’ 
responsiveness to online media (Table 7.5). Governments mention several 
concerns in dealing with online participation. Early studies of e-participation 
projects name internet access and skills of citizens as an issue of concern 
The Contingency of Governments’ Responsiveness to the Virtual Public Sphere 193
(Kangas & Store 2003). Also later studies mention that participation of a 
broad group of citizens – in terms of representativeness (cf. Dahlgren 2005) 
– is not ensured and therefore online media are not seen as a suitable channel 
of participation (Seltzer & Mahmoudi 2013; Evans-Cowley & Hollander 2010).
With regard to this representational dimension of online participation as well, 
studies highlight the importance of a (perceived) demand for responsiveness 
by the population (Haug 2007; Small 2012). Borge et al. (2009) found in a 
comparison of Catalonian municipalities that population size and average 
age are significant determinants of the start of online participation initia-
tives. A greater number of citizens and a younger population are perceived 
to have a higher demand for online participation opportunities. Also Fred-
ericks and Foth (2013) found differences between urban population sizes in 
governments’ responsiveness to online participation. Larsson (2013) found 
that higher educated populations and larger administrations are significant 
predictors of the uptake of social media by Swedish municipalities, but popu-
Table 7.5: Online participation explanations of governments’ responsiveness to the 
virtual public sphere
Explanations Articles N (%)
Representational dimension: 
participation of (new) publics
Kangas & Store 2003
Seltzer & Mahmoudi 2013
Evans-Cowley & Hollander 2010
Dutton & Lin 2001
Bekkers et al. 2011
5 (13.6%)
Representational dimension: 
perceived demand
Haug 2007
Small 2012
Borge et al. 2009
Fredericks & Foth 2013
Kangas & Store 2003
Polat 2005
6 (15.8%)
Interactional dimension: Quality of 
online participation
Ferber et al. 2005
Hepburn 2014
Seltzer & Mahmoudi 2013
Goodman 2010
4 (10.5%)
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lation size however is not. Larsson’s study shows that administration size 
probably moderates the relationship between population size and govern-
ments’ responsiveness to online participation. The lack of demand by citizens 
is named as a reason for not implementing online participation initiatives or 
governments’ lack of responsiveness (Polat 2005). When socio-demographic 
characteristics of the population indicate that there is little internet access 
and familiarity, governments will be less responsive to online participation 
(Kangas & Store 2003).
On the interactional dimension of online media, some studies detect re-
luctance of governments to be responsive to online participation due to the 
quality of debate (Goodman 2010; Seltzer & Mahmoudi 2013; Hepburn 2014). 
The status of online discussion in the policy process is controversial due to 
anonymity and unconstructive contributions (cf. Papacharissi 2004). Govern-
ments are afraid that venues of online participation ‘will be dominated by a 
few crackpots or manipulated by special interests’ (Ferber et al. 2005: 92). 
Hepburn (2014) states that online participation is perceived to be vulnerable 
to political manipulation. Participation tools can be hijacked by certain stake-
holders, compromising the representativeness of outcomes. Governments 
find the authenticity of online contributions hard to judge and therefore are 
hesitant to let online contributions influence policy outcomes.
Other factors
Next to specifying explanations within the categories of our analytical frame-
work, our review also revealed that the type of policy issue matters (Table 7.6).
Table 7.6: Other explanations of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public 
sphere
Explanations Articles N (%)
Issue complexity Kangas & Store 2003
Van der Merwe & Meehan 2013
Hepburn 2014
Deligiaouri 2013
4 (10.5%)
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Complex (Kangas & Store 2003), ‘wicked’ (Van der Merwe & Meehan 2013) 
or ‘politically divisive’ (Hepburn 2014) issues are perceived to be less suited 
for citizen opinion-formation, deliberation and mobilization online. Studies 
show that with regard to such technical issues, expert knowledge is preferred 
over the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ (cf. Surowiecki 2004). As Deligiaouri (2013: 
119) states: ‘Specialized and technical draft laws are less applicable for public 
commenting as they require from participants good and sometimes special-
ized knowledge of the topic.’. This might be valid for citizen participation in 
general, but seems even more so for online participation online, in which the 
identity and expertise of participants often remains hidden.
Conclusions
This literature review studied what factors account for the responsiveness of 
governments towards policy discussion in the virtual public sphere. Our find-
ings show that the role of the virtual public sphere in the policy process is not 
only dependent on the power of the media and the stakeholders who are using 
them. The practices of governments are very important as well. We were able 
to uncover this side of the agenda-setting process by taking responsiveness 
as a central concept. This literature review resulted in a specified explanatory 
model of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere with four 
categories of explanations (Figure 7.3). The influence of the virtual public 
sphere in the policy process is contingent with regard to individual policy-
maker characteristics, institutional characteristics, perceived characteristics 
of online participation and characteristics of the policy issue at hand.
Institutional characteristics as explanations for governments’ responsiveness 
to the virtual public sphere have been most prominent in empirical research 
thus far. This may be due to the fact that responsiveness to the public sphere 
is mostly defined as an institutional characteristic: the responsiveness of 
certain policy domains or governance systems. Studies focusing on individual 
policymakers and their perceptions of online media and issue complexity 
7.5 
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show that the agency of individual policymakers is relevant as well. They 
have certain levels of experience and preferences in dealing with (online) 
media. Their responsiveness to online debate is diminished by anonymity 
and concerns with authenticity of online content. This lack of trust in citizen 
participation will negatively influence the involvement of their contributions 
in the policy process (cf. Yang 2005). Complex policy issues are considered to 
be less suitable for citizen participation in general and online participation 
in particular. Moyonner-Smith (2006) however shows that online laymen’s 
knowledge can contribute even in a complex decision-making process as the 
built of a Parisian airport. It can even empower the participation of citizens. 
Policymaker perceptions and scientific evidence thus disagrees on whether 
layman’s knowledge can be useful in complex and highly technical policy 
problems.
Figure 7.3: Explanatory model
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Studies focused on government-initiated online participation generally en-
countered higher levels of government responsiveness than studies focusing 
on citizen-initiated online participation. Representativeness of participation 
and quality of debate are however weak factors in such top-down designs of 
a virtual public sphere. They delimit citizens’ choice in topic of discussion, 
tone of debate and ways of expressing themselves. As a result, many studies 
conclude that the government-initiated participation was not really suc-
cessful in terms of numbers of participants or degree of online interaction 
between citizens and policymakers. Citizen-initiated practices of online 
participation have the potential to attract larger numbers and greater diver-
sity of citizens. There are examples of vivid public spheres with mobilization, 
critical argumentation and voicing opinions to policymakers. Responsiveness 
to citizen-initiated online participation is however restricted by three critical 
factors on the institutional, issue and policymaker dimension: governments 
are lacking awareness, access and acquaintance in being responsive to - let 
alone to participate in - citizen-initiated discussions.
Responsiveness to the virtual public sphere is a merit in terms of democratic 
legitimacy and relevant from a more strategic concern of public reprisals in 
the form of civic disobedience or protests and risking electoral loss (cf. Brooks 
& Manza 2006). Too much government responsiveness is however undesir-
able as a volatile environment will undermine the stability and functioning 
of the policy field. A tendency of populism is risked when a system is only 
responding to its external context of public preferences without formulating 
long-term policy objectives. Policies and policymakers need to be responsive 
to external claims while continuously pursuing more long-term goals.
The method of systematic literature review and meta-synthesis of the 
findings has a number of limitations. We cannot make any statements about 
the importance and prevalence of certain explanations as they may be more 
representative of research choices than of the empirical reality. The literature 
is still too much in a state of development and the sample is too small and 
diverse to assume that the findings represent all instances of government’s 
responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. Furthermore, as outlined in the 
methodology section, we only included peer-reviewed scholarly articles in 
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our sample. This omits possibly relevant conference proceedings, working 
papers, dissertations, books and book chapters. However, we choose the qual-
ity assurance of peer review over gaining a larger sample of publications.
While communicative aspects of the virtual public sphere have been a 
popular object of study over the past years, research into its links with the 
centers of decision-making is still in its early stages. This is characterized 
by many (single) case-studies, conceptual and methodological diversity and 
publications in a great variety of journals. A coherent research tradition has 
not yet been established. We propose three directions for future research. 
Firstly, future research should focus its efforts on citizen-initiated online 
participation as this is underrepresented in current research. This type of 
online participation seems to be more promising as a virtual public sphere 
than government-initiated participation projects which often have problems 
with motivating citizens to participate and still are very similar to offline 
channels of participation. This type of research requires sophisticated tools 
and methods as citizen contributions will not be centered in one online venue, 
but dispersed over the Web.
Secondly, the agency of individual policymakers is often overlooked in 
studies into the responsiveness. Our review shows that their resources and 
competencies as well as their perceptions of the quality of online debate 
and the complexity of the policy issue constitute an important explanation 
for governments’ responsiveness to the virtual public sphere. Politicians and 
administrators are often the subject of research into the utilization of social 
media for distributing information to the public, but less when it comes to 
being responsive to online debate. Research should focus on the competencies 
and skills of policymakers in dealing with online civic engagement, tensions 
with regard to their professional role and varying responsiveness related to 
policymakers’ positions in policy networks. Also their perceptions of online 
participation and the complexity of the policy issue at hand influence their 
responsiveness to online participation and should be taken into account.
Lastly, and related to the previous point, our research shows that a broader 
conceptualization of responsiveness will result in a more comprehensive 
understanding of governments’ responsiveness to the virtual sphere. There 
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is a tendency to conceptualize responsiveness as a system characteristic that 
can be measured by policy change as a result of the policy process. This is 
an outcome-oriented definition of responsiveness implying that without any 
changes in policy, there has been no responsiveness. With regard to the virtual 
public sphere that includes a great variety of opinion, such an outcome-ori-
ented definition of responsiveness is not sufficient. Adding a practice-based 
conceptualization of responsiveness as an attitude of individual policymakers 
provides a more comprehensive outlook on responsiveness when it comes to 
the virtual public sphere. These directions for further research will contribute 
to gaining a better understanding of the impact of the virtual public sphere in 
the policy process.
8
CONCLUSIONS AND 
DISCUSSION
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Policy in the public eye
There is extensive interaction between the media and various policy agendas. 
Policy actors from inside and outside government are often referenced as 
sources in traditional media coverage or actively contribute to social media 
debate. Vice versa, media coverage is an important factor in policy processes. 
It not only influences the structure of policy networks and processes (Klijn et 
al. 2014; Korthagen 2015a; Schillemans & Pierre 2016), but can also put issues 
on the policy agenda (Wolfe et al. 2013). This latter influence is referred to as 
agenda-setting. Only in a minority of cases – such as the case of Mauro Manuel 
described in Chapter 1 – a media effect was explicitly acknowledged. In many 
cases, media effects on the substantive policy agenda remain implicit, and it is 
unclear whether and how they occurred. This study has sought to further our 
knowledge on policy agenda-setting effects by applying a feedback model of 
policy agenda-setting. We studied policy agendas within the policy domain of 
immigration and integration policies and analyzed agenda-setting and fram-
ing dynamics when policy-related issues were in the ‘public eye’ of the media.
The term ‘agenda’ is a metaphor for ‘a collection of problems, understandings 
of causes, symbols, solutions, and other elements of public problems’ that come 
to the attention of a certain group of people or organizations (Birkland 2011: 
106). Different types of agendas have been subject of agenda-setting studies. 
This includes the public agenda, the media agenda, the political or symbolic 
policy agenda and the substantive policy agenda. Most relevant to this study is 
the distinction between the symbolic and substantive policy agenda. Agenda-
setting studies in political communication have primarily focused on the sym-
bolic policy agenda, which is operationalized by studying the congressional 
agenda, parliamentary questions, or agendas of MPs or political parties (Van 
Aelst et al. 2014: 215). Changes on this symbolic agenda do not necessarily 
have policy consequences. Responsiveness and reference to media is often a 
political strategy rather than an act of actually pursuing policy change.
This study focused on agenda-setting effects on the substantive policy 
agenda. This policy agenda includes issues that are explicitly subject to the ac-
tive and serious consideration of authoritative decision-makers (Cobb & Elder 
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1972). They require substantive action on the part of policymakers including 
the allocation and re-allocation of government resources. As issues often pass 
the symbolic policy agenda before arriving on the substantive policy agenda, 
the latter is seen as a subset of the symbolic policy agenda. Changes on the 
substantive policy agenda are generally believed to be rarer as bureaucratic 
processes take time and investment (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006). Eventual 
changes on the policy agenda such as legislative or budgetary change are 
difficult to relate back to the far shorter issue attention cycles of media cover-
age or other sources of information. Furthermore, agenda-setting effects of 
media on this agenda are more difficult to pin down in empirical studies. The 
substantive policy agenda is often implicitly defined in policy processes that 
take place behind closed doors.
Recent studies suggest that a more comprehensive understanding of policy 
agenda-setting can be reached by interpreting agenda-setting as an exchange 
of feedback between media and policymaking processes (Wolfe et al. 2013; 
Nowak 2013). This model offers three key advantages when studying the sub-
stantive policy agenda. First, it acknowledges that information not only flows 
from media to the policy agenda but also vice versa. This is similar to Pierson’s 
(1994) notion of policy feedback that argues that policies also produce poli-
tics. Today, there is general consensus that agenda-setting is a mutual rather 
than unidirectional process of exchange in which the media and policy agenda 
are interdependent (Van Aelst et al. 2014; Vliegenthart et al. 2016). This en-
tails taking into account reciprocal relations on an individual and institutional 
level between the media and the policy agenda. Scholars generally agree that 
media coverage influences the policy agenda more than the other way around, 
indicating processes of policy agenda-setting (cf. Vliegenthart et al. 2016).
Second, this model acknowledges multiple qualities of feedback sent by 
the media. Media coverage is produced by a diverse range of media outlets 
and involves not only a quantitative distribution of issue salience, but also 
includes qualitative features of issue framing. This study takes into account 
social media as well as traditional media coverage. Furthermore, it takes into 
account not only the quantity of media attention for issues, but also the fram-
ing of media coverage. Frames communicate an interpretation of the issue 
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at hand, including a problem definition, causal explanation and a proposed 
(policy) solution (Entman 1993; Rein & Schön 1993). Media coverage can 
exercise ‘negative feedback’ toward the policy agenda when it agrees with 
the dominant frame on the policy agenda and argues for a policy status quo. 
It can also provide ‘positive feedback’ when frames in media coverage are 
contrasting the policy frame and argue for policy alternatives (Baumgartner 
& Jones 2002). Because it is assumed that media coverage does not operate in 
a vacuum, I study how media coverage is influenced by various policy actors, 
including government officials themselves.
Third, a feedback model of agenda-setting assumes that agenda-setting not 
only depends on characteristics of media as the agenda setter, but also of the 
policy agenda as the receiving ‘agent’ in the process. The feedback model of 
agenda-setting draws our attention to how the media provide information, 
but also to how the information is received on the policy agenda. I study the 
agenda-setting influence of the policy agenda by focusing on its ‘responsive-
ness’. Responsiveness concerns the extent to which and ways in which the 
policy agenda takes media coverage into account (Hobolt & Klemmensen 
2005). This can entail changes in issue salience or issue framing on the policy 
agenda, but also a broader sensitivity to media coverage in policy processes, 
even including anticipation of media coverage. I study the forms this respon-
siveness toward media coverage takes and how this varies according to differ-
ent types of media outlets and issue frames.
By elaborating a feedback model in this study, I build further on common ap-
plications of agenda-setting and framing theory in political communication 
and policy science. Both agenda-setting research traditions can benefit from 
borrowing from each other and combining different aspects of their theoreti-
cal applications. The tradition of agenda-setting research in political commu-
nication has developed as a positivist tradition specifying multiple aspects 
of media effects, often distinguishing agenda-setting and framing effects. It 
has been criticized for focusing too much on linear (Van Aelst et al. 2014; 
Vliegenthart et al. 2016) and quantitative (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006; Wolfe 
et al. 2013) effects. It has been argued that the research tradition should go 
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beyond a model of media as the ‘almighty agenda setter’ (Walgrave 2008; Van 
Aelst et al. 2008). Due to its strong focus on media, it often overlooks the larger 
complex political and policy arena in which media coverage takes shape.
Agenda-setting models in policy science allow for more complexity than 
agenda-setting studies in political communication. The multiple streams 
approach (Kingdon 1984) and advocacy coalition model (Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith 1993) acknowledge the complexity of policy information, the role 
of focusing events or external shocks, and that of (coalitions of) actors in 
connecting information, beliefs and interpretations in motivating policy 
continuation or change. Agenda-setting studies in policy science include 
notions of reciprocal exchanges between the policy agenda and external 
influence and of the relevance of framing of information as an intrinsic part 
of policy agenda-setting. It also criticizes static models of policymaking pro-
cesses in which agenda-setting is a distinct phase. Furthermore, the barrier 
model (Bachrach & Baratz 1970) has its value in conceptualizing barriers in 
the reception of information in the policy process. This aspect relates to the 
reception of feedback on the policy agenda and is also acknowledged in the 
idea of a bottleneck of attention in the punctuated equilibrium framework 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993). However, agenda-setting models in policy sci-
ence are fairly general approaches rather than middle-range theories. They 
are best suited to ex post interpretation of agenda-setting effects and often do 
not focus on the role of media specifically – let alone the contemporary media 
landscape of the 24-hour news cycle, including social media. The feedback 
model of policy agenda-setting combines the empirical specificity of agenda-
setting research in political communication with more multifaceted notions of 
media information and policy processes, and interdependencies between the 
two from policy science.
I applied a constructivist approach focusing on media effects related to focus-
ing events within a specific policy domain. I empirically applied a feedback 
model of agenda-setting on a likely case for policy agenda-setting by the 
media: the policy domain of immigration and migrant integration in the 
context of the Netherlands. Characteristics of the policy issue, and the media 
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and political system of the Netherlands make this policy domain a likely case 
for policy agenda-setting. Immigration and integration are contested issues 
for which a multiplicity of frames exists and agenda changes occur frequently. 
As such it can be considered an ‘intractable policy controversy’ (Scholten 
2013). Immigration and integration issues regularly gain media-attention. 
Furthermore, media scholars tend to agree that the Netherlands is a political 
and media system in which exchanges between the media and policy agenda 
are likely (Hallin & Mancini 2004). Dutch media demonstrate high internal 
plurality in terms of issue framing, and they operate fairly autonomously from 
government. In addition, the Netherlands is one of the leading countries in 
internet access and social media use. This makes the policy domain of im-
migration and migrant integration in the Netherlands a suitable case to study 
instances when policy-related issues are in the public eye.
This concluding chapter first returns to the central research question that 
guided this research: ‘How are policy agendas in the domain of immigration 
and integration shaped and how do traditional and social media coverage of 
policy-related issues influence this type of agenda?’ This question is answered 
based on a synthesis of findings from the various empirical chapters and their 
interpretation in the context of policy agenda-setting as a feedback process. A 
feedback model of policy agenda-setting draws our attention to characteris-
tics of the media that are sending policy feedback, but also to characteristics 
of the policy agendas that are receiving the feedback, and how this in turn 
influences the media coverage. In section 8.2 I first address conclusions 
related to media overage sending policy feedback. In section 8.3 I present 
conclusions related to the reception of media feedback on the policy agenda. 
These sections provide a synthesis of findings from the six empirical chapters 
structured according to the three research themes. Together they provide an 
answer to the overall research question.
Section 8.4 discusses the limitations of this research. Section 8.5 outlines 
avenues for future research. The final section of this dissertation, section 8.6, 
addresses the generalizability of the conclusions and discusses the broader 
relevance of the findings for agenda-setting theory and theory on the mediati-
zation of governance. It also touches upon the societal relevance of the conclu-
208 Chapter 8
sions in the light of media coverage and policy responses concerning current 
developments in immigration and migrant integration in Western Europe.
Media coverage sending policy feedback
Media framing matters
Chapter 4 of this study took into account the framing of media coverage as 
a quality of media feedback in addition to a quantitative measure of media 
attention in order to come to a more comprehensive understanding of media 
effects on the policy agenda. The quantity of media attention does not fully 
explain changes to the policy agenda and qualitative aspects of media cover-
age related to the framing of the issue provide an important explanation as 
well. When the predominant framing of the issue in media coverage does 
not contest the current policy frame but is supportive of current policies and 
legitimizes them, media coverage will not bring about a change to the policy 
agenda. This was for example the case with media coverage of the increased 
inflow of Eritrean asylum seekers in 2014. Media coverage was largely in 
agreement with the frame of State Secretary Teeven‘s policy approach. Large 
quantities of media attention for this case were not associated with changes 
in the policy agenda. We conclude that large quantities of media attention 
do not always imply that media coverage is providing ‘positive feedback’ for 
the policy frame. This makes ‘frame contestation’ a necessary condition for 
agenda-setting.
Furthermore, this chapter demonstrates that large quantities of media at-
tention are not a necessary condition for agenda change when media coverage 
is very ‘consonant’ in communicating a contesting issue frame. This means 
that media coverage is very consistent in communicating a frame that is con-
testing the current policy frame. Notable examples are the cases of individual 
asylum seekers Ahmed Ghafoor Ahmadzai and Dennis Butera, the cases of the 
hunger strike of rejected asylum seekers in detention and a new policy for au 
pairs. In these cases, relatively small amounts of media attention were very 
consonant in contesting the current policy frame and the initial policy frame 
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related to these issue was quickly revised. It can be concluded that including 
qualitative measures of media coverage in agenda-setting studies provides 
for a more comprehensive understanding of when media coverage of policy-
related focusing events are associated with changes in policy agenda.
Furthermore, I conclude that there are common patterns in which the media 
provide positive feedback to the policy agenda of immigration. This conclu-
sion is relevant in the light of theorization on media framing of immigration 
and integration issues specifically (D’Haenens & De Lange 2001; Van Gorp 
2006; Vliegenthart & Roggeband 2007). Media frames of immigration issues 
and their interaction with issue frames on the policy agenda differ according 
to the type of focusing event that gains media attention. In media coverage of 
focusing events related to concrete persons or groups, a human interest frame 
tends to dominate. On the policy agenda, these cases are initially often ap-
proached from a managerialist frame. We described this as a ‘David vs. Goliath’ 
dynamic between dominant framing in the media and the policy agenda (cf. 
Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud 2014). The media effect in these cases often entailed a 
frame change toward a human interest frame. In focusing events concerning 
more abstract phenomena or policy initiatives, generally a threat frame or 
managerialist frame dominated the media coverage. When a managerialist 
frame on the policy agenda was met with a dominant managerialist counter-
frame in media coverage, this led to negotiation dynamic. The media effect 
often entailed an adaptation of the managerialist frame on the policy agenda.
Policy entrepreneurs use various practices to influence 
media framing
Media not only influence the policy agenda, but actors involved in the policy 
process also influence media coverage (Cook 1998; Korthagen 2015b). Issue 
frames in media coverage do not emerge in a vacuum but they strongly reflect 
frames that exist in society, especially frames of authoritative actors or actor 
coalitions (Bennett 1990; Entman 2003a). The selection of issues and issue 
frames from policy actors that gain media coverage is determined by news 
values and media logic. Chapter 5 describes how policy entrepreneurs use 
certain practices to make their frames of immigration issues more attractive 
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to media. These framing practices of policy entrepreneurs selectively steer 
media attention toward certain frames and legitimize them, while discredit-
ing and steering attention away from alternative frames. Framing practices 
that are often used include the use of framing devices (such as visual images, 
metaphors, catchphrases, examples or statistics), acts of mobilization of at-
tention and support, emphasizing obtrusiveness, calling upon expertise and 
authority and venue-shopping. Via media coverage, policy entrepreneurs 
can attribute responsibility to other levels of government (vertical venue-
shopping) or other government branches (horizontal venue-shopping). As 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, there are vertical and horizontal exchanges between 
the local and national policy agendas, making venue-shopping efforts in me-
dia coverage worthwhile.
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the use of framing practices does not only 
vary according to the authoritative position of policy entrepreneurs but also 
according to their feedback aims. Some policy entrepreneurs use framing 
practices to promote frames in the media that provide negative feedback 
toward the current policy frame. This is often supported by framing practices 
of calling upon expertise, and deflecting attention for alternative frames by 
non-response or venue-shopping. By pointing to another (policy) venue, 
policy entrepreneurs divert pressure from other policy entrepreneurs toward 
policy change. Frames that provide positive feedback toward the current 
policy frames are often brought to the attention of media via practices of 
mobilization, emphasizing obtrusiveness and the use of framing devices. As 
a result of the use of such framing practices, policy actors are important ‘co-
authors of the news’ (Cook 2006: 162) in traditional as well as social media. 
By ‘going public’ they use the media for the ‘mobilization of bias’ (Schattsch-
neider 1960) in favor of their policy frame and take part in agenda-setting and 
framing of the policy agenda.
Media effects interplay with other non-mediatized influences on the policy 
agenda. Media coverage is therefore not a factor independent of or external 
to institutional policymaking routines (cf. Cook 2006; Korthagen 2015a). In 
some cases this can be problematic. When media coverage is strongly influ-
enced by actors from authoritative elites, it can create feedback loops in which 
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‘public relations activity [of the government] results in press coverage, which is 
then interpreted as significant public opinion.’ (Cohen 1973: 179). In this case, 
media coverage is in fact an echo of the voices of governmental and politi-
cal elites (Tresch 2009), instead of being a bearer of the public sphere and a 
critical ‘watchdog’ of democratic processes. This risk is especially present in 
countries with low levels of press freedom.
Social media are not an autonomous factor in policy 
agenda-setting
Social media are a relatively new source of media coverage of policy issues. 
It is argued that social media are more inclusive to alternative voices in pub-
lic debate that may be excluded from the mainstream media (cf. Studlar & 
Layton-Henry 1990; Fraser 1992; Dahlberg 2001; Mehra et al. 2004; Albrecht 
2006). Furthermore, it is argued that social media facilitate more continu-
ous and direct exchanges with the policy agenda (Dahlgren 2005; Loader & 
Mercea 2012).
Chapter 6 reports on 52 in-depth interviews with migrant youth of various 
ethnic backgrounds in Rotterdam. Based on their accounts of inter-ethnic and 
intra-ethnic uses of social media, we arrive at a better insight into whether 
and how social media are used as a subaltern public sphere. This chapter 
shows that social media were used for different purposes based on different 
motivations. There is no intra-ethnic online public sphere in which migrant 
youth exclusively engage. Their minority background plays a role in only some 
of their social media activity for which they access designated online venues. 
For example, ‘Marokko.nl’ proved a popular forum for Moroccan-Dutch youth 
when they wanted to explore aspects of their ethnic identity and background. 
This could for example involve the exchange of recipes for cooking or the 
reading of love stories. However, the majority of our respondents’ online be-
havior takes place in social media communities of interest on a different basis 
than a shared ethnic background. For example, our respondents mentioned 
engaging in social media venues related to a shared study, interest in sports 
or discussion of news and current affairs. These often involved inter-ethnic 
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exchanges in which ethnicity was not a relevant factor motivating their choice 
of social media venues.
Furthermore, Chapter 6 indicates that engaging in political debate or dis-
cussion of policy issues was not a popular activity of migrant youth on social 
media. Many of our respondents mention consulting multiple online news 
platforms to gain various perspectives on news, for example, when events in 
their country of origin and issues concerning their ethnic group are in the 
news. Social media informed our respondents on these types of policy issues 
from a different perspective. However, our respondents were rarely motivated 
to engage in policy discussion or political action on social media themselves. 
In this phase of their lives, they were pre-occupied with issues of personal de-
velopment, ambitions and identities. Only in a minority of cases they actively 
contributed to a subaltern public sphere with the potential to bring forward 
different issues or issue frames.
A separate research project indeed indicates that social media do not por-
tray a substantially different way of thinking about immigration issues but 
rather mirror the attention and framing present in traditional media (Dekker 
& Scholten 2015). The quantity of media attention for immigration cases 
largely follows the same pattern in social media as in traditional media. Also, 
the prevalence of various frames in social media coverage is highly similar 
to the distribution of frames in traditional media coverage We explain this 
congruence between traditional and social media coverage by intermedia ex-
changes (cf. Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2008). Social media content often refers 
to and is based on earlier publications in traditional media. In most cases, the 
writer shares a link or copies a statement from elsewhere and adds one’s own 
opinion - either agreeing or disagreeing with the frame that is expressed in 
traditional media content. Only in a minority of cases did the user not share 
existing content but fully developed the content himself.
Based on these findings, it can be concluded that social media do not consti-
tute a ‘subaltern’ public sphere of discussion of immigration and integration 
issues. While social media coverage on immigration issues is very similar to 
traditional media coverage, our findings also show that social media bring 
about a new media logic of ad hoc commenting on focusing events and policy 
Conclusions and Discussion 213
responses (cf. Van Dijck 2013). Social media are a suitable platform for several 
framing practices (Chapter 5). Framing devices such as the use of metaphors, 
catchphrases and visualization thrived on social media. In comparison to 
traditional media, social media communication very concise and media-rich. 
Short texts are combined with visual images or references to other content. 
Therefore, these framing devices fit the media logic of social media very well. 
Social media also enable new forms of mobilization and online activism (How-
ard & Parks 2012). Examples of this presented in this research were among 
many others the online petition and Twitter hashtag in the Mauro Manuel 
case. Lastly, social media offer policy actors a channel to communicate their 
message in a very ad hoc way without being filtered by traditional media. 
One example was the case of Abdul Ghafoor Ahmadzai. His lawyer tweeted to 
mobilize attention for Ahmadzai’s case immediately as soon as the Ministry 
faxed the notice with flight details for Ahmadzai’s return flight. 
While popular discourse and research sometimes tend to have a bias 
toward successful examples of online activism that generated policy change, 
this study indicates that such a direct influence is rare. Communication on 
social media does not immediately reach a very large and diverse audience. 
Social media are primarily organized around communities of interest (Hay-
thornthwaite 2005; Boyd & Ellison 2007). Therefore, messages shared within 
these communities will reach a public of like-minded people first. Only when 
the message is shared by many or by certain opinion leaders who bridge dif-
ferent online communities is the message able to mobilize broader support. 
Traditional media in turn report on social media debate and mobilization as a 
form of ‘voxpop’, particularly when social media content is shared abundantly 
and becomes ‘trending’. Through these processes of intermedia agenda-set-
ting, social media can function as a catalyst for coverage on traditional media 
from a certain frame. Small sparks of online activism can fuse a larger fire of 
contestation (Bekkers et al. 2011). Therefore, government officials consider 
social media to be an uncertain factor in policymaking processes. However, 
social media do not constitute an autonomous factor in policy agenda-setting 
of immigration issues.
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Reception of media feedback on the policy agenda
Responsiveness of the policy agenda to media coverage 
can take different forms
Not all government organizations and individual policymakers are equally 
influenced by the media (Kunelius & Reunanen 2012; Schillemans 2012). This 
research focused on the ‘responsiveness’ of the policy agenda as an integral 
part of agenda-setting processes. This concerns how policy agendas of im-
migration and integration issues take shape and the extent and ways in which 
media coverage is taken into account. This proves an important additional 
determinant of media effects on the policy agenda.
Based on the findings of Chapter 7, this study distinguishes between re-
sponsiveness as an outcome and responsiveness as an attitude or practice. 
Responsiveness as an outcome entails the extent to which issue salience and 
issue frames on the policy agenda change, following shifts in attention and 
framing in media coverage. This is how we studied media effects in Chapter 4. 
We operationalized the effect as a frame change on the policy agenda occur-
ring in a time frame of one year after the onset of the media attention. In most 
cases, this frame change on the policy agenda did not imply structural or leg-
islative change that would also impact other cases (a notable exception is the 
‘Kinderpardon’). Our operationalization also took into account adjustments 
in the policy frame related to individual cases that did not entail structural 
policy change. 
A valuable finding in Chapter 3 that helped to gain a more complete image 
of media effects on the policy agenda is that changes on the policy agenda do 
not necessarily entail a full frame shift. For example, sometimes the policy 
strategy is changed while the problem definition remains the same. In other 
cases, the policy intentions are kept broad and vague. ‘Frame ambiguity’ tends 
to emerge in a context of bounded rationality and political controversy over 
an issue. This is the case with the policy domain of immigration and integra-
tion. In such contexts, ambiguous or ‘weak’ frames are a sensible solution and 
have particular strengths. They are able to placate multiple and sometimes 
conflicting political views. Also, they leave opportunity for policy continuation 
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in a situation of uncertainty about the issue and when new information on the 
issue may come up. Frame analyses should be sensitive to frame ambiguity 
on the substantive policy agenda, particularly in policy domains related to 
intractable policy controversies. Media effects on the policy agenda resulting 
in partial or very minor changes may be overlooked.
Chapter 7 indicates that responsiveness to media coverage can also take 
the form of an attitude or practice. Responsiveness as an attitude or practice 
relates to policy institutions sharing specific policy beliefs, routines and other 
practices, or to individual policymakers. Responsiveness to media coverage 
is the practice of taking into consideration issues and issue frames that are 
expressed in the media in policymaking processes. As an example, responsive-
ness as an attitude is expressed by Minister Leers in the quote in Chapter 1. 
When deciding whether he will use his discretionary power to grant Mauro 
a residence permit, he is taking media coverage into account. This form of 
responsiveness can be present in processes of policymaking regardless of 
whether this eventually results in policy change.
Based on mediatization literature, we can elaborate on this form of respon-
siveness with the notion of media-reflexivity (cf. Davis 2009). Media-reflexivity 
does not only entail taking media coverage into account as soon as it emerges, 
but continuously anticipating how decisions would be portrayed in the media. 
This logic has expanded from influencing only communication and public 
relations departments to the practices and routines of policymakers in admin-
istration (Schillemans 2012; Thorbjørnsrud et al. 2014). Exchanges between 
policymakers and journalists in advance of media coverage may already influ-
ence changes on the policy agenda (cf. Protess et al. 1987; Korthagen 2015b). 
Responsiveness as an attitude or practice has been described in the context 
of the mediatization of politics and governance entailing a structural change 
in which government organizations have adapted to the media and their logic 
(cf. Strömbäck 2008; Esser & Strömbäck 2014). The empirical chapters of this 
dissertation indicate that a broader operationalization of responsiveness is a 
valuable addition to operationalizing responsiveness only in terms of changes 
in the outcome on the policy agenda. 
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Perceived representativeness of public opinion drives 
responsiveness to media coverage
The extent to which media coverage is perceived to be representative of public 
opinion in society is an important mechanism underlying media effects on the 
policy agenda. This entails the perception of the extent to which public agenda 
has been affecting the media agenda. Chapter 7 indicates that when media 
coverage is believed to be representative of public opinion in society, policy 
agendas tend to be more responsive to this coverage. When media coverage is 
believed to be an extreme opinion which does not represent a ‘silent major-
ity’, or is something that will ‘blow over’, then it is ignored in policymaking 
processes. Whether media coverage (on traditional media or social media) is 
truly representative of public opinion becomes irrelevant because it concerns 
the perception that media coverage is influenced by public opinion (Schudson 
1995; Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006: 100). Regardless of whether or not media 
coverage is a complete or valid representation of public opinion in society, 
policymakers tend to act upon this premise (Linsky 1986: 87). Hence, the 
‘public eye’ is socially constructed as a reality which the policy agenda tends 
to act upon.
This mechanism steering the reception of media coverage as feedback on 
the substantive policy agenda is different from mechanisms that have been 
described in relation to the public and political agenda. Studies of public 
agenda-setting by the media generally assume a cognitive mechanism of 
responsiveness of audiences to media content: one of stimulus-response. It 
assumes that exposure to media attention for an issue will make this issue 
more salient to the public (McCombs & Shaw 1972; Capella & Hall Jamieson 
1997; Scheufele 2000). In contrast, political agenda-setting studies generally 
describe a mechanism of political strategy (Yanovitzky 2002: 425;  Walgrave & 
Van Aelst 2006; Davis 2007; Walgrave 2008). Vliegenthart et al. (2016:14) con-
clude that: ‘Political actors do adapt to the media logic, but only to the extent 
that it is to their own advantage. Politicians’ political logic serves as guidance 
for their selective adaptation to the media logic’. Studies indicate that issue 
ownership and being an opposition party increase responsiveness to media 
coverage (Green-Pedersen & Stubager 2010; Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2011; 
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Van der Pas 2014; Vliegenthart et al. 2016). Political parties wish to show their 
electorate that they are ‘on top of things’ (Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006).
Regarding the policy agenda, the ‘bottleneck of attention’ of policy pro-
cesses has been understood from a rationalist perspective of ‘bounded ratio-
nality’ and how well new information fits the current policy image or frame 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993). This is an institutional as well as individual 
process (Pritchard 1992; Berkowitz 1992). Responsiveness is a form of frame 
reflection in which the current policy frame is confronted with policy alterna-
tives which are framed in media coverage (cf. Schön & Rein 1994). Baumgart-
ner and Jones’ model of punctuated equilibria asserts that for long periods 
of time, policy subsystems only respond to information that fits the current 
policy frame and only brings about incremental changes. Only in exceptional 
occasions – when contesting information becomes so prominent that it can no 
longer be ignored – policy agendas become responsive to alternative frames 
and more radical changes in policy occur. 
This study adds to this interpretation that perceived representativeness of 
public opinion is an important factor in reaching this tipping point. This mech-
anism of responsiveness to the policy agenda elaborates upon the ‘third per-
son effect’ by which political responsiveness to media coverage is sometimes 
explained. This entails that actors respond to media because they believe the 
mass media affect the public – presumably more than it influences themselves 
(Davison 1983; Van Dalen & Van Aelst, 2014: 59). The mechanism underlying 
media-effects on the policy agenda is differs by entailing the perception of 
how the public or other interest groups have affected media coverage. Studies 
have demonstrated that policymakers tend to adjust policies in response to 
public opinion changes, comparable to the workings of a thermostat (Stimson 
et al. 1995; Wlezien 1995; Burstein 2003). They constantly measure public 
opinion and adjust their policy accordingly. 
This is an important contribution as Van Aelst et al. (2014: 200) conclude 
with regard to political agenda-setting that ‘agenda-setting work has, until 
recently, remained somewhat undertheorized. In particular, insights on why and 
how politicians adapt to the agenda of the media are still in need of elabora-
tion’. This is even more the case for the policy agenda and policymakers in 
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government. Policymakers’ perceptions of media coverage are usually studied 
as trust in media, while this is operationalized as whether actors perceive 
media to be unbiased, truthful in their reporting, giving a multisided and 
complete picture of issues and are thus trustworthy. These studies often 
indicate that this conceptualization of perceptions of media is not relevant to 
agenda-setting (Vesa et al. 2015). For future research, this study suggests that 
this focus be diverted from trust in media to perceived representativeness of 
media coverage.
Responsiveness toward social media is less 
institutionalized
The mechanism of perceived representativeness of public opinion that is 
driving the responsiveness to media coverage becomes particularly apparent 
when studying responsiveness to social media. While public organizations 
are known to devote substantial time and resources to traditional media 
coverage (Cook 1998; Thorbjørnsrud et al. 2014; Schillemans & Pierre 2016), 
social media are rather new to the media landscape and require a different 
media literacy and sensitivity. They bring about new norms and practices of 
communication on public issues. According to Brants and Van Praag (2006: 
38), technological and commercial developments have changed the media 
landscape from a stable supply to a volatile market. Responsiveness to social 
media coverage is less established in institutional routines than traditional 
media (cf. Djerf-Pierre & Pierre 2016). Therefore, it often comes down to the 
practices of individual policymakers. Many of them struggle with access to 
and interpretation of social media coverage. Earlier studies point to different 
stages of social media adoption and institutionalization (Mergel & Bretsch-
neider 2013; Mergel 2016). This brings along legal and ethical issues. For ex-
ample, to what extent can online content and metadata referring to individual 
citizens be stored and used by government authorities for various purposes? 
And, to what extent and how should governments inform citizens about their 
practices of monitoring social media content?
Chapter 7 of this study demonstrates that determinants of responsiveness to 
social media include personal experience and competences and institutional 
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resources and incentives such as the implementation of a social media analysis 
tool. Policy actors’ position in policy networks and political motivations also 
play a role. Furthermore, we find important differences related to the policy 
domain and perceived quality of social media participation. Policy issues and 
domains which are rather technical and complex are generally perceived to 
be less suitable for online participation. Expert knowledge is preferred over 
‘wisdom of the crowds’ (Surowiecki 2004) in these policy domains.
In addition, perceptions of the representativeness of online discussion 
strongly steer responsiveness to social media. On the one hand, policymakers 
feel an incentive to be responsive to social media coverage as it is directly 
produced by citizens and it is assumed that no intermediary organizations 
select and frame the information that is communicated. It is often regarded as 
the online equivalent of citizens writing to their government representatives. 
On the other hand, uncertainty about groups of people that social media rep-
resent inhibits responsiveness. Policymakers are afraid that social media ‘will 
be dominated by a few crackpots or manipulated by special interests’ (Ferber 
et al. 2005: 92). Policymakers are often unclear about which part of the public 
social media are representing and whether their social media opinions can be 
generalized to broader society. When social media seem to represent only a 
minority group and when the quality of online contributions is perceived to 
be low, governments are less responsive to this type of mediated information.
In the context of social media, the mechanism of perceived representative-
ness of public opinion steering the reception of media feedback on the policy 
agenda creates a paradoxical outcome. On the one hand, social media are 
valued for their potential to include minorities whose voices are generally 
unheard in traditional media and to facilitate direct exchanges with citizens. 
But on the other hand, social media coverage is dismissed when it is perceived 
to only represent a small, minority group in society. This is problematic when, 
in the context of debate on policy issues, many users of social media consider 
their online behavior to be acts of political activism and policy feedback. When 
their message is ignored, they will feel misrepresented.
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Limitations of this study
This section discusses three main limitations of this study that resulted from 
methodological choices in the research design. An important question is 
whether alternative choices were available and whether this would have led 
to different conclusions.
Selection of media outlets
This study took into account media coverage of immigration issues based on 
a diverse range of Dutch national newspapers, opinion magazines and televi-
sion news and current affairs programs by public broadcasters. Furthermore, 
publically available social media content was collected via a social media 
monitoring tool (cf. Dekker & Scholten 2015) was collected. By doing so, a 
broad overview of coverage that is part of the media consumption by many 
Dutch citizens and policymakers alike could be captured. However, there are 
media outlets that we did not take into account in this study which might have 
led to different conclusions concerning media effects on the policy agenda. 
Most prominent types of media that were excluded are (semi-)private social 
media venues and local media.
Firstly, social media content in this study was only collected from public 
sources, mainly Twitter, public weblogs and public Facebook groups. Discus-
sions in (semi-)private communities were not taken into account. Further-
more, we collected our data based on queries collecting content that explicitly 
refers to specific cases in our research. By using this method of data collection, 
we did not collect online content referring to immigration more in general or 
referring to cases without being very specific. While these queries enabled the 
collection of content including a variety of issue frames, this way of selecting 
social media coverage excludes more generic statements on immigration and 
integration. By only studying public social media content and this method 
of data collection, we might exclude subaltern public spheres in which the 
distribution of attention for issues and issue frames is possibly more different 
from traditional media coverage. While including this content would possibly 
have led to different conclusions on the attention for issues and prevalence 
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of issue frames in online media coverage on immigration, it is not likely that 
this would have led to different findings concerning media effects on policy.
Chapter 7 of this dissertation indicates that due to the limited accessibility of 
these online venues and uncertainties of representativeness, (semi-)private 
social media content is likely to be ignored by policymakers. This type of 
content is not very likely to have an independent effect on policy. Only when 
the message is shared by many or by certain opinion leaders in other more 
public online venues and is picked up by other media, will it be able to have 
an effect. Our analysis of public social media content and traditional media 
publications covered this.  Furthermore, including (semi-)private social me-
dia would require further ethical reflection on permission to use these data 
for scientific research.
Another type of media that was excluded in this research were local media 
which operate in specific localities such as cities or provinces. Local media in 
the Netherlands include newspapers, radio and television channels, and today 
also social media channels and communities. While local news media in the 
Netherlands are in decline (Landman & Kik 2015), they still have an important 
democratic function on the local level of governance. For example, long before 
the case of Mauro Manuel became a national news topic, his case had already 
been reported on in the local media in the province of Limburg where Mauro 
lived at the time. When his case became national news, local media continued 
their coverage and this was an important source of information for national 
media. This was also the case in news about the asylum center in the village 
of Oranje in the province of Drenthe. Local media coverage opposing the 
establishment of this asylum center enabled issue linkages with critical media 
reports on asylum centers in other locations such as Rijs in Friesland, Budel in 
Noord Brabant and Rekken in Gelderland. Through these issue linkages, the 
establishment of asylum centers in small villages in the Netherlands became a 
topic of national news coverage and policy debate. 
Next to agenda-setting effects on the substantive policy agenda of the lo-
cal government, coverage of local media also has an important function in 
agenda-setting of the national policy agenda. By excluding local media from 
the study, an integrated outlook on processes of intermedia agenda-setting 
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between local and national media was omitted. However, many relevant local 
publications were shared in social media content, which in turn was taken 
into account in this study. This enabled us to nevertheless obtain an overview 
of issue-attention and -frames introduced by local media. When these media 
outlets contributed new information to the debate, this often transferred to 
the national media being studied. Local media still play an important role 
which should be studied more systematically in future research.
Causal inference
The feedback model of agenda-setting and the social constructivist approach 
applied in this case study does not allow for causal inferences as is common 
in positivist statistical research designs. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) method that was applied in Chapter 4 replaces linear notions of causal-
ity by assuming equifinality and multifinality (Verweij & Gerrits 2012: 27). 
This entails taking into account that different conditions can produce similar 
outcomes, and that the same condition can produce different outcomes in 
different contexts. This fits the theoretical assumption that media effects on 
the policy agenda are not linear causal effects but entail complex causal in-
teractions between media and the policy agenda (Boydstun 2013; Wolfe et al. 
2013). This study highlighted this different notion of causal inference by using 
qualitative language of ‘association’ and ‘understanding’ factors ‘contributing’ 
to an outcome.
A consequence of this approach is that statistically generalizable statements 
on media effects were not obtained. However, this qualitative methodology 
is believed to better reflect the complex reality of policy agenda-setting and 
framing. An added value of this methodology is the insight gained into the 
mechanisms underlying policy agenda-setting by the media. 
The policy agenda-setting effect
When studying media effects on the substantive policy agenda, this study fo-
cused on changes in the issue framing in policy. This is notably different from 
the agenda-setting effect that is studied in political agenda-setting studies. 
These studies focus on quantitative shifts in issue salience instead of qualita-
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tive shifts in framing. Distinguishing between the two is easier concerning the 
symbolic political agenda than the substantive policy agenda. While political 
communication scholars often consider agenda-setting and framing to be 
distinct processes that should be analytically distinguished as ‘accessibility’ 
(agenda-setting) and ‘applicability’ (framing) effects (Scheufele & Tewksbury 
2007), in policy sciences they are generally considered to be closely inter-
twined. As Van Aelst et al. (2014: 204) argue, the substantive policy agenda 
has a direct impact on, or is policy (cf. Walgrave & Van Aelst 2006; Pritchard 
1992: 108). Changes in issue salience and issue framing are strongly inter-
twined. This is the case when agenda-setting effects are operationalized as 
legislative or budgetary change, but also when it is operationalized as changes 
in the issue framing on the policy agenda of a specific policy domain – as was 
done in this study. 
By studying agenda-setting effects on the substantive policy agenda, we 
inevitably go beyond the original agenda-setting hypothesis of allocation of 
attention and the agenda-setting phase of the policy process. Conclusions on 
agenda-setting effects by the media on this agenda cannot be generalized to 
agenda-setting effects on the political agenda or the public agenda, while the 
concept of agenda-setting suggests a similar process. As concluded in section 
8.3, agenda-setting on these various agendas is also steered by different un-
derlying mechanisms. This way, this study elaborates on the broader theory 
of mediatization of governance. While mediatization is a useful concept to 
place the agenda-setting impact of the media in perspective of other types of 
media influence, mediatization literature has been less successful in bringing 
forward a middle-range theory and testable hypotheses (cf. Altheide & Snow 
1979; Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008; Esser & Strömbäck 2014).
It is not necessarily problematic that agenda-setting and framing were 
studied conjointly. It is usually assumed that an agenda-setting effect is estab-
lished more easily than a framing effect, as reflected by the famous quote by 
Bernhard Cohen: ‘[the press] may not be successful much of the time in telling 
people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what 
to think about.’ (1963:13). Also, several more recent agenda-setting studies 
argue that a media effect is deemed most likely in the agenda-setting phase, 
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in comparison to subsequent phases of the policy process – including policy 
formulation (Linsky 1986: 94; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Voltmer 2007: 5; 
Van Dalen & Van Aelst 2014: 42). Therefore, the media effect that was encoun-
tered in this study includes both an agenda-setting effect and framing effect. A 
limitation of this study is that the two were only distinctively operationalized 
in Chapter 4. 
Directions for future research
Reflection on the findings and limitations of this study points to avenues for 
future research. The feedback model of agenda-setting that was applied in 
this study proved fruitful and more closely approaches the empirical reality 
of policy agenda-setting. The feedback model of agenda-setting highlighted 
processes of reception of media feedback on the policy agenda that remained 
underexposed in common positivist research designs. It is therefore recom-
mended to elaborate on this qualitative research design in future research. 
A number of features of this feedback model of policy agenda-setting studies 
should be developed further. Firstly, our knowledge on media effects on the 
policy agenda could be specified further by focusing on differences between 
various media outlets and intermedia agenda-setting effects between them. 
As suggested in section 8.4, including types of media that were not taken into 
account here such as local media would be relevant.
Secondly, an important topic of study for future research is responsiveness 
of the policy agenda as an attitude or practice of policymakers. Our knowledge 
on this can be advanced by studying policymakers’ own media consump-
tion. Policymakers are known to be true news addicts who closely follow 
the coverage of multiple media outlets (Pritchard 1992). These practices 
have become institutionalized in devoting substantial time and resources to 
media monitoring and management (Cook 1998; Thorbjørnsrud et al. 2014; 
Schillemans & Pierre 2016). Today, many government organizations are also 
piloting social media monitoring. However, it is still relatively unclear how 
institutional processes structure policymakers’ media consumption and how 
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policymakers take media feedback into further consideration in policymaking 
processes. This research suggests that several factors are likely at play. Fac-
tors on an institutional level such as access and resources are relevant, next 
to more personal characteristics of policymakers such as competencies and 
previous experience.
This research suggests that in studying policymakers’ interpretations of 
media coverage, a focus on perceptions of the representativeness of public 
opinion would be a fruitful direction. Unravelling these factors requires an 
ethnographic research design of participant observation and qualitative in-
terviews in government organizations. This can also reveal the sense-making 
processes by which media coverage is interpreted and taken into consider-
ation in policymaking processes. A specific form of responsiveness as an at-
titude or practice that future research should take into account is anticipatory 
behavior of policymakers related to the media (cf. Van Aelst et al. 2014: 207). 
This includes practices by which government officials aim to avert critical me-
dia coverage or to arrange supportive coverage for the current policy frame. 
Future studies should consider agenda-setting dynamics between media and 
policy as mutual exchanges of feedback.
Lastly, future studies should look beyond a media effect in isolation. The 
media interact with other forces influencing the policy agenda, for example 
politics, stakeholder lobby or forms of citizen participation. Chapter 2 dem-
onstrates that consultation and cooperation take place between different 
stakeholders in the policy domain on different levels of governance. Taking 
this into account generates insight into the role of media within the broader 
framework of democratic exchanges between the state and public sphere.
Broader relevance of findings
Theoretical and societal relevance
The theoretical relevance of this research lies in addressing gaps in policy 
agenda-setting research related to the influence of media, in order to come to 
a more comprehensive understanding of when media coverage has an effect 
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on the policy agenda. A direct effect of media coverage on the policy agenda 
is only encountered in a minority of cases. Not only the quantity of media at-
tention, but also qualitative characteristics related to framing are relevant in 
explaining when media coverage has an agenda-setting effect. Social media 
do not have an independent effect on the policy agenda but are able to influ-
ence traditional media coverage to some extent. Furthermore, not only factors 
related to media coverage which is sending policy feedback, but also factors 
related to policy agendas which are receiving this feedback play a role. The 
underlying mechanism of responsiveness of policy agendas toward media 
coverage is the extent to which media coverage is perceived to represent 
public opinion. When media coverage is perceived to be highly representa-
tive of public opinion in society, the policy agenda will be more responsive. 
By applying a feedback model of policy agenda-setting, this study embeds 
agenda-setting and framing theory in broader theorization on mediatization 
of governance and comes to a more comprehensive understanding of media 
effects.
The findings of this study have societal relevance as well. At the core of 
democratic theory is the argument that citizens should be able to influence 
the policies that govern their lives (Held 1996; Dahl 2000). This requires that 
private citizens and societal organizations should have an understanding 
of ways in which the policy agenda is influenced and – if willing – put this 
knowledge into practice for their own interests. A better insight into media 
effects on policy can help private citizens and societal actors to take a critical 
stance toward attention and frames that media attribute to policy issues and 
to mobilize this communicative power and contribute to media coverage. This 
is particularly relevant at times when traditional channels of exchanges be-
tween the public and policymakers such as political party membership, civil 
society organizations and election turnout are in decline (Pritchard 1992).
On the other hand, this study has relevance for policymakers in government 
as well. As this research shows, policy agendas are selectively responsive to 
media coverage. Insight into mechanisms driving responsiveness to media 
coverage helps policymakers reflect on their practices in relation to media 
influence and how this aligns with democratic and institutional values. Too 
Conclusions and Discussion 227
much responsiveness to the media may be undesirable. A volatile environ-
ment will undermine the stability and professional functioning of the policy 
domain. The risk of a tendency toward populism could occur when a system 
only responds to an erratic context of public preferences mixed with media 
logic without formulating long-term policy objectives. Policies and policymak-
ers need to be responsive to external claims while continuously pursuing 
more long-term goals.
Generalizability of findings
This study was based on a constructivist epistemology and qualitative 
research methodology. Agenda-setting by the media was studied in relation 
to one specific case: the policy domain of immigration and migrant integra-
tion policies in the Netherlands. This policy domain and political and media 
system setting was chosen as a likely case of media effects. In correspondence 
with earlier studies in this context, we found that media-attention and fram-
ing for immigration varied and that media effects are limited (Vliegenthart & 
Roggeveen 2007; Bonjour & Schrover 2015). Although findings of this study 
have limited statistical generalizability, they can nevertheless be theoretically 
generalized to similar likely cases.
First of all, findings are generalizable to policy domains governing a simi-
larly intractable policy controversy as immigration and integration. Soroka 
(2002a) contends that media influence on the policy agenda is most plausible 
for policy issues and domains that lend themselves to dramatic events. Wal-
grave et al. (2008: 832) assert that ‘the joint consideration of issue obtrusive-
ness, dramatism, and concreteness offers some reasonable purchase on the 
question of which issues should be most open to media effects’. The domains 
of environmental policies and ‘law and order’ are examples of such similar 
policy domains in which similar agenda-setting effects by the media can be 
expected. The findings would not be generalizable to more abstract and less 
obtrusive policy domains in which a media effect on the policy agenda is less 
likely. Examples of such policy domains are foreign policy and administrative 
policy.
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Secondly, generalizability of these findings is limited to similar political 
systems and media systems. Hallin & Mancini (2004: 47) have developed a 
typology of media- and political systems – which usually develop in co-evolu-
tion. The Netherlands belongs to the North/Central European or Democratic 
Corporatist model which includes countries that are sharing are a relatively 
open parliamentary system of governance in which media influences are 
likely. Furthermore, the media system is characterized by a large degree of 
press freedom and journalistic professionalism, high circulation and large in-
ternal plurality in terms of issue framing. Other countries in this model where 
these findings could be generalized are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (cf. Hallin & Mancini 2004). 
Van Dalen & Van Aelst (2014) further specify Hallin and Mancini’s typology 
by indicating that there are differences within Western European political 
and media systems as well. They contend that in political systems that lack 
strong centralized power, such as Sweden and Norway, politicians are more 
responsive to the media. In this respect, the Netherlands is comparable to the 
Scandinavian countries, while being less comparable to federal states such as 
Germany or Belgium.
Lastly, our study focused on policy agenda-setting on the national level of 
government. The question is whether these findings are generalizable to sub-
stantive policy agendas on other levels of government as well. Studies suggest 
that findings would be generalizable to the local level of government (Tan & 
Weaver 2009). However, in the Netherlands as well as other contexts, local 
media are in decline (Bakker & Scholten 2014; Raad voor Maatschappelijke 
Ontwikkeling 2014; Landman & Kik 2015). This situation jeopardizes the role 
of the media as providers of policy feedback related to local developments. 
Also on a supra-national level such as the European Union, researchers often 
speak of a ‘democratic deficit’ of media reporting on EU policymaking (cf. Bijs-
mans & Altides 2007). Because of a lack of transnational media and an under-
representation of EU policy issues in national media, policy agenda-setting by 
the media may be less prominent at this level of governance as well. Chapter 
2 of this study however indicates that there are multi-level exhange between 
policy agendas in this domain, possibly facilitating further media effects. 
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Relevance to current developments in immigration and 
integration
In addition to the theoretical generalizability of the findings to comparable 
policy domains and media systems, the findings of this study have a broader 
relevance in the light of current theoretical and societal debates on the media 
coverage of immigration and migrant integration issues. After the completion 
of this empirical study, asylum migration to Europe remained a major news 
topic in 2015 and 2016. To what extent can these findings on media framing of 
these issues and agenda-setting dynamics be generalized to current affairs? 
As large numbers of asylum migrants come to Europe, media coverage is often 
structured by relatively abstract themes: Can European welfare states deal 
with large numbers of refugees? Are the motives of asylum seekers genuine? 
Will refugees be able to integrate into European societies? In relation to these 
types of issues, managerialist frames are expected to be found on the policy 
agenda. When media coverage is contesting these policy frames, this likely 
happens from an alternative managerialist frame. When media cover more 
concrete cases, for example the situation of individual migrants, specific 
groups of migrants or local initiatives for asylum migrants, it is more likely 
that a human interest frame will be dominant in media coverage. Accordingly, 
they can put these issues on the policy agenda and contest the managerialist 
policy frame.
In addition, certain actors and framing practices encountered in this study 
(Chapter 5) have become institutionalized in communication about asylum 
migration and are commonly used in the current media coverage. For ex-
ample, water metaphors, and catchy terms to depict ‘bogus’ asylum seekers 
are still often used. Again, statistics are used and interpreted in multiple ways 
to fit a certain issue frame. Images of either large groups of immigrants at the 
borders of ‘Fortress Europe’ or individual asylum seekers such as the iconic 
picture of Aylan Kurdi, the three-year-old Syrian boy who was found on the 
shores of Bodrum (Argos TV Medialogica 2016), influence media coverage 
to a substantial degree. Certain events are framed as focusing events fitting 
existing frames, such as the sexual assaults during New Year’s Eve in Cologne 
(Germany) that supported the framing of immigrants as a threat.
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Interestingly, the media themselves have become an important subject of 
debate on a meta-level concerning coverage of issues related to asylum 
migration to Europe. The media are criticized for over representing certain 
issues while ignoring others, and for using the ‘wrong’ issue frame. This criti-
cism is heard frequently and is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, because 
it indicates that media are deemed an important factor influencing public 
opinion and policy agendas. Media are attributed a democratic responsibility 
in fueling public debate with ‘objective’ and balanced coverage.
Secondly, it shows how the concept of ‘framing’ has made its way into our 
daily language. It is, however, attributed a different meaning from its schol-
arly application in a constructivist approach. ‘Framing’ is often used as an 
accusation of distorting the truth. It is hence seen as a purposeful act while 
assuming that there is an objective and singular truth of the issue. This is an 
understanding of the concept that is different from most scholarly conceptu-
alizations – including the one in this study.
Thirdly, it is interesting to note that the criticism of selecting and framing 
by the media is expressed by various actors and that this criticism concerns 
various issues and issue frames. The media are criticized by some actors for 
paying too much attention to human interest frames and events supporting 
this frame, while at the same time other actors criticize the media for over 
representing immigration as a threat. In many cases, the exact opposite criti-
cism is voiced at the same time. This indicates that ‘blaming the media’ (Deuze 
2006) has become an important framing practice. Often, actors in the debate 
refer to a ‘silent majority’ which does not voice its opinion or is insufficiently 
represented in the media. The actor voicing this concern implies that this 
silent majority will have a nuanced opinion of the issue, most likely the issue 
frame of the actor making the statement. This makes accusations of selectivity 
and framing, and references to an unheard truth and ‘silent majority’ a generic 
framing device by which the validity of one’s own frame is stressed.
How the media cover focusing events related to Dutch immigration and inte-
gration policies does not only reach audiences in the Netherlands. A previous 
study which I conducted in the framework of the THEMIS project indicates 
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that social media coverage from the Netherlands travels through migrant 
networks and informs decision-making processes of prospective migrants in 
origin countries of migration (Dekker & Engbersen 2014; Dekker et al. 2015). 
Social media information makes prospective migrants more ‘streetwise’ in 
choosing a destination and organizing their journey. In some cases, informa-
tion that is communicated via social media encourages prospective migrants 
to undertake the journey of migrating to the Netherlands. In other cases, so-
cial media distribute information that discourages future migration (Dekker 
et al. 2016). Information that circulates in migrant networks via social media 
does not inherently encourage or discourage future migration. How informa-
tion about potential destination countries is perceived is dependent on the 
situation the prospective migrant is in. In addition, information obtained from 
social media is usually taken into consideration supplementary to informa-
tion from other channels such as personal contacts with social ties who have 
already migrated or information from government organizations (Dekker et 
al. 2015).
Government officials are increasingly aware of this global reach of social 
media information and they make use of this potential when new policy 
changes in immigration and integration policies are published. Examples 
of this are open letters from the Dutch Minister of Immigration to asylum 
seekers in the Netherlands tempering their expectations by stating that the 
asylum procedure will take a long time (20-10-2015; 11-2-2016). Another 
notable example is the Danish law regulating that asylum seekers have to 
hand in money and valuables that are larger than 10,000 Danish Krone in 
value upon arrival in Denmark (26-01-2016). The announcement of this law 
and media coverage of it reached beyond Denmark. Besides a direct effect on 
asylum seekers who are already in Western Europe, such measures will have 
an indirect effect once this information travels via social media and reaches 
prospective migrants outside of Europe.
Various European governments are now also using traditional and social 
media to directly inform potential migrants about migration to their country– 
mostly to discourage them from migrating to their country. For example, on 
September 7th 2015, Denmark published an advertisement in four Lebanese 
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newspapers in ten different languages. It informed prospective migrants (in 
transit) in Lebanon about changing conditions of Denmark’s asylum procedure. 
While the Danish government, through Minister of Integration Inger Støjberg, 
stressed that the campaign was meant to inform and not to dissuade migrants, 
the campaign was highly criticized by human rights organizations for doing 
exactly this. Another example are the recent Facebook campaigns started by 
Norway, Finland and Belgium to inform potential asylum migrants in Arabic 
about the asylum procedures in their countries. These campaigns specifically 
target potential asylum migrants from Iraq and Afghanistan whose asylum 
applications will not be granted in all cases (Schans & Optekamp, 2016).
Studies of how traditional and social media cover immigration and integra-
tion issues do not only provide insight into possible effects on the public and 
policy agenda in the Netherlands. Media - and particularly social media - con-
stitute a transnational public sphere (Nash 2014). As such, media coverage 
also influence the reality of the immigration and integration issues that the 
policies are dealing with.
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Summary in Dutch 
Nederlandstalige samenvatting
Introductie
Kwesties die gerelateerd zijn aan overheidsbeleid komen regelmatig in de 
aandacht van de media te staan. De aandacht die media aan verschillende be-
leidskwesties schenken en de framing waarvanuit zij belicht worden varieert. 
In de framing van deze kwesties geven media een definitie aan het probleem, 
de oorzaken en de benodigde (beleids)oplossingen. Mediaberichtgeving over 
degelijke kwesties is een daarmee vorm van feedback op het beleid. In som-
mige gevallen wordt de mediaberichtgeving opgepikt door beleidsmakers 
en wordt deze feedback meegewogen in beleidsprocessen. Bij de bekende 
casus van Mauro Manuel in 2011 speelde mediaberichtgeving uiteindelijk een 
doorslaggevende rol en leidde het tot veranderingen op de beleidsagenda. 
Echter, zijn veel meer gevallen te noemen waarin media geen invloed hadden, 
of waarin de invloed van media onduidelijk bleef.
De invloed van media op de beleidsagenda kan worden verklaard door 
agendavormings- en framing-theorie. Deze theorie wordt toegepast op 
verschillende agenda’s (waaronder de publieke agenda, politieke agenda en 
beleidsagenda) en heeft zich daarom ook binnen verschillende wetenschap-
pelijke disciplines ontwikkeld. Dit proefschrift brengt wetenschappelijke 
inzichten rond agendavorming en framing vanuit de media- en communica-
tiewetenschappen, sociologie, politicologie en bestuurskunde samen om te 
komen tot een betere verklaring van media-effecten op beleid. 
Deze studie past inzichten vanuit verschillende wetenschappelijke discipli-
nes toe in een feedback-model van agendavorming. Dit model veronderstelt 
ten eerste dat uitwisselingen tussen media en de beleidsagenda wederzijds 
zijn en dat er een afhankelijkheidsrelatie tussen beiden bestaat. Ten tweede 
veronderstelt dit model dat media-aandacht pluriformer is dan alleen kwan-
titeit van aandacht voor kwesties. Ook de framing van media-aandacht speelt 
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mee en mogelijke verschillen daarin in verschillende traditionele en social 
media. Ten derde veronderstelt dit model dat institutionele en individuele 
vormen van responsiviteit van de beleidsagenda de invloed van media op de 
beleidsagenda mede bepalen.
Casus
Ik onderzoek effecten van mediaberichtgeving op de beleidsagenda binnen 
het beleidsdomein van immigratie en integratie in Nederland. Dit vormt 
de casus van deze studie. Het beleidsdomein van immigratie en integratie 
reguleert de toegang van migranten tot Nederland en de daaropvolgende 
processen van integratie. Dit beleidsdomein is zeer complex en controversieel 
en kan gekarakteriseerd worden als een ‘weerbarstige beleidscontroverse’. 
Er bestaat geen eenduidige definitie van het beleidsprobleem en de beno-
digde beleidsinterventies. Rond immigratie- en integratiekwesties bestaan 
meerdere ‘frames’ die een verschillende interpretatie aan de kwesties geven 
in termen van probleemdefinitie, causale verklaring en beleidsoplossingen. 
Gedurende de afgelopen decennia zijn verschillende frames leidend geweest 
in het beleid. Daarnaast is de context van Nederland als politiek systeem en 
medialandschap een belangrijke factor in de keuze voor deze casus. Beleidsa-
genda’s in Nederland zijn relatief ontvankelijk voor externe invloeden. Boven-
dien kent Nederland een grote mate van persvrijheid en diversiteit van media 
dat diverse en kritische mediaberichtgeving over beleidskwesties waarborgt.
Mijn onderzoek richt zich op specifieke kwesties binnen het beleidsdomein 
die door beleidsactoren zijn aangegrepen om publiciteit te zoeken en aan de 
basis hebben gestaan van een cyclus van mediaberichtgeving. Ik heb gekeken 
naar kwesties die veel media-aandacht hebben ontvangen zoals de casus van 
Mauro en de Vluchtkerk. Ook heb ik kwesties onderzocht die relatief weinig 
media-aandacht hebben ontvangen zoals de casus van Dennis Butera of de 
afspraken rond terugkeer van asielzoekers naar Rwanda en Burundi. Tevens 
is variëteit aangebracht door heel concrete kwesties van individuele migran-
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ten of de vestiging van asielzoekerscentra te selecteren naast meer abstracte 
(beleids)voorstellen of initiatieven.
Onderzoeksvraag en focus
De onderzoeksvraag die dit onderzoek richting geeft, luidt:
Hoe worden beleidsagenda’s in het beleidsdomein van immigratie en immigra-
tie vormgegeven en hoe is mediaberichtgeving van traditionele en social media 
over kwesties gerelateerd aan immigratie en integratiebeleid van invloed op 
deze agenda?
Mijn onderzoek bestaat uit zes empirische hoofdstukken waarin verschillende 
aspecten van deze onderzoeksvraag worden belicht. Deze hoofdstukken pas-
sen binnen drie onderzoeksthema’s: de beleidsagenda van een weerbarstige 
beleidscontroverse, de rol van media-framing bij agendavorming van beleid 
en de responsiviteit van de beleidsagenda naar social media als een nieuwe 
publieke sfeer.
Bevindingen
Het eerste thema van dit onderzoek raakt aan de vraag hoe je de beleidsa-
genda van immigratie en integratie als weerbarstige beleidscontroverse 
onderzoekt. Hoe komt deze tot stand en hoe kun je een mogelijke invloed van 
media waarnemen? Onderzoek naar beleidsagenda’s van integratie in Duits-
land, Nederland en Zweden laat zien dat lokale en nationale beleidsagenda’s 
sterk met elkaar in verband staan. Nationale regulering bepaalt de lokale 
beleidskaders, maar ook lokale overheden kunnen kwesties agenderen op de 
nationale beleidsagenda. Hun ervaring met en analyse van integratieproble-
matiek op lokaal niveau wordt dan op de nationale agenda overgenomen. Een 
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bekend voorbeeld hiervan is de ‘Rotterdamwet’ betreft stedelijke segregatie 
die uiteindelijk landelijk aangenomen werd.
De beleidsagenda van een specifiek beleidsdomein laat zich lastig meten 
in termen van prioritering van kwesties. Media-effecten worden vaak 
duidelijk in veranderingen van ‘frames’ waarmee kwesties op de agenda 
benaderd worden die veranderingen in de prioritering en interpretatie van 
kwesties weerspiegelen. Bij frame-analyse van de beleidsagenda troffen we 
regelmatig ambigue frames aan, die op merkwaardige wijze een bepaalde 
probleemdefinitie en beleidsstrategie combineerden of bepaalde elementen 
van het beleidsframe te raden overlieten. Frame-ambiguïteit is geen teken van 
zwakke beleidsvorming, maar bleek in het kader van weerbarstige beleids-
controverses vaak een voordeel wanneer informatie over de kwesties onzeker 
is of wanneer er politieke onenigheid bestaat.
Het tweede thema onderzoekt hoe kwantiteit van media-aandacht en frames 
van mediaberichtgeving de invloed van de media op de beleidsagenda bepalen. 
Het onderzoek richtte zich op de eenduidigheid van frames in mediabericht-
geving en het criterium of het dominante frame in de media het beleidsframe 
ondersteunde of bekritiseerde. De bevindingen laten zien dat de kwantiteit 
van media-aandacht geen voldoende voorwaarde is voor de totstandkoming 
van een effect op de beleidsagenda. Er bestaan verschillende kwesties waarin 
de hoeveelheid media-aandacht relatief bescheiden was, maar waarbij er toch 
veranderingen op de beleidsagenda plaatsvonden. In deze kwesties was de 
media-framing heel eenduidig in het bekritiseren van het bestaande beleids-
frame. Met name contestatie van het beleidsframe bleek een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde te zijn voor agendavorming van de beleidsagenda.
Het feedbackmodel van agendavorming neemt aan dat de framing van 
kwesties in de media mede het resultaat is van invloeden van beleidsactoren 
op mediaberichtgeving. Als bron of als auteur voeden zij de media met infor-
matie die gekleurd is vanuit hun frame van de kwestie. Beleidsactoren kunnen 
hun informatie op verschillende manieren meer toegankelijk en aantrekkelijk 
maken voor media. Dit betreft het gebruik van ‘framingmiddelen’ zoals slo-
gans, voorbeelden of visuele beelden, het organiseren van mobilisatie zoals 
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demonstraties of een (online) petitie, of het benadrukken van de expertise 
van degenen die de informatie naar voren brengt. Middels framingmiddelen 
kunnen zij ook rivaliserende frames in de media bekritiseren. Het onderzoek 
laat zien dat de framing van informatie door beleidsactoren in de media 
niet alleen afhankelijk is van de autoriteit van de beleidsactor, maar ook het 
beleidsdoel dat hij voor ogen heeft. Wie het bestaande beleidsframe wil be-
kritiseren past andere middelen toe dan wie het beleidsframe wil verdedigen.
Het derde en laatste thema van dit onderzoek richt zich specifiek op social 
media. Dit relatief nieuwe type media wordt vaak gebruikt voor discussie 
over beleidskwesties. Ook zijn beleidsmakers en politici zelf vaak actief op 
deze platforms. Er wordt verondersteld dat dit type media meer continue en 
directe uitwisseling tussen burgers en beleidsmakers kan faciliteren en dat 
social media de stem van minderheden in het debat kan laten horen, waar 
deze soms wordt buitengesloten door de mainstream media. Deze kwaliteiten 
maken social media tot een relevant kanaal voor agendavorming, met name 
als het gaat om kwesties van immigratie en integratie die etnische minderhe-
den aangaan. Onderzoek onder Rotterdamse jongeren laat zien dat hun etni-
sche achtergrond slechts in beperkte mate hun social mediakeuzes bepaalt. 
Meerdere aspecten van hun identiteit vormen drijfveren die ten grondslag 
liggen aan hun social mediagebruik waardoor zij zich vaak in interetnische 
online netwerken begeven. Voor onze respondenten was dat niet vaak een 
intra-etnische publieke sfeer die nieuwe issues of frames wilde agenderen.
Bovendien is een structurele connectie tussen social mediadiscussie en de 
beleidsagenda nog onvoldoende gewaarborgd. Een meta-analyse van eerdere 
studies laat zien dat social media nog weinig geïnstitutionaliseerd zijn in be-
leidsprocessen. De responsiviteit naar social mediaberichten wordt daarom 
in belangrijke mate gestuurd door individuele competenties en voorkeuren 
van beleidsmakers. Zij laten de invloed van social media afhangen van hun 
beoordeling van de relevantie van dit type informatie voor het beleidsdomein 
waarin zij werkzaam zijn en van hun perceptie van de representativiteit 
van social media voor publieke opinie. In sommige beleidsdomeinen wordt 
interne expertise verkozen boven de ‘wisdom of the crowds’. Daarnaast wordt 
266 Samenvatting
social media informatie eerder genegeerd wanneer beleidsmakers moeilijk 
kunnen inschatten van wie het afkomstig is en als ze veronderstellen dat het 
slechts een kleine minderheid in de samenleving vertegenwoordigt.
Conclusies
De toepassing van een feedbackmodel van agendavorming en framing in dit 
onderzoek maakt het mogelijk om tot een meer omvattende verklaring van 
effecten van media op de beleidsagenda te komen. Het maakt inzichtelijk 
welke kenmerken van mediaberichtgeving en de beleidsagenda bepalend zijn 
en op wat voor manier er wederzijdse uitwisseling bestaat. Hoewel het be-
leidsdomein van immigratie en integratie een waarschijnlijke casus vormde 
voor media-effecten op beleid, blijkt deze invloed relatief beperkt. 
Ook social media spelen geen autonome rol spelen in agendavormings-
processen. Social media zenden geen andere boodschap dan traditionele 
media waar het gaat om kwantiteit van aandacht of specifieke frames. Echter, 
social media leveren wel een belangrijke bijdrage aan agendavorming van de 
beleidsagenda via een indirecte route van traditionele media. Social media 
zijn zeer geschikte kanalen voor de verspreiding van framingmiddelen en 
nieuwe vormen van mobilisatie. Hiermee kunnen ze bepaalde kwesties of 
frames onder de aandacht van traditionele media brengen. Als frames niet 
door gezaghebbende actoren naar voren worden gebracht die de media als 
bron kunnen noemen, vormt de ‘voxpop’ van social media soms alsnog een 
legitimatie voor traditionele media om erover te berichten.
Het beperkte effect is ook deels het resultaat van de focus op responsiviteit 
als daadwerkelijke veranderingen op de beleidsagenda, bijvoorbeeld in pri-
oritering van kwesties of verandering van issue frames. Wanneer hier geen 
verandering in plaatsvindt, betekent dit niet vanzelfsprekend dat media geen 
effect hebben. . Responsiviteit kan ook een attitude of handelingspraktijk 
zijn die uiteindelijk niet leidt tot beleidsconsequenties. Responsiviteit kan 
tot uitdrukking komen in de vorm van media-reflexiviteit als gevolg van 
mediatisering van beleidsprocessen. Hierbij zijn beleidsprocessen doordron-
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gen geraakt van medialogica en wordt in besluitvorming geanticipeerd op 
mogelijke media-aandacht. De beleidsagenda reageert in dat geval niet als 
gevolg van, maar parallel aan of zelfs voorafgaand aan mediaberichtgeving. 
Dit noopt tot uitbreiding van de agendavormingstheorie met inzichten vanuit 
de mediatiseringsliteratuur.
De gepercipieerde representativiteit van publieke opinie een belangrijk 
onderliggend mechanisme is dat de responsiviteit van de beleidsagenda 
naar mediaberichtgeving stuurt. Wanneer aangenomen wordt dat media in 
belangrijke mate representatief zijn voor publieke opinie, is een effect van 
media op de beleidsagenda waarschijnlijker. Wanneer gedacht wordt dat 
mediaberichtgeving slechts een extreme opinie vertegenwoordigt en de ‘stille 
meerderheid’ negeert, of dat mediaberichtgeving snel over zal waaien, is een 
effect op de beleidsagenda minder waarschijnlijk. Waar de politieke agenda 
reageert op de media vanuit strategische overwegingen en de gedachte dat 
media de publieke opinie zal beïnvloeden, is dat bij de beleidsagenda anders. 
De beleidsagenda reageert als gedacht wordt dat mediaberichtgeving sterk 
beïnvloed is door publieke opinie.
Dit onderliggend mechanisme van agendavorming van de beleidsagenda 
stuurt agendavormingsprocessen richting de mainstream. Dit tempert ver-
wachtingen voor social media als publieke sfeer van alternatieve geluiden in 
het debat. Omdat zij georganiseerd zijn op basis van kleinere gemeenschap-
pen van mensen met gedeelde interesses of opinies worden zij gemakkelijker 
genegeerd. Hoewel er online vruchtbare discussie plaats kan vinden waarin 
nieuwe kwesties en frames naar vormen worden gebracht, blijft de uitwisse-
ling met de beleidsagenda beperkt.
Bredere relevantie
De bevindingen van dit onderzoek dragen bij aan theorie over de invloed van 
media op de beleidsagenda. Daarnaast dragen de resultaten van dit onder-
zoek bij aan theorie over de framing van immigratie- en integratiekwesties 
in media en beleid. De agendavormingsdynamieken die beschreven worden 
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in dit onderzoek zijn te generaliseren naar vergelijkbare beleidsdomeinen 
binnen vergelijkbare politieke en media-contexten. Hierbij valt te denken aan 
milieubeleid of openbare orde en veiligheidsbeleid die ook gekenmerkt kun-
nen worden als weerbarstige beleidscontroverses. 
De conclusies hebben ook maatschappelijke relevantie. Ten eerste voor 
burgers en maatschappelijke organisaties. De bevindingen van deze studie 
geven inzicht in hoe traditionele en social media kunnen helpen om invloed 
op de beleidsagenda uit te oefenen. Juist in tijden van afbrokkeling van andere 
democratische kanalen - af te lezen aan een afname in partijlidmaatschap, ver-
kiezingsopkomst en deelname in maatschappelijk middenveld - is het belang-
rijk dat er andere kanalen bestaan die democratische legitimiteit bewaken. 
Ook voor beleidsmakers zijn deze conclusies relevant om responsiviteit naar 
media te bewaren zonder zich teveel te laten leiden door de waan van de dag.
De huidige context van de ‘vluchtelingencrisis’ maakt de bevindingen op-
nieuw relevant. Ook nu worden we geconfronteerd met een diversiteit aan 
aandacht en frames in mediaberichtgeving over gerelateerde kwesties en ver-
andering van beleid. Ook de media zelf zijn vaak onderwerp van discussie en 
worden vaak bekritiseerd van overrepresentatie van sommige onderwerpen 
en frames. Ongeacht of dit terecht of onterecht is, laat mijn onderzoek zien dat 
ook deze beschuldiging een belangrijk framingmiddel is om het eigen frame 
onder de aandacht van de media te brengen.
Op basis van mijn eerdere onderzoek weten we dat berichten rond immi-
gratie en integratie in Europa via social media potentiële migranten buiten 
Europa kunnen bereiken. Deze informatie wegen zij mee in hun migratiebe-
slissingen. Wanneer immigratie- en integratiekwesties in Europa aandacht 
krijgen in de media, kan dat niet alleen gevolgen hebben voor het beleid, maar 
ook voor de kwestie die daarin centraal staat: immigratie.
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